- PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01280 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial despite declining to deny under § 325(d).
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“Other than initials on a lengthy IDS, nothing in the record indicates that the Examiner substantively considered Takeuchi, Kim, Pienemann, or among over 1,000 other references listed on the IDS, which, as noted in the Director Review Decision, “is over 40 times the size of a typical IDS.” Pet. Remand Br. 5–6; DR Dec. 7 n.3 (citing Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees During Fiscal Year 2025, 89 FR 91898 at 91924 (Nov. 20, 2024)); Ex. 1002, 228–284. Petitioner also shows that the applicant did not respond to the Examiner’s request that the applicant specifically point out “any particular reference or portion of a reference in the [IDS] which the examiner should take [sic] pay particular attention to.” Ex. 1002, 174, 295– 302.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Patent Owner is likely correct that the ITC would not have been inclined to grant a stay if one had been requested at the time the Institution Decision issued. Moreover, the ITC conducted a full evidentiary hearing a month after the Institution Decision issued, and the target date for the ITC’s final determination is several months before the projected statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision. PO Remand Br. 7. Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. See also Klein Tools, Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., IPR2024-01400, Paper 22 at 2 (PTAB June 9, 2025) (Acting Director Stewart determining that Fintiv factor 1 weighs in favor of discretionary denial when the ITC investigation is unlikely to be stayed, the ITC already conducted a full evidentiary hearing, and the ITC final determination is expected to issue six months before the statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision).” slip op. at 19
Discretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,925,202 - PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01406 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution of review of claims 1, 3, 4, 8–13, and 15 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. A stay of litigation pending resolution of an inter partes review allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts, and strongly weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. The Guidance Memo states that “the Board will apply the Fintiv factors when there is a parallel proceedings at the International Trade Commission.” Guidance Memo 2. Patent Owner asserts that a stay of the ITC Investigation had not been requested at the time of the Institution Decision,7 and argues that “the ITC does not stay investigations pending IPR.” PO Supp. Br. 4. Patent Owner also notes that the Institution Decision issued “just days before the ITC evidentiary hearing.” Id. Accordingly, Patent Owner argues that this factor favors denial. Id. Patent Owner is likely correct that the ITC would not have been inclined to grant a stay if one had been requested at the time the Institution Decision issued. Moreover, the ITC conducted a full evidentiary hearing less than three weeks after the Institution Decision issued, and the target date for the ITC’s final determination is four months before the statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision. PO Supp. Br. 5. Accordingly, we” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,925,202 - Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00010 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–14, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the balance of factors favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“2. Factor 2: ITC Final Determination Date Fintiv provides that an ITC trial date that is earlier than the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision may favor discretionary denial if the ITC is going to decide the same or substantially similar issues to those presented in the petition. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 8. The Guidance Memo further provides that “the Board is more likely to deny institution where the ITC’s projected final determination date is earlier than the Board’s deadline to issue a final written decision.” Guidance Memo 2. Here, the ITC has set the target date for its final determination to March 2, 2026. Ex. 2010, 3 (ITC Order Amending the Procedural Schedule). Our final written decision would be due almost three months later, in late May 2026, should we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,070,755 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00011 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–4 and 6–8, exercising § 314(a) discretion because the Fintiv factors favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. at 5–6. We take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Id. at 6.” slip op. at 19
