- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Truesight Communications LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01477 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–14 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the stipulation against denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Statutory Deadline We weigh this factor as favoring the exercise of discretionary denial. The parties agree that the projected statutory deadline for issuing our Final Written Decision (April 23, 2026) is a little more than six months after trial is currently scheduled in the District Court litigation (October 6, 2025). Supp. Br. 4; Prelim. Resp. 19–20. Because the currently scheduled District Court trial is set to begin six months before our deadline to reach a final decision, this factor favors discretionary denial in this case. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. C. Factor 3 – Investment in the Parallel Proceeding We weigh this factor as favoring the exercise of discretionary denial. Showing substantial investment in the District Court litigation, document production is substantially complete and fact discovery will be completed within two weeks of this Decision on Institution. Ex. 2001, 4–5 (Second Amended Docket Control Order). Further, a hearing on claim construction and associated briefing is complete. Id. And, the deadline to serve Institution. Id. at 4. These actions show that there has been notable investment by the parties in the District Court litigation. Furthermore, we must consider this parallel work in relation to the October 6, 2025 District Court litigation trial date, which is six months before the projected statutory deadline of our Final Written Decision. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 10. As work in the District Court litigation has moved beyond preliminary stages into more advanced stages, instituting at this time implicates at least some duplicative costs. See id. On the matter of petition timing, it is often reasonable for a petitioner to wait to file its petition until it learns which claims are being asserted against it in the parallel proceeding. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 11. Here, Petitioner filed its petition on September 27, 2024, which is four months after receiving Patent Owner’s May 29, 2024 disclosure of asserted claims and infringement contentions and nine months after it was served Patent Owner’s December 29, 2023 infringement complaint. Ex. 1017; Ex. 1018, 1. Further, Petitioner served its amended invalidity contentions in the District Court litigation on December 17, 2024, i.e., after it filed its Petition.5 We do not find the timing of the Petition in this case to outweigh the significant investment in the District Court litigation. Considering the substantial investment in the District Court litigation and the rapidly advancing District Court litigation trial date balanced against the timing of the Petition, we determine this factor weighs in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,898,803 - PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01142 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, and 18 under § 314(a), concluding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“denial because district court is very likely to address patentability issues at trial before we would issue a final written decision. Factors 3 and 4 weigh marginally against discretionary denial. Factor 5 either weighs in favor of discretionary denial or is neutral, but even if it were neutral, factor 2 alone outweighs the marginal weight of factors 3 and 4. Based on our assessment, we determine that Fintiv Factors 1–5 favor exercising discretion to deny institution. With that determination in mind, we proceed to evaluate Fintiv Factor 6. G. Fintiv Factor 6: Other Circumstances that Impact the Board’s Exercise” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot reached
“We further note that Petitioner’s general view that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jung to arrive at the pertinent limitation is not well supported and somewhat circular. See Pet. 42–43. It is inadequately explained why a skilled artisan would have reasonably sought to modify Jung so that it then “expressly teaches” what is required by the claims, as is advanced by Petitioner. See id. at 42. It is a dubious proposition that simply seeking to account for the requirements of the challenged claims serves as suitable reasoning that would have prompted modification of the “express[] teach[ings]” of a reference.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’868 patent (“POSITA”) would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems. Ex-1003, ¶ 48. A POSITA would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks. Id. More education may supplement practical experience or vice versa. Id. Pet. 20–21. Patent Owner does not offer an assessment of its own, or dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“proceeding. See Pet. 12. Patent Owner provides a construction of the phrase “to derive, based on a beam reference signal of the network beam, a UE beam,” which Patent Owner contends is not necessary to substantiate its arguments, but is offered to “elucidate[] the distinction between the ’868 Patent and the alleged prior art from the reasons” offered by Patent Owner in its Preliminary Response. PO Resp. 8. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the above-noted phrase means “selecting a UE beam from a plurality of candidate UE beams based on a beam reference signal of the network beam.” Id. Patent Owner explains the basis for its proposed construction of the relevant phrase through citation to content of the ’868 patent including Figures 21 and 22 of the patent along with description of those Figures. See Prelim. Resp. 8–10. In reviewing the basis for Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction, we conclude that the construction has ample and adequate support in the record before us. We determine that no other claim term need be addressed expressly See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,887,868 - PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01121 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under Fintiv, finding that the parallel district court proceedings would likely address patentability before a final written decision and the merits were not compelling.