- Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 25, 2023 · IPR2023-00565 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–20 because the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial, and the petition did not present a compelling unpatentability challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“and the district court, we have concerns regarding duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting decisions (including due to Petitioner’s different claim construction positions in the district court and in this IPR, see infra Section II.f). We agree with Patent Owner that a Sotera-type stipulation would have helped ensure that an inter partes review functions as a true alternative to litigation in relation to grounds that could be at issue in an inter partes review. Here, Petitioner could have expressly waived in district court any overlapping patentability or invalidity defenses but chose not to. Given the facts here, this factor weighs in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,076,269 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · PGR2021-00030 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing
Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted, and institution was denied for all challenged claims based on changed circumstances in the parallel district court proceeding under Fintiv.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we agree with Patent Owner that a rehearing of our prior institution decision is appropriate due to the changed circumstances of: (1) the statutory disclaimer of claims 6–8 of the ’039 patent, (2) Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment of related proceeding PGR2021-00042, and (3) the additional investment in the parallel proceeding by the district court and the parties, including the completion of a jury trial that resulted in a jury verdict not finding invalidity of the challenged claims. We further agree with Patent Owner that “[c]ontinuing with this proceeding would result in duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting results between the district court and the Board.” Reh’g Req. 9. It is the combination of these changed circumstances, rather than any one of them individually, that compels the result we reach.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“In considering the parties’ positions and the evidence of record, we note that we have been instructed not to exercise discretion to deny a petition when “the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge.” Guidance Memo 4–5. We previously described “Petitioner’s argument that the claims lack enablement” as presenting “strong merits.” Paper 17, 3. Despite that determination, we believe the record as it stands currently does not “present[] a compelling unpatentability challenge” on the lack-of-enablement issue. Guidance Memo 4–5. The district court already has substantially completed its review of the enablement issue, and a jury has determined that the claims do not lack enablement. Given this new information, we cannot conclude that Petitioner’s enablement case is compelling.” slip op. at 6
- Adverse judgmentOther
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,808,039 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Evolved Wireless LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · IPR2021-00950 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 14–16 and 18–20, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the ITC investigation was advanced and the preliminary merits were a closer call.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“In evaluating whether to do so, we consider the following factors in assessing “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“B. Analysis Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (stating “[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”) (emphasis added); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). The advanced state of either a parallel district court action or a parallel ITC investigation may warrant exercising discretion on behalf of the Director to deny a petition for inter partes review. See NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“NHK”); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6, 8 (PTAB March 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 58 & n.2, available at” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner contends that Nokia discloses, “in the context of the disclosed handover operations, performing a contention free . . . RACH procedure (step 5 [of Nokia’s Figure 1]), wherein the identifier information necessary for the UE to communicate with the target base station during the RACH procedure was previously transmitted in a message from the source base station to the UE (e.g., Handover Command, Step 4).” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1037 ¶ 92). Petitioner motivates its reasoning for effecting a combination of Nokia with Hu by contending that a person of skill in the art “would recognize that the specific implementation of such a conventional, contention free RACH procedure as referenced in Nokia could be implemented using” a variety of known methods. Id. at 33. Such a person “would also have recognized,” Petitioner further contends, “that using conventional RACH procedures wherein each UE is assigned and uses its own different preamble would make the handover process quicker and more efficient by reducing contention between the mobile station and the other mobile stations on the RACH.” Id. Petitioner relies on such features to argue that “Hu discloses the full implementation level details of how such a conventional, contention free RACH procedure using allocated resources in the form of a dedicated code resource (i.e., a dedicated preamble) is performed.” Id. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s reading of Nokia, particularly that it discloses a contention-free RACH procedure. See Prelim. Resp. 36–43. Patent Owner correctly observes that the timing alignment in step 5 of Nokia’s Figure 1 “involves one of two different procedures: a ‘one or two step RACH procedure’ OR a ‘Non contention based access burst.’” Id. at 37. Patent Owner elaborates that, although Nokia teaches that the “UE receives allocation(s)” that can be used in an access burst in the second of these procedures, Nokia “does not even teach what an ‘access burst’ is or how it would be used in a non-contention-based manner—and certainly does not teach or suggest that the non-contention-based manner would involve a RACH procedure.” Id. at 38. Patent Owner further supports its position with “[o]ther contemporaneous submissions by Nokia [that] confirm this and explain what Nokia meant by a contention-free access burst procedure,” as well as LTE standards documents. Id. at 38–43 (citing Ex. 2009, 1–2; Ex. 2010 § 10.1; Ex. 2011 § 10.1.2.1; Ex. 2012 § 10.1.2.1). We have reviewed this evidence, and find on this record that it provides some support for Patent Owner’s position. The merits of this case thus present the “closer call” that favors exercising discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review under Fintiv.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Evolved Wireless LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · IPR2021-00949 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1–3 and 6–8, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because most factors favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“The merits of this case thus present the “closer call” that favors exercising discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review under Fintiv. 7. Conclusion As noted in Fintiv, we consider the above factors as part of “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv at 6. In this instance, most of the factors we consider weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review, with Fintiv factor 4 weighing only somewhat against. We accordingly exercise that discretion and deny the Petition.” slip op. at 20