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“For example, citing Fuller’s disclosures of “signals,” Petitioner argues that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that each individual signal necessarily includes an amplitude, and that the M individual signals thus correspond to a plurality of individual amplitude estimates.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 99). Similarly, citing Fuller’s disclosure of “channel estimates,” Petitioner argues that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that the channel estimates include amplitude estimates, and that the estimated individual signals include at least estimated amplitudes.” Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 102). In support of these arguments, however, Petitioner cites Dr. Min’s testimony, which does not cite objective supporting evidence and, thus, warrants limited weight. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 99, 102; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or an equivalent field, and two years of experience with cellular telecommunications, radio-access network architectures and protocols, and signal propagation in wireless networks.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56). Petitioner further proposes that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not take a position on the relevant level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’651 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,920,651 - Duplo U.S.A. Corporation v. Mgi Digital Technology S.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00936 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, and 12 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“G. Balancing the Fintiv Factors A holistic balancing of the Fintiv factors weighs in favor of discretionary denial. As discussed above, only factor 4 weighs somewhat against discretionary denial. The remaining factors either do not support institution (factors 1 and 6) or weigh in favor of denial of institution (factors 2, 3, and 5). Moreover, Petitioner has not submitted a Sotera-type stipulation or shown compelling evidence of unpatentability that would make discretionary denial inappropriate under the Guidance Memo. Given the late stage of the parallel District Court Proceeding, the substantial investment by the parties in that proceeding, and the lack of strong countervailing considerations, the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“As such, even if we were to determine that Petitioner’s Nagashima- based challenges met the lower threshold for instituting an inter partes review (a question we need not reach in our Fintiv analysis), these challenges, if unrebutted in trial, do not plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill is a factor to be considered when determining obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with printer technology. Pet. 5. Petitioner further asserts that more relevant experience may compensate for less formal education and that more relevant formal education may compensate for less practical experience. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Patent Owner does not propose its own definition but does assert that Petitioner has understated the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 9. For the purpose of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition, because Patent Owner presents no countervailing definition and because we find Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art adequate and supported on this record. We also note that our analysis would not change if we were to apply a higher level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Nagashima discloses or suggests the claimed covering ink ordroplets of covering ink and, thus, Petitioner’s Nagashima-based grounds fail to present a compelling, meritorious, challenge. First, we disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that the ’806 patent defines covering ink as synonymous with “viscous product” so that “covering ink” broadly covers any “viscous product” including printing ink. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:21–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 57–61). Rather, the ’806 patent states that “[i]n the present document, the terms of ‘covering ink’, ‘viscous product’ and ‘varnish’ are synonyms.” Ex. 1001, 3:21–22. We understand this sentence to mean that when ’806 patent uses the term “viscous product,” that the term is synonymous with “covering ink” within the ’806 patent, but is not intended to broadly mean that “covering ink” encompasses the entire universe of viscous products. We also determine that there are substantial issues with Petitioner’s argument that Nagashima discloses or suggests using covering ink in its device. Petitioner’s argument that Nagashima does not limit its device to any particular ink and identifies ink having different characteristics, including viscosity, does not plainly lead to a conclusion that Nagashima discloses use of covering ink. See Pet. 8. Nor does Petitioner’s argument that because some inkjet printers have been used to deposit covering ink, and those inkjet printers and Nagashima’s device both involve similar piezo-type ink ejection heads for ejecting different ink types and viscosities, plainly lead to a conclusion that a POSITA would have found it obvious to use Nagashima to apply a covering ink. See Pet. 9–10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–66; see” slip op. at 24
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,783,806 - Duplo U.S.A. Corporation v. Mgi Digital Technology S.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00935 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1, 7, 12, and 18 under § 314(a), weighing the Fintiv factors in favor of discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“G. Balancing the Fintiv Factors A holistic balancing of the Fintiv factors weighs in favor of discretionary denial. As discussed above, only factor 4 weighs somewhat against discretionary denial. The remaining factors either do not support institution (factors 1 and 6) or weigh in favor of denial of institution (factors 2, 3, and 5). Moreover, Petitioner has not submitted a Sotera-type stipulation or shown compelling evidence of unpatentability that would make discretionary denial inappropriate under the Fintiv Memo. Given the late stage of the parallel district court proceeding, the substantial investment by the parties in that proceeding, and the lack of strong countervailing considerations, the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 27