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“In Fintiv, the Board explained that “cases addressing earlier trial dates as a basis for denial under NHK Spring have sought to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. Fintiv sets forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. These factors consider the following: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, “the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“2. Claim Construction In interpreting the claims of the ’402 patent, we “us[e] the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). The claim construction standard includes construing claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The parties each contend that resolution of this proceeding does not require that the meaning of any claim term be made explicit. See Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 8. We agree. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“1. Level of Ordinary Skill As part of our compelling-merits analysis, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312– 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (the level of ordinary skill is pertinent to claim construction); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (the level of ordinary skill is one of the factors to consider when determining obviousness). Petitioner proposes the following: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’402 patent (“POSITA”) would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems. Ex-1003, ¶ 73. A POSITA would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks. Id. More education may supplement practical experience or vice versa. Id. Pet. 21–22. Patent Owner does not offer an assessment of its own, or dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 17
- BurdenNot reached
“outset, we note that the language of claims 1 and 12 is clear in reciting the presence of two distinct signals, i.e., a control signal and a reference signal, and that it is the control signal that “triggers” transmission of the reference signal. See Ex. 1001, 14:5–6, 60–62. Patent Owner credibly argues that the “two-step embodiment” of Figure 10 of the ’402 patent, and in particular steps 1005 and 1010, describe the control and reference signal transmissions that are encompassed by claims 1 and 12. See Prelim. Resp 8–10. Patent Owner also credibly argues that the Figure 10 embodiment is distinct from other disclosed embodiments, including the “single-step embodiment” of Figure 8. See id. at 10–11. Patent Owner further explains reasonably that the content of column 6 of the ’402 patent on which Petitioner relies has a more “natural reading” in distinguishing between separate transmission of a “control signal” that “triggers” separate transmission of a “reference signal” as described in connection with Figure 10 as juxtaposed with transmission of a “control channel,” which is distinct from a control signal, and a “reference signal” that may constitute a single transmission, as is described in conjunction with Figure 8. See id. at 16–17. It logically follows that if, as Patent Owner credibly argues, the claims of the ’402 patent do encompass the latter transmission scheme, rather than the former, then Petitioner’s reliance on Moon, as presented in its Petition, is insufficient to account for those claims. On this record, we need not decide whether Petitioner would likely prevail on the above-noted issues as Patent Owner raises sufficiently substantial arguments that the preliminary evidence, if unrebutted in trial, does not plainly lead to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. Because, as noted above, Patent Owner has identified potentially dispositive gaps or flaws in Petitioner’s apprehension as to what is adequate in Moon’s disclosure to account for the claims of the ’402 patent, Petitioner’s proposed grounds cannot be said to rise to the level of a “compelling” meritorious challenge.” slip op. at 22
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,148,402 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00997 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–10, exercising its discretion under § 314(a) because the Fintiv factors favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Based on the preliminary record, we can reasonably expect trial in the parallel district court proceedings to begin four to five months prior to the deadline for our final written decision, based on the scheduled trial date and the median time-to-trial statistics. See Fintiv Memo 8–9 & n.12 (approving the use of median time-to-trial statistics). Even if the proceedings are staggered, at least one of the proceedings would likely begin and conclude well before our decision, making it highly likely that there will be duplicate efforts in evaluating the challenged claims based on the prior art. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the second factor weighs substantially in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“and Trademark Office under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“ordinary skill in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312– 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (the level of ordinary skill is pertinent to claim construction); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (the level of ordinary skill is one of the factors to consider when determining obviousness). For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is “the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or Computer Engineering; familiarity with the relevant 3GPP standards as of this time; and at least two years of experience in design, development, and/or testing of cellular networks.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44). Although Patent Owner argues for a higher level of ordinary skill (see Prelim. Resp. 7–8), our determination that the Petition lacks compelling merits would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties argue that we need not address any claim-construction issues for our analysis, and we agree. See Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 25. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,798,754 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00992 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–4, 6–9, 11–14, 16–19, and 21–23 under Fintiv because the parallel trial was likely to precede the final written decision.