- Zhuhai Cosmx Battery Co., Ltd. v. Ningde Amperex Technology Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 24, 2023 · IPR2023-00585 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–3 and 5–12 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and no compelling unpatentability challenge overcame them.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“When determining whether to exercise discretion to deny institution in view of a parallel proceeding, we consider the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Given the testimony regarding Wang’s use of relatively low- temperature “ultrasound welding” (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 43, 48, 109; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 85– 86 (ultrasonic welding “involves the use of a high frequency of ultrasonic energy to produce oscillating shears to create solid-state bonds between two sheets clamped under pressure at elevated but relatively low temperatures”); Ex. 2005, 3), and in the absence of any articulation of the benefit of heat reduction in Wang’s process, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to combine Deng’s heat-dissipating notch with Wang’s secondary battery in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See also Prelim. Resp. 22 (arguing that the “use of resistance welding in Wang would cause significant damage to Wang’s current collector, rendering Wang’s lithium-ion battery inoperable”), 24–25 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 78). As Patent Owner also points out, Deng’s notch is not located in an electrode tab receiving groove to receive an electrode tab, nor does it mitigate a burr problem (Prelim. Resp. 16, Sur-Reply 5)), which calls into question Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine Deng’s notch with Wang’s electrode tab receiving groove in the manner proposed (Pet. 30 (“In view of Deng’s stated benefits of its electrode notch, such as to reduce the accumulation of heat and the resulting deformation and/or warping of the electrode to which the tab is welded,” one of ordinary skill in the art “would on the current collector where the first (e.g., anode) electrode tab will be welded.” (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 76))), because Deng’s notch lacks the location and function that would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to make the combination. We also consider Patent Owner’s concerns about the suitability of Deng’s availability for combination with Wang sufficiently well-founded, based in part on Patent Owner’s argument and evidence indicating that Deng is directed to a flat metal plate type battery that would use a resistance welding process, instead of a lithium-ion wound battery that would use an ultrasonic welding process. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. Accordingly, we find Petitioner’s rationale for the combination lacking. As discussed above, “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fintiv Memo, 4. While Petitioner’s arguments and evidence provide an explanation for the proposed combination with respect to limitation 1(g), they do not plainly lead to a conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the combination of Wang and Deng to attain limitation 1(g) and, thus, are not sufficiently supported by the record for purposes of an obviousness challenge under this framework. Consequently, Petitioner does not present a compelling, meritorious challenge to claim 1 as obvious over Wang and Deng.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner also argues that Deng is not analogous art. Id. at 23–30 (citing In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed” and “(2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.”)). As to the first prong of the analogous art test, Patent Owner argues that Deng is a flat metal plate type battery, whereas Wang and the ’352 patent are lithium-ion batteries. Id. at 23. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art “would not weld electrode tabs in lithium-ion batteries in such a manner” as the resistance welding used in Deng. Id. at 25. As to the second prong of the analogous art test, Patent Owner argues that Deng is not reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor of the ’352 patent was involved, because “Deng discloses, at best, heat mitigation techniques related to resistance welding,” which “would damage the current collector of a lithium-ion battery,” and “would not have been considered by the inventors when solving the problems of the ’352 Patent.” Id. at 27. As argued by Patent Owner, Deng’s benefit of reducing heat accumulation and warping from resistance welding “is not an issue for the lithium-ion battery of Wang or the ’352 patent,” which one of ordinary skill in the art would understand to benefit from the low operating temperature and good welding performance of ultrasonic welding. Id. at 29–30. Next, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s proposed modification would render Wang’s current collector susceptible to damage and tearing. Id. at 30–32. Finally, Patent Owner argues that even if Wang” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,329,352 - Zhuhai Cosmx Battery Co., Ltd. v. Ningde Amperex Technology LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 22, 2023 · IPR2023-00587 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–17 under § 314(a), finding the parallel litigation favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Concerns about the degree of overlap may be mitigated where a petitioner agrees not to pursue in the parallel proceeding the grounds advanced in the petition. Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 11–12, 12 n.5 (June 16, 2020) (informative). “The PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Fintiv Memo, 7–8 (emphasis added); Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). Here, Petitioner’s stipulation extends to the same grounds raised in the Petition, but does not extend to any ground “that could have been reasonably raised,” pursuant to Sotera. Patent Owner points to the narrowness of the proffered stipulation in the Sur-Reply and asserts this factor “only marginally weighs in favor of institution.” Sur-Reply 3. Because Petitioner’s stipulation obviates some potential for duplication or redundancy with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims (albeit not to the extent a full Sotera-type stipulation would have) and the parallel litigation does not include claims 10–16, we determine that the fourth Fintiv factor weighs against denial of institution.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.” Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, it is not enough to be able to find all of the pieces of the claimed invention somewhere in a prior art reference; rather, those elements must be set out in the prior art reference in the same way they are in the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fintiv Memo 4. While the Petition and Dr. Gido provide an explanation for the full range in which Iwai’s D90 necessarily would be found, the Petition and Dr. Gido identify only a single value for the adhesive porous layer thickness of Iwai’s Example 7 and Comparative Example 2. Pet. 48, 51; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 165, 174. The Petition and Dr. Gido direct us to the average thickness “a” of Iwai’s adhesive porous layer without taking into account Iwai’s disclosure of the ratio of the average thickness layer “a” to the volume average particle diameter “r.” Iwai describes the volume average particle diameter “r” being “projected at a proper height . . . formed on a surface of the adhesive porous layer.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 43. Thus, the evidence of record purportedly mapping claim 1’s recited “thickness of the porous layer” to Iwai does not plainly lead to a conclusion that Iwai necessarily discloses to a POSA the claimed “ratio of Dv90 of the inorganic particles to the thickness of the porous layer is in a range from 0.3 to 3.0.” Consequently, Petitioner does not present a compelling, meritorious challenge to claim 1 as anticipated by Iwai.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“In addition to the lack of support in the record for the Petition and Dr. Gido’s assumption that the porous layer thicknesses of Examples 4 and 5 are the same as the porous layer thickness of Example 1 discussed above in connection with the anticipation challenge of claim 1, the cited record does not plainly support Petitioner’s assertion that Nishikawa teaches or suggests claim 10’s recited “uniform coating solution.” The Petition acknowledges that Nishikawa teaches a mixed solvent containing DMAc and TPG to provide a coating slurry. Pet. 31; Ex. 1003 ¶ 64; Ex. 1005, 22:26–33 (Example 4), 22:46–51 (Example 5). Nishikawa teaches that the solvent mixture includes a polar solvent (DMAc preferred) and a poor solvent (such as TPG) that “induces a microscopic phase separation structure to facilitate formation of pores upon providing the heat resistant porous layer.” Ex. 1005, 11:1–5. The Petition does not sufficiently explain why such a phase separation structure produced by Nishikawa’s mixed solvent meets claim 10’s recited “uniform coating solution.” Consequently, Petitioner does not present a compelling, meritorious challenge to claim 10 as obvious over Nishikawa’s teachings.” slip op. at 25
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,964,987 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01578 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1–15 based on its holistic Fintiv analysis of the parallel ITC investigation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“requested a stay of the ITC investigation, and we agree with Patent Owner that a stay of the ITC investigation is unlikely given that post-trial briefing is completed. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of not instituting this proceeding.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Section 314(a) does not require the Director to institute an inter partes review. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). Rather, a decision whether to institute is within the Director’s discretion, and that discretion has been delegated to the Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,886,488 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 9, 2021 · IPR2021-00982 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–7 and 10–30, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv based on the parallel ITC investigation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“involving the ’983 patent, Patent Owner correctly notes that Fintiv expressly addresses ITC investigations, and the Board has considered ITC investigations in weighing whether or not to exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 8 (“[E]ven though the Office and the district court would not be bound by the ITC’s decision, an earlier ITC trial date may favor exercising authority to deny institution under NHK if the ITC is going to decide the same or substantially similar issues to those presented in the petition.”); Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips N.V, IPR2020- 00754, Paper 11 (PTAB Oct. 27, 2020); Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc., IPR2020-00800, Paper 10 (PTAB Oct. 22, 2020). In view of this, we consider the facts surrounding the ITC investigation for purposes of analyzing the Fintiv factors in this case. Specifically with regard to Factor 1, there is no evidence here that Petitioner has requested a stay of the ITC investigation, and we agree with Patent Owner that a stay of the ITC investigation is unlikely given the advanced stage of the investigation, including the fact that the hearing in the ITC investigation is scheduled to begin on December 13, 2021. Accordingly, we determine that this factor weighs against instituting this proceeding.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“the Fintiv factors. Because our analysis is fact driven, no single factor is determinative of whether we exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). Further, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Having evaluated all of the factors based on the arguments and evidence of record, in the exercise of the Director’s discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review is not instituted. III. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,612,983 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 14, 2021 · IPR2020-00968 · APJ Wesley B Derrick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request and left in place its discretionary denial of inter partes review based on parallel proceedings under Fintiv.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on a petition, the decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“Additionally, Petitioner disagrees with our assessment that Fintiv’s fourth factor weighs “slightly in favor of institution,” arguing that we “gave insufficient weight to [this] factor, which looks to the overlap between the issues.” Req. 3–4, 11–12; Dec. 13–15. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, we did consider sufficiently all of the evidence regarding whether the ITC proceeding would resolve all or substantially all of the patentability disputes between the parties. Specifically, in our Decision we expressly stated that “[b]ecause the ITC proceeding involves only claims 1, 2, and 5, the ITC proceeding will not directly resolve the dispute concerning the patentability of other claims challenged by Petitioner, claims 3, 4, and 6–14.” Dec. 14. Moreover, consistent with Petitioner’s arguments, we determined “[t]his weighs in favor of institution.” Id. Petitioner would have us end our evaluation of Fintiv’s fourth factor there, but doing so would require that we overlook additional information in the record relevant to the overlap of issues in the ITC and in this proceeding. This additional information includes Patent Owner’s undisputed assertions and evidence demonstrating some overlapping claims, prior art, and invalidity theories in the ITC investigation and the Petition. Dec. 14–15; Prelim. Resp. 10–12; Sur-reply 6 (noting “there is substantial overlap in issues between the Petition and the ITC case when looking at the overlap of claims”). As explained in the Decision, there is no reason to expect that the ITC proceeding would not substantially address the issues for all challenged claims in this proceeding. Dec. 14–15. Therefore, after considering all relevant evidence, we determined that “[o]n balance, based on the fact that the Petition is directed to some [Fintiv’s fourth] factor weighs slightly in favor of institution.” Dec. 15. Our consideration of all relevant facts regarding the the overlap of issues presented to the Board and the ITC undermines Petitioner’s assertion that we erred in the application of Fintiv’s fourth factor. Furthermore, with regard to Petitioner’s argument that we failed to give a single Fintiv factor sufficient weight, we note that our Fintiv analysis is fact driven and no single factor is determinative of whether we exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a).” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Instead of specifically identifying matters the Board purportedly misapprehended, Petitioner uses the Rehearing Request as an opportunity to express its disagreement with our Decision and present new arguments. A request for rehearing, however, is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or for Petitioner to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,423,322 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 14, 2021 · IPR2020-00946 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 314(a) based on the Fintiv analysis of parallel proceedings.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on a petition, the decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“Additionally, Petitioner disagrees with our assessment that Fintiv’s fourth factor weighs “slightly in favor of institution,” arguing that we “gave insufficient weight to [this] factor, which looks to the overlap between the issues.” Req. 3–4, 11–12; Dec. 12–14. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, we did consider sufficiently all of the evidence regarding whether the ITC proceeding would resolve all or substantially all of the patentability disputes between the parties. See Req. 11–12. Specifically, in our Decision we expressly stated that “[b]ecause the ITC proceeding involves only claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’497 patent, whereas Petitioner’s challenges in this proceeding involve claims 1–12, resolution of the ITC proceeding will not directly resolve the parties’ dispute concerning patentability of claims 3, 4, and 6–12 of the ’497 patent.” Dec. 13. Moreover, consistent with Petitioner’s arguments, we determined “[t]his weighs in favor of institution.” Dec. 13.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,131,497 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 14, 2021 · IPR2020-00947 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, leaving in place its denial of IPR because parallel proceedings, including the ITC investigation, supported discretionary denial under Fintiv.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on a petition, the decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDecided for patent owner
“III. DISCUSSION In our Decision, in the exercise of the Director’s discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we declined to institute an inter partes review in view of parallel proceedings, including an ITC proceeding involving the same parties and the ’497 patent. Dec. 5–16. Petitioner contends that we misapplied the factors set forth in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), for determining when discretionary denial of institution is warranted. Req. 1. According to Petitioner, “[t]he Board erred in several ways that collectively amount to a misapprehension of the relevant law and facts leading to an abuse of discretion.” Req. 2–3. We disagree.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,131,497 - Philip Morris Products, S.A. v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 19, 2021 · IPR2020-01097 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 19–21 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors slightly favored denial because the parallel ITC proceeding involved the same parties, claims, and prior art and would conclude …
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“3. Balancing the Fintiv Factors Under Fintiv, we are required to take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. On balance and taking into account the consistent treatment of this petition and the 919 IPR, we determine that the ITC evidentiary hearing occurring simultaneous with the due date of this Decision whether to institute an inter partes review, combined with the ITC’s target date for a final determination occurring four months prior to the projected due date for a final decision, where the ITC investigation involves the same parties, the same challenged claims, and the same asserted prior art, outweighs slightly the factors that favor institution, including Petitioner’s diligence in filing the Petition, the strength of the Petition on the merits, and the relatively moderate investment in the ITC investigation to date.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,839,238 - Ethicon, Inc. v. Board Of Regents, The University Of Texas SystemInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 10, 2020 · IPR2019-00406 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims, exercising § 314(a) discretion because the parallel district court case was advanced, overlapping, and likely to conclude first.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“waive a jury demand, a trial “will happen sooner if it is scheduled as a bench trial than it will as a jury trial.” Id. at 14:20–24. According to the Court, the parties should expect trial to occur within a year. See id. at 17:21–23 (“What I’m telling you is that you will get reached in sooner than a year, in all likelihood.”). Both parties withdrew their request for a jury demand. See Ex. 3006. Were we to institute inter partes review, a final written decision in this proceeding would issue in June 2021—leaving a year before resolution of this proceeding. Given the Western District of Texas’ emphasis that the parallel litigation should proceed as if still set for June 22, 2020, and its expectation of holding a bench trial within a year, this factor weighs strongly in favor of discretionary denial in this case.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,596,296
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.