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“§ 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”) After considering the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine it is appropriate to exercise our discretion and decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill is a factor to be considered when determining obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with inkjet and related printer technology. Pet. 4. Petitioner further asserts that more relevant experience may compensate for less formal education and that more relevant formal education may compensate for less practical experience. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–29). Patent Owner does not propose its own definition but does assert that Petitioner has understated the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 9–10. For the purpose of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition. We also note that our analysis would not change if we were to apply a higher level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 17
Discretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,506,031 - PTAB · Jan 19, 2023 · IPR2022-01233 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–10, 13, 14, 16, and 21 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors decisively favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“§ 314(a). See NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 58 & n.2 (Nov. 2019) (“Trial Practice Guide”)8. We consider the following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may institute an inter partes review if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). However, we have discretion to deny a petition even if a petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” threshold standard for instituting trial. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’071 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“We do not agree with Petitioner’s assertion that it presents a “compelling unpatentability challenge.” Pet. 86; Reply 2–5. Weighing the arguments and evidence presently of record, we do not find Petitioner’s evidence sufficient to “plainly” result in a conclusion of unpatentability. Fintiv Memo 5 n.6; Pet. 9–81; Prelim. Resp. 16–43. For example, in the challenge based on Kim, we do not find Petitioner’s evidence regarding claim elements [1.4] and [21.3] sufficient to plainly lead to a conclusion of unpatentability. See Pet. 12–18, 28; Prelim. Resp. 21–25. We find significant merit in Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner fails to address persuasively limitation [1.4]’s recitation of “distinguishing the information simultaneously received from each of the transmitting nodes according to their respective said unique estimated signal parameters” and similar language in element [21.3]. Prelim. Resp. 21–25. Patent Owner presents viable arguments that Petitioner addresses this claim language with evidence that is unavailing, for instance, because it relates to Kim’s request channel, whereas Petitioner’s evidence for earlier, related limitations relates to traffic data. Id. As another example, we find significant merit in Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner’s Baum-based challenge relies on different embodiments of Baum without providing sufficiently persuasive evidence that the different embodiments would apply to one another. See Pet. 75–76 (relying on “joint detection”); Prelim. Resp. 41 (“First, the Petition combines multiple embodiments from Baum, but without any explanation of why the teachings relating to the non-joint detection embodiment would apply to the joint detection embodiment so as to teach distinguishing the individual signal components of the ‘joint desired signal.’”); see also Reply 5; Sur-reply 5. Petitioner apparently views the disclosures in Baum’s columns 18–21 as all discussing the same embodiment, but Petitioner does not provide sufficiently persuasive support for this position. See Pet. 75–76; Reply 5.” slip op. at 17
- BurdenNot reached
“We do not agree with Petitioner’s assertion that it presents a “compelling unpatentability challenge.” Pet. 86; Reply 2–5. Weighing the arguments and evidence presently of record, we do not find Petitioner’s evidence sufficient to “plainly” result in a conclusion of unpatentability. Fintiv Memo 5 n.6; Pet. 9–81; Prelim. Resp. 16–43. For example, in the challenge based on Kim, we do not find Petitioner’s evidence regarding claim elements [1.4] and [21.3] sufficient to plainly lead to a conclusion of unpatentability. See Pet. 12–18, 28; Prelim. Resp. 21–25. We find significant merit in Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner fails to address persuasively limitation [1.4]’s recitation of “distinguishing the information simultaneously received from each of the transmitting nodes according to their respective said unique estimated signal parameters” and similar language in element [21.3]. Prelim. Resp. 21–25. Patent Owner presents viable arguments that Petitioner addresses this claim language with evidence that is unavailing, for instance, because it relates to Kim’s request channel, whereas Petitioner’s evidence for earlier, related limitations relates to traffic data. Id. As another example, we find significant merit in Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner’s Baum-based challenge relies on different embodiments of Baum without providing sufficiently persuasive evidence that the different embodiments would apply to one another. See Pet. 75–76 (relying on “joint detection”); Prelim. Resp. 41 (“First, the Petition combines multiple embodiments from Baum, but without any explanation of why the teachings relating to the non-joint detection embodiment would apply to the joint detection embodiment so as to teach distinguishing the individual signal components of the ‘joint desired signal.’”); see also Reply 5; Sur-reply 5. Petitioner apparently views the disclosures in Baum’s columns 18–21 as all discussing the same embodiment, but Petitioner does not provide sufficiently persuasive support for this position. See Pet. 75–76; Reply 5.” slip op. at 17