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Based on the preliminary record, we can reasonably expect trial in the parallel district court proceedings to begin four to five months prior to the deadline for our final written decision, based on the scheduled trial date and the median time-to-trial statistics. See Fintiv Memo 8–9 & n.12 (approving the use of median time-to-trial statistics). Even if the proceedings are staggered, at least one of the proceedings would likely begin and conclude well before our decision, making it highly likely that there will be duplicate efforts in evaluating the challenged claims based on the prior art. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the second factor weighs substantially in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“that “[t]he Board should deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because all six Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial.” Prelim. Resp. 70–71 (citing Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)). For the reasons below, we agree with Patent Owner, and we disagree with Petitioner that the Petition presents a compelling, meritorious challenge.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312– 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (the level of ordinary skill is pertinent to claim construction); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (the level of ordinary skill is one of the factors to consider when determining obviousness). For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is “the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or Computer Engineering; familiarity with the relevant 3GPP standards as of this time; and at least two years of experience in research, design, development, and/or testing of cellular networks.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45). Although Patent Owner argues for a higher level of ordinary skill (see Prelim. Resp. 7–8), our determination that the Petition lacks compelling merits would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 16
- BurdenNot reached
“Although we need not decide which side would likely prevail on these issues, Patent Owner raises sufficiently substantial arguments that the preliminary evidence, if unrebutted in trial, does not plainly lead to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. The ground based on Nogami does not simply rely on Nogami’s plain disclosure, but also relies on expert testimony as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nogami’s disclosure based on the background knowledge in the art. Thus, Petitioner has not, on the preliminary record, presented a compelling meritorious challenge to claim 1 and its related claims.” slip op. at 19
Discretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,951,359 - Zhuhai Cosmx Battery Co., Ltd. v. Ningde Amperex Technology Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 24, 2023 · IPR2023-00585 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–3 and 5–12 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and no compelling unpatentability challenge overcame them.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“When determining whether to exercise discretion to deny institution in view of a parallel proceeding, we consider the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Given the testimony regarding Wang’s use of relatively low- temperature “ultrasound welding” (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 43, 48, 109; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 85– 86 (ultrasonic welding “involves the use of a high frequency of ultrasonic energy to produce oscillating shears to create solid-state bonds between two sheets clamped under pressure at elevated but relatively low temperatures”); Ex. 2005, 3), and in the absence of any articulation of the benefit of heat reduction in Wang’s process, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to combine Deng’s heat-dissipating notch with Wang’s secondary battery in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See also Prelim. Resp. 22 (arguing that the “use of resistance welding in Wang would cause significant damage to Wang’s current collector, rendering Wang’s lithium-ion battery inoperable”), 24–25 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 78). As Patent Owner also points out, Deng’s notch is not located in an electrode tab receiving groove to receive an electrode tab, nor does it mitigate a burr problem (Prelim. Resp. 16, Sur-Reply 5)), which calls into question Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine Deng’s notch with Wang’s electrode tab receiving groove in the manner proposed (Pet. 30 (“In view of Deng’s stated benefits of its electrode notch, such as to reduce the accumulation of heat and the resulting deformation and/or warping of the electrode to which the tab is welded,” one of ordinary skill in the art “would on the current collector where the first (e.g., anode) electrode tab will be welded.” (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 76))), because Deng’s notch lacks the location and function that would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to make the combination. We also consider Patent Owner’s concerns about the suitability of Deng’s availability for combination with Wang sufficiently well-founded, based in part on Patent Owner’s argument and evidence indicating that Deng is directed to a flat metal plate type battery that would use a resistance welding process, instead of a lithium-ion wound battery that would use an ultrasonic welding process. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. Accordingly, we find Petitioner’s rationale for the combination lacking. As discussed above, “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fintiv Memo, 4. While Petitioner’s arguments and evidence provide an explanation for the proposed combination with respect to limitation 1(g), they do not plainly lead to a conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the combination of Wang and Deng to attain limitation 1(g) and, thus, are not sufficiently supported by the record for purposes of an obviousness challenge under this framework. Consequently, Petitioner does not present a compelling, meritorious challenge to claim 1 as obvious over Wang and Deng.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner also argues that Deng is not analogous art. Id. at 23–30 (citing In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed” and “(2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.”)). As to the first prong of the analogous art test, Patent Owner argues that Deng is a flat metal plate type battery, whereas Wang and the ’352 patent are lithium-ion batteries. Id. at 23. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art “would not weld electrode tabs in lithium-ion batteries in such a manner” as the resistance welding used in Deng. Id. at 25. As to the second prong of the analogous art test, Patent Owner argues that Deng is not reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor of the ’352 patent was involved, because “Deng discloses, at best, heat mitigation techniques related to resistance welding,” which “would damage the current collector of a lithium-ion battery,” and “would not have been considered by the inventors when solving the problems of the ’352 Patent.” Id. at 27. As argued by Patent Owner, Deng’s benefit of reducing heat accumulation and warping from resistance welding “is not an issue for the lithium-ion battery of Wang or the ’352 patent,” which one of ordinary skill in the art would understand to benefit from the low operating temperature and good welding performance of ultrasonic welding. Id. at 29–30. Next, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s proposed modification would render Wang’s current collector susceptible to damage and tearing. Id. at 30–32. Finally, Patent Owner argues that even if Wang” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,329,352 - Zhuhai Cosmx Battery Co., Ltd. v. Ningde Amperex Technology LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 22, 2023 · IPR2023-00587 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–17 under § 314(a), finding the parallel litigation favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Concerns about the degree of overlap may be mitigated where a petitioner agrees not to pursue in the parallel proceeding the grounds advanced in the petition. Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 11–12, 12 n.5 (June 16, 2020) (informative). “The PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Fintiv Memo, 7–8 (emphasis added); Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). Here, Petitioner’s stipulation extends to the same grounds raised in the Petition, but does not extend to any ground “that could have been reasonably raised,” pursuant to Sotera. Patent Owner points to the narrowness of the proffered stipulation in the Sur-Reply and asserts this factor “only marginally weighs in favor of institution.” Sur-Reply 3. Because Petitioner’s stipulation obviates some potential for duplication or redundancy with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims (albeit not to the extent a full Sotera-type stipulation would have) and the parallel litigation does not include claims 10–16, we determine that the fourth Fintiv factor weighs against denial of institution.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.” Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, it is not enough to be able to find all of the pieces of the claimed invention somewhere in a prior art reference; rather, those elements must be set out in the prior art reference in the same way they are in the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fintiv Memo 4. While the Petition and Dr. Gido provide an explanation for the full range in which Iwai’s D90 necessarily would be found, the Petition and Dr. Gido identify only a single value for the adhesive porous layer thickness of Iwai’s Example 7 and Comparative Example 2. Pet. 48, 51; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 165, 174. The Petition and Dr. Gido direct us to the average thickness “a” of Iwai’s adhesive porous layer without taking into account Iwai’s disclosure of the ratio of the average thickness layer “a” to the volume average particle diameter “r.” Iwai describes the volume average particle diameter “r” being “projected at a proper height . . . formed on a surface of the adhesive porous layer.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 43. Thus, the evidence of record purportedly mapping claim 1’s recited “thickness of the porous layer” to Iwai does not plainly lead to a conclusion that Iwai necessarily discloses to a POSA the claimed “ratio of Dv90 of the inorganic particles to the thickness of the porous layer is in a range from 0.3 to 3.0.” Consequently, Petitioner does not present a compelling, meritorious challenge to claim 1 as anticipated by Iwai.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“In addition to the lack of support in the record for the Petition and Dr. Gido’s assumption that the porous layer thicknesses of Examples 4 and 5 are the same as the porous layer thickness of Example 1 discussed above in connection with the anticipation challenge of claim 1, the cited record does not plainly support Petitioner’s assertion that Nishikawa teaches or suggests claim 10’s recited “uniform coating solution.” The Petition acknowledges that Nishikawa teaches a mixed solvent containing DMAc and TPG to provide a coating slurry. Pet. 31; Ex. 1003 ¶ 64; Ex. 1005, 22:26–33 (Example 4), 22:46–51 (Example 5). Nishikawa teaches that the solvent mixture includes a polar solvent (DMAc preferred) and a poor solvent (such as TPG) that “induces a microscopic phase separation structure to facilitate formation of pores upon providing the heat resistant porous layer.” Ex. 1005, 11:1–5. The Petition does not sufficiently explain why such a phase separation structure produced by Nishikawa’s mixed solvent meets claim 10’s recited “uniform coating solution.” Consequently, Petitioner does not present a compelling, meritorious challenge to claim 10 as obvious over Nishikawa’s teachings.” slip op. at 25
