- TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. / TCL Industries Holdings Co., Ltd. v. University Of Rochester (Intellectual Ventures I, LLC)Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01245 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 12 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not show compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv factors”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. In evaluating the Fintiv factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review,” recognizing that “there is some overlap among these factors” and that “[s]ome facts may be relevant to more than one factor.” Id.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review (also “IPR”) unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Thus, although Petitioner contends that Njølstad implements a dynamically changeable frequency for each domain wherein a local “rate requirement can dynamically be configured” such that “the locally generated clock rate is just high enough to perform the actual processing task” at that rate (Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1009 § IV.D)), such teaching merely supports Petitioner’s contention that the frequency is dynamically changeable at the local level (id.). However, as Patent Owner points out, such showing is not a compelling disclosure of the frequency generation being independent of the frequencies of the other domains, as required by the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp. 28–34. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not presented compelling merits that Njølstad teaches “the frequency being dynamically changeable independently of the frequencies of the clock signals generated for others of the plurality of domains” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 25
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached
“However, Patent Owner argues that Iyer published after the invention to the ’443 patent was actually reduced to practice. Prelim. Resp. 27–28. In particular, Patent Owner provides evidentiary testimonies of Dr. Kaeli (Ex. 2001) and Mr. Albonesi (Ex. 2003) to support its contends the ’443 patent incorporates by reference a paper authored by the inventors and published in February 2002 (Ex. 2005), which demonstrates conception by providing a full written description of the claimed invention. Prelim. Resp. 6–16. According to Patent Owner, a simulation described in the paper embodied the invention in a tangible form, wherein the simulation described in the paper showed that the invention worked for its intended purpose. Id. at 16–19 (citing Exs. 2001, 2003, 2005). Similarly, Patent Owner contends that the application from which Soerensen issued was filed on August 29, 2002, which is after the invention date of the ’443 patent. Prelim. Resp. 35. According to Patent Owner, while Soerensen claims priority to the Soerensen Provisional Application (Ex. 1022), the passages from Soerensen relied on in the Petition are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the Soerensen Provisional Application because the subject matter was not disclosed in the manner provided by 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. We recognize potential merits to Patent Owner’s position. That is, we do not find compelling Petitioner’s contention that the challenged claims would have been obvious Iyer or Soerensen.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,089,443 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Digital Doors, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 12, 2024 · IPR2023-00970 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1, 5, 25, 26, 30, and 50 because the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial and the Petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of Fintiv factors 1–5. As discussed above, factors 1 and 3 are neutral, factors 2 and 5 weigh in favor of discretionary denial of institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against discretionary denial. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence of record on factors 1–5 favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“§ 42.4(a) (2023). Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review (also “IPR”) unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“provided compelling evidence to support its contention that Bossemeyer, alone or in combination with Merenda, teaches “permitting full or partial reconstruction of said data with corresponding extracted data and remainder data after accessing said respective extract stores” recited in claims 1 and 29.5 5 In view of this determination, we do not need to address Patent Owner’s additional argument that Bossemeyer is not analogous art to the ’482 patent. Prelim. Resp. 16–24. Similarly, we do not need to address Patent Owner’s additional argument that a person of ordinary skill would not have found it obvious to combine Merenda with Bossemeyer. Prelim. Resp. 50–61.” slip op. at 31
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,552,482 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Digital Doors, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00972 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 31, 36, and 41, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the merits were not compelling.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of Fintiv factors 1–5. As discussed above, factors 1 and 3 are neutral, factors 2 and 5 weigh in favor of discretionary denial of institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against discretionary denial. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence of record on factors 1–5 favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Accordingly, following CommScope, where, as here, our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors favors denial of institution. we address the merits of the Petition to determine whether the merits are compelling.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Resp. 34–35. We agree with Patent Owner that Merenda’s “parsing” does not disclose extracting, i.e., filtering or separating, security sensitive information from source data to obtain extracted data. Id. at 42. Instead, Merenda discloses storing data entered in empty fields pre-designated as “private” separately from data entered in fields pre-designated “public.