Discretionary denial - Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. / Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP v. Seagen Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2021 · PGR2021-00042 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 6–8 under § 324(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial despite potential merit in the enablement challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied
“parties. We recognize that many legitimate reasons may lead a party not to file a motion to stay a parallel proceeding prior to the Board’s institution decision, including because such a motion may be viewed as premature. Be that as it may, our precedential guidance instructs us to consider whether the court has granted a stay of the parallel proceeding, or whether evidence exists that a stay may be granted upon institution. Fintiv Order at 5–6. As it stands, the record lacks sufficient evidence to suggest that a stay has been granted, or may be granted in the future. It is a judge who determines whether to grant a stay based on the facts of each specific case as presented in the briefs by the parties. We decline to infer, based on actions taken in different cases with different facts, how the district court judge would rule should a stay be requested in the Texas Litigation. For these reasons, we determine that the facts underlying this factor are neutral.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“35 U.S.C. § 324(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard is set forth in § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review shall not be instituted unless “the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,808,039 - Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. / Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP v. Seagen Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2021 · PGR2021-00030 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of post-grant review for claims 1–5, 9, and 10 under § 324(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Additionally, the Board’s precedential Fintiv Order identifies several factors to be considered when analyzing issues related to the Director’s discretion to deny institution, with the goal of balancing efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5‒6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“the Fintiv Order”). These factors include: 1) whether a stay exists or is likely to be granted if a” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,808,039 - Edwards Lifesciences Corp. / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Evalve, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 19, 2020 · IPR2019-01546 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 314(a), citing the advanced district court litigation, substantial overlap, and the trial scheduled well before a final Board decision.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“First, trial is set to conclude well before a final decision would be due in this proceeding. Here, the district court has scheduled a five-day jury trial to begin on May 6, 2020. Ex. 3001, November 21, 2019, minute order. The Court’s comments in the docket reflect an intent to preserve this trial date. Id. at docket entry 333 (considering Patent Owner’s motion to amend the complaint to be withdrawn because it would require a substantial of extension of the trial date). Also, it appears from the district court’s docket that extensive pre-trial briefing by the parties, including motions to exclude or strike expert testimony, is well underway. See Ex. 3001, docket entries 352–359. The parties are also seeking partial summary judgment on various issues in view of the upcoming trial. Id. at docket entries 340–351. Accordingly, we expect that the jury trial in the district court proceeding would conclude more than ten months before a final decision would be due. See Prelim. Resp. 9; 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100; NHK, IPR2018-00752, Paper 8, 19–20 (exercising discretion to deny institution where trial was set to occur six months before the Board’s expected final decision). Second, there is substantial overlap between the arguments raised in the district court litigation and those raised in the Petition. Petitioner relies predominantly on the same prior art – Kuehn, Tremulis, Roth, and Skelton – in both proceedings to challenge patentability and articulates substantially the same arguments as to why the combination of the teachings of these references renders obvious claims 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 14, 16, 1720, 22, 33, and 34 of the ’388 patent. Compare Pet. 30–79 (argument with respect to Grounds 1 and 2), with Ex. 2063, 193–238 and Ex. 2013 (redline comparison of arguments from the Petition and arguments in the invalidity contentions filed in the district court litigation). In addition, the claim constructions requested in this proceeding overlap with those addressed in the district court proceeding and would be decided under the same claim construction standard.9 Pet. 22–28; Ex. 2061, 2–3, 11–13; Ex. 2062, 2. Third, both the parties and the district court have already directed substantial time and energy toward resolving the district court litigation. 9 The claim construction standard to be employed in an inter partes review recently changed from broadest reasonable interpretation to “the same claim construction standard used by Article III federal courts . . . which follow According to Patent Owner, as of the filing of its Preliminary Response, the parties had “produced over 2 million pages of documents and . . . taken around 50 depositions.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Similarly, as already discussed, the district court has been asked to decide a motion of a temporary restraining order (Ex. 3001, docket entry 63), a motion for a preliminary injunction (id. at docket entries 164, 165, and 166),10 and claim construction (id. at docket entry 297). The District Court held lengthy hearings regarding the preliminary injunction motion and claim construction that involve many of the issues presented here. Id. at docket entry 122 (minute order giving the parties 3 hours each to present arguments regarding the preliminary injunction motion); id.at docket entry 219 (minute order allocating 3 hours to be split between the parties for a Markman hearing). The district court has also been asked to rule on numerous discovery disputes. Id. at docket entries 26, 66, 74, 75, 184, 265, and 305, and at March 22, 2019 minute order. Given how far advanced the litigation is, the continued indication that trial will proceed as scheduled, and the substantial work involving many of the same issues presented here already accomplished by the district court and the parties, institution of an inter partes review here cannot be considered to be an efficient or effective alternative to the litigation.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,736,388
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.