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,964,987 - ROKU, Inc. v. Ioengine, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2023 · IPR2022-01554 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 17–21, 25–35, 59–69, 85–89, and 93–99 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and no compelling merits challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“The Fintiv Memo directs that “compelling, meritorious challenges will be allowed to proceed at the PTAB even where district court litigation is proceeding in parallel.” Ex. 2011, 4. The Director defines “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges [as] those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. We consider whether there are compelling merits when, as here, our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors favors denial of institution. See CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (precedential). For the reasons below, we determine that the Petition and the preliminary evidence do not present a compelling, meritorious challenge.7” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“In particular, the preliminary record does not plainly show that Alger or the other references teach or disclose a portable device and a separate terminal with processing capabilities sufficient to facilitate a key exchange between the terminal and the portable device as recited in the claims. See, e.g., Ex. 1301, 32:48–53, 33:26–30.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,972,584 - ROKU, Inc. v. Ioengine, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2023 · IPR2022-01553 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–16, 22–24, 36–53, 58, 70–84, and 90–92, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“A holistic balancing of the Fintiv factors weighs in favor of discretionary denial. As discussed above, only factor 4 weighs against discretionary denial, and factors 2 and 3 weigh heavily in favor. Moreover, Roku has not submitted a Sotera-type stipulation that would make discretionary denial inappropriate under the Fintiv Memo, and likewise, the Petition does not show compelling evidence of unpatentability under factor 6. Given the late stage of the parallel district court proceeding, the substantial investment by the parties in that proceeding, and the lack of strong countervailing considerations, the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of an inter partes review challenging claims 1– 16, 22–24, 36–53, 58, 70–84, and 90–92 of the ’584 patent. V. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“In particular, the preliminary record does not plainly show that Alger or the other references teach or disclose a portable device and a separate terminal with processing capabilities sufficient to facilitate a key exchange between the terminal and the portable device as recited in the claims. See, e.g., Ex. 1201, 32:48–53, 33:26–30. In the Petition, Roku contends that “Alger’s PDA 120 is a ‘portable device,’” and that “Alger’s ‘monitor 147,’ which includes a screen/display, . . . , is the ‘terminal comprising . . . an output component’ in Claim 1.” Pet. 28–30 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 153–154, 158). Roku relies on Lyle for teaching the use of HDCP, which involves the exchange of a key between a transmitter and a receiver. See Pet. 71–72. In response, IOENGINE argues that “[t]he only alleged ‘terminal’ that [Roku] identifies in either reference is Alger’s monitor 147,” but according to IOENGINE, Alger’s monitor 147 “is merely an ‘output component’ with no processor or memory as required by every Challenged Claim.” Prelim. Resp. 26–27. IOENGINE argues that at the time of Alger’s disclosure, monitors such as monitor 147 did not have general-purpose computing capabilities that could facilitate a key exchange. Id. at 27 (Ex. 2001 ¶ 88).” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,972,584 - ROKU, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2023 · IPR2022-01552 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 17–21, 25–35, 59–69, 85–89, and 93–99 because the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Ex. 2011, 3 (footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential)). Roku’s stipulation, however, falls far short of a Sotera-type stipulation that would bar Roku from pursuing any grounds in the parallel district court proceeding that could have reasonably been raised before the Board. Thus, while Roku’s stipulation would prevent some overlap between this proceeding and the parallel district court proceeding, the scope of the stipulation does not rise to the level contemplated in the Fintiv Memo. Thus, although we find that the fourth Fintiv factor weighs somewhat against discretionary denial of institution, this does not end our analysis because Roku has declined to submit a Sotera-type stipulation.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“§ 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2022). However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“In particular, we find it a close issue whether Ozawa discloses a “portable device” as recited in unchallenged independent claims 1, 39, and 73, which is also part of the challenged dependent claims. In claims 1 and 39, the term “portable device” is introduced in the preamble and appears throughout the claims. See Ex. 1101, 32:46–33:30, 36:32–37:11. In claim 73, a “portable device” is recited as an element of the claimed system. See id. at 39:44–40:20. In its Petition, Roku assumes, for its arguments, that the claim preambles, including the term “portable,” are limiting. See Pet. 24, 27–28. In its Preliminary Response, IOENGINE argues that “[t]he term ‘portable device’ is limiting because it provides antecedent basis for 11 instances in the body of claim 1,” and because the specification specifically focused on portability as an important feature of the invention. Prelim. Resp. 11–13. We agree with IOENGINE that the claim preambles are limiting at least to the extent that “portable” is a necessary feature of the portable device recited in the claims. We also point out that in the parallel district court litigation, the court specifically held that the preambles of claims 1, 39, and 73 are limiting. See Ex. 2008, 29–31. We agree with the district court’s analysis.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“In light of IOENGINE’s preliminary arguments, we find the issue of whether Ozawa discloses a “portable device” to be a close issue. The 9 IOENGINE erroneously identifies the Preliminary Infringement Contentions as Exhibit 1116 rather than Exhibit 1118. evidence does not plainly support Roku’s position at this stage, and the question would need to be further developed at trial. Because the “portable device” limitation is part of all challenged claims, Roku would need to prevail on this issue to prevail on any claim at trial. Thus, we determine that Roku has not, at this stage, presented a “compelling, meritorious challenge[]” to any claim of the ’584 patent. Ex. 2011, 4. Accordingly, we find that the sixth Fintiv factor does not weigh against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,972,584
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.