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 23, 24, 26, 31, Figs. 1–3. No extracting takes place because the customer has already separated the private data from the public data in filling out the web form and entering data in separate fields that were previously designated either private or public. See Easttom Decl. ¶¶ 43–49 (discussing Merenda). We agree with Dr. Easttom’s analogy to an airport security process: Merenda works a bit like standard versus pre-check security at the airport. Before the security lines form, the official is trained to recognize that boarding passes with the green “pre-check” icon may enter the pre-check security line, and that those with boarding passes missing that icon should go to the regular security line. This step is analogous to what Merenda describes as its “parsed” step, meaning parsing in advance what kinds of information/boarding passes will qualify for different treatment. As people (like individual items of information) arrive, depending on what’s on their boarding pass, they go directly to either the pre-check security line (like the private data set) or the standard security line (like the public data set). Id. ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Petitioner presents no compelling argument that Merenda’s disclosure of storing data entered in fields pre-designated as “private” separately from data entered in fields pre-designated “public” discloses or suggests the extracting step.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of data storage systems and data security as of November 13, 2000.” Pet. 6 (citing Zadok Decl. ¶¶ 114, 115). Petitioner adds that “[l]ess professional experience can be substituted by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner chooses not to state a position on this issue. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the art before us.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1006 ¶ 23 (emphasis added). It does not appear that Petitioner is relying on Merenda’s “sophisticated” notion of data parsing to teach or suggest the extracting limitation. See Pet. 31 (quoting from Merenda paragraph 23, describing only “simplistic” parsing). In any event, we agree with Patent Owner that “[t]his more sophisticated version of ‘parsing’ doesn’t remove anything, it combines data fields.” Prelim. Resp. 34; Easttom Decl. ¶ 55. Merenda’s “simplistic” version of parsing fares no better. Prelim. Resp. 34–35. We agree with Patent Owner that Merenda’s “parsing” does not disclose extracting, i.e., filtering or separating, security sensitive information from source data to obtain extracted data. Id. at 42. Instead, Merenda discloses storing data entered in empty fields pre-designated as “private” separately from data entered in fields pre-designated “public.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 23, 24, 26, 31, Figs. 1–3. No extracting takes place because the customer has already separated the private data from the public data in filling out the web form and entering data in separate fields that were previously designated either private or public. See Easttom Decl. ¶¶ 43–49 (discussing Merenda). We agree with Dr. Easttom’s analogy to an airport security process: Merenda works a bit like standard versus pre-check security at the airport. Before the security lines form, the official is trained to recognize that boarding passes with the green “pre-check” icon may enter the pre-check security line, and that those with boarding passes missing that icon should go to the regular security line. This step is analogous to what Merenda describes as its “parsed” step, meaning parsing in advance what kinds of information/boarding passes will qualify for different treatment. As people (like individual items of information) arrive, depending on what’s on their boarding pass, they go directly to either the pre-check security line (like the private data set) or the standard security line (like the public data set).” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,958,268 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Digitaldoors, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00967 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claim 81 because the Fintiv factors favored denial and the Petition did not present compelling evidence of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of Fintiv factors 1–5. As discussed above, factors 1 and 3 are neutral, factors 2 and 5 weigh in favor of discretionary denial of institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against discretionary denial. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence of record on factors 1–5 favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“compelling-merits question requires a higher standard of proof, ‘highly likely to prevail,’ than the statutory standard for institution, ‘reasonably likely to prevail.’” Prelim. Resp. 48. Patent Owner asserts that the Petition is deficient because Bossemeyer is not analogous art to the ’825 patent. Id. at 2, 16–23. Patent Owner contends also that Bossemeyer and Glick fail to teach the claimed “extracted data” and “reconstruction” claim elements discussed infra. Id. at 2, 23–41. Finally, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner fails to provide sufficient motivation to combine Bossemeyer and Glick. Id. at 42–47. slip op. at 19
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther
“repeatedly refers to Bossemeyer’s “partitioned” database server and attempts to equate “partitioning” with “extraction.” See, e.g., Pet. 35 (“Specifically, in Bossemeyer, user data is partitioned, e.g., extracted, into limited access information and/or proprietary information, and public information.”) (color highlighting omitted). We do not find this argument compelling. We agree with Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Easttom, who testifies, “a partitioned memory does not imply or suggest extraction.” Easttom Decl. ¶ 29. As Dr. Easttom explains, a partitioned memory “merely refers to memory with different areas reserved for different types of information.” Id.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction We apply the claim construction standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). construction (Pet. 11) and Patent Owner’s choice not to state its position on claim construction. We determine we need not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,313,825 - NXP USA, Inc. v. Impinj, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2022-00005 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Rehearing