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,814,071 - Aviagames, Inc. v. Skillz Platform Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 9, 2022 · IPR2022-00530 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–3, 7–12, and 16–21 under § 314(a), finding denial best served efficiency after the district court held the claims invalid.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“First, we believe that the Fintiv analysis and factors are a poor fit to the circumstances of this proceeding.10 The Fintiv factors are “related to a parallel, co-pending proceeding” in a district court involving the same patent challenged before the Board. See Fintiv 5 (Heading B) (capitalization omitted). Here, the District Court found the challenged patent to be invalid on a basis that we cannot consider—subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”). There is no parallel consideration by a district court of the invalidity of the challenged claims of the ’602 patent under 35 U.S.C. §§102 or 103. Second, even if we consider the Fintiv factors, we disagree with Petitioner and determine that, under the circumstances presented here, these factors support our denying institution. The Fintiv factors and a Fintiv analysis emphasizes, inter alia, concerns of efficiency. Fintiv 5, 6, 15, 16. As discussed below, we believe that efficiency as shown by analysis of the Fintiv factors strongly favors denial of institution. We consider each of the Fintiv factors. We then weigh the factors together and decide, in this case, to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on the particular circumstances presented in this case.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,479,602 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · PGR2021-00030 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing
Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted, and institution was denied for all challenged claims based on changed circumstances in the parallel district court proceeding under Fintiv.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we agree with Patent Owner that a rehearing of our prior institution decision is appropriate due to the changed circumstances of: (1) the statutory disclaimer of claims 6–8 of the ’039 patent, (2) Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment of related proceeding PGR2021-00042, and (3) the additional investment in the parallel proceeding by the district court and the parties, including the completion of a jury trial that resulted in a jury verdict not finding invalidity of the challenged claims. We further agree with Patent Owner that “[c]ontinuing with this proceeding would result in duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting results between the district court and the Board.” Reh’g Req. 9. It is the combination of these changed circumstances, rather than any one of them individually, that compels the result we reach.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“In considering the parties’ positions and the evidence of record, we note that we have been instructed not to exercise discretion to deny a petition when “the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge.” Guidance Memo 4–5. We previously described “Petitioner’s argument that the claims lack enablement” as presenting “strong merits.” Paper 17, 3. Despite that determination, we believe the record as it stands currently does not “present[] a compelling unpatentability challenge” on the lack-of-enablement issue. Guidance Memo 4–5. The district court already has substantially completed its review of the enablement issue, and a jury has determined that the claims do not lack enablement. Given this new information, we cannot conclude that Petitioner’s enablement case is compelling.” slip op. at 6
- Adverse judgmentOther
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,808,039 - Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. / Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP v. Seagen Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2021 · PGR2021-00042 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 6–8 under § 324(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial despite potential merit in the enablement challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied
“parties. We recognize that many legitimate reasons may lead a party not to file a motion to stay a parallel proceeding prior to the Board’s institution decision, including because such a motion may be viewed as premature. Be that as it may, our precedential guidance instructs us to consider whether the court has granted a stay of the parallel proceeding, or whether evidence exists that a stay may be granted upon institution. Fintiv Order at 5–6. As it stands, the record lacks sufficient evidence to suggest that a stay has been granted, or may be granted in the future. It is a judge who determines whether to grant a stay based on the facts of each specific case as presented in the briefs by the parties. We decline to infer, based on actions taken in different cases with different facts, how the district court judge would rule should a stay be requested in the Texas Litigation. For these reasons, we determine that the facts underlying this factor are neutral.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“35 U.S.C. § 324(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard is set forth in § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review shall not be instituted unless “the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,808,039
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.