The Board denied NXP’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of PGR institution on claims 1–20 based on its holistic Fintiv analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Huawei Device Co., Ltd., v. Optis Cellular Tech., LLC, IPR2018-00816, Paper 19, 3 (PTAB Jan. 8, 2019) (precedential) (citations omitted). Further, “[a]bsent a showing of ‘good cause’ . . . , new evidence will not be admitted” in connection with a request for rehearing. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 90 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (citing Huawei Device Co., IPR2018-00816, Paper 19 at 4). Thus, a request for rehearing is not generally an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“with the Request. “Ideally, a party seeking to admit new evidence with a rehearing request would request a conference call with the Board prior to filing such a request so that it could argue ‘good cause’ exists for admitting the new evidence. Alternatively, a party may argue ‘good cause’ exists in the rehearing request itself.” Huawei Device Co., IPR2018-00816, Paper 19 at 4; see also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide at 90 (quoting the same). Petitioner did not request a conference call prior to filing the Request to argue that good cause exists and does not present arguments in the Request regarding good cause. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing that good cause exists to justify consideration of those exhibits to evaluate whether we erred by overlooking or misapprehending anything in the Decision. B. We Did Not Misapprehend the Significance of the Facts Pertaining to” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“argument, we stated that, “[b]ecause the currently scheduled trial in the parallel proceeding is scheduled to begin over two months before our deadline to reach a final decision, this factor weighs somewhat in favor of discretionary denial.” Dec. 9. After discussing all of the Fintiv factors and after “consider[ing] ‘a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review,’” we exercised discretion to deny institution of a post-grant review. Id. at 12–13 (quoting Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6).” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,929,734 - NXP USA, Inc. v. Impinj, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 21, 2022 · IPR2021-01556 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial collectively outweighed those against it.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“strong evidence to the contrary.” Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15, 13 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”). “If the court’s trial date is earlier than the projected statutory deadline, the Board generally has weighed this fact in favor of exercising authority to deny institution.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. Because the currently scheduled trial in the parallel proceeding is scheduled to begin two months before our deadline to reach a final decision, this factor weighs somewhat in favor of discretionary denial. See Fintiv II, Paper 15 at 13.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,776,198 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Monarch Networking Solutions LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 31, 2021 · IPR2020-01678 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR for claims 1–10 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favored denial because the district court trial was near and the litigation was substantially advanced.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Section 314(a) states that [t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. Under § 314(a), we have discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140. We consider several factors when determining whether to deny institution under § 314(a) based on a parallel district court proceeding, specifically 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“The current trial date in the District Court Litigation is June 7, 2021, which is approximately ten months before the projected statutory deadline for a final written decision in this case. Reply 2; Sur-reply 3; Ex. 2012, 1. Although there is some uncertainty regarding the trial date in the District Court Litigation, it does not outweigh the substantial gap between the trial date and the final written decision deadline.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,451,844 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00527 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing requests and left in place its § 314(a) denial of institution in both proceedings based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“Petitioner has not shown that this change in circumstance warrants modifying (1) the determination that Fintiv factor 4 weighs in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution or (2) the determination, after weighing all factors and taking a holistic view of the relevant circumstances, to exercise discretion to deny institution. Several of the claims challenged in each Petition are still at issue in the parallel proceeding, and the combinations of references asserted by Petitioner in the district court largely overlap with the combinations of references asserted in the Petitions. Petitioner has not identified any differences among the claims that have been dropped and the claims that remain as a reason to modify our Decision. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 13 (“if a petition involves the same prior art challenges but challenges claims in addition to those that are challenged in the district court, it may still be inefficient to proceed because the district court may resolve validity of enough overlapping claims to resolve key issues in the petition”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,633,187 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00526 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing requests, leaving institution denied in both proceedings based on its Fintiv analysis of the parallel litigation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“noted that, “[e]ven if Petitioner’s contentions are true, Petitioner has not shown these contentions will avoid adjudication of Intel’s invalidity defenses” in the related Western District of Texas litigation. Dec. Inst. 13. In light of the record at the time, we found that Petitioner’s arguments in connection with Fintiv factor 6 did not weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution. Id. at 13–15. Accordingly, we maintain our finding that Petitioner’s argument does not weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,633,187 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 11, 2021 · IPR2020-00582 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing request and maintained its discretionary denial of institution under Fintiv, despite weighing Factor 6 neutrally.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“The change in circumstances regarding the trial date does not persuade us to change our decision to exercise our discretion to deny institution. Even if we were to institute an inter partes review proceeding, the deadline for issuing a final written decision could be no earlier than February 2022. Thus, at this time, it appears likely that trial will occur many months before any final written decision would likely issue in this proceeding. Therefore, we maintain our finding that Fintiv Factor 2” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,292,485
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.