- Immersion Systems LLC v. Midas Green Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 31, 2022 · PGR2021-00104 · APJ Frederick C Laney · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR challenging claims 1, 5, 6, and 10, exercising discretion under § 324(a) based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Thus, a jury trial is scheduled to occur in the related district court litigation approximately four months prior to when a final written decision would be statutorily due in this post-grant review, and the district court has indicated that any changes to the schedule, including the trial date, are disfavored. We find these facts weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution under this factor.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundOther
“For example, under Petitioner’s Ground 1, although Petitioner’s and its witness’s (Dr. Mudawar’s) interpretations of the prior art as teaching the claimed subject matter are not unreasonable, the interpretations are not particularly clear or strong. Pet. 14–27. Petitioner pieces together portions from Best, Krajewski, and/or Cray that do not explicitly disclose the claimed subject matter, relying instead on Dr. Mudawar to interpret the references’ disclosures as meeting specific claim limitations. Id. Further, Petitioner, for the most part, asserts that each limitation of, for example, independent claim 1, is individually disclosed by one or more of Best, Krajewski, and/or Cray without clearly explaining how one reference’s disclosed apparatus or system would be specifically modified by the ordinarily skilled artisan in view of the teachings of the others. Id. Moreover, when discussing a motivation to combine Best, Krajewski, and/or Cray, Petitioner relies on the fact that they are directed to analogous art and then, primarily, that the features they teach would achieve the same advantages extolled by the ’446 patent itself for its claimed invention, which is not strong support that the prior art would have been combined or modified absent some improper hindsight. Id. at 30–35. Thus, although Petitioner may have made a sufficient showing for” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,820,446 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Evolved Wireless LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · IPR2021-00950 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 14–16 and 18–20, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the ITC investigation was advanced and the preliminary merits were a closer call.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“In evaluating whether to do so, we consider the following factors in assessing “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“B. Analysis Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (stating “[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”) (emphasis added); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). The advanced state of either a parallel district court action or a parallel ITC investigation may warrant exercising discretion on behalf of the Director to deny a petition for inter partes review. See NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“NHK”); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6, 8 (PTAB March 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 58 & n.2, available at” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner contends that Nokia discloses, “in the context of the disclosed handover operations, performing a contention free . . . RACH procedure (step 5 [of Nokia’s Figure 1]), wherein the identifier information necessary for the UE to communicate with the target base station during the RACH procedure was previously transmitted in a message from the source base station to the UE (e.g., Handover Command, Step 4).” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1037 ¶ 92). Petitioner motivates its reasoning for effecting a combination of Nokia with Hu by contending that a person of skill in the art “would recognize that the specific implementation of such a conventional, contention free RACH procedure as referenced in Nokia could be implemented using” a variety of known methods. Id. at 33. Such a person “would also have recognized,” Petitioner further contends, “that using conventional RACH procedures wherein each UE is assigned and uses its own different preamble would make the handover process quicker and more efficient by reducing contention between the mobile station and the other mobile stations on the RACH.” Id. Petitioner relies on such features to argue that “Hu discloses the full implementation level details of how such a conventional, contention free RACH procedure using allocated resources in the form of a dedicated code resource (i.e., a dedicated preamble) is performed.” Id. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s reading of Nokia, particularly that it discloses a contention-free RACH procedure. See Prelim. Resp. 36–43. Patent Owner correctly observes that the timing alignment in step 5 of Nokia’s Figure 1 “involves one of two different procedures: a ‘one or two step RACH procedure’ OR a ‘Non contention based access burst.’” Id. at 37. Patent Owner elaborates that, although Nokia teaches that the “UE receives allocation(s)” that can be used in an access burst in the second of these procedures, Nokia “does not even teach what an ‘access burst’ is or how it would be used in a non-contention-based manner—and certainly does not teach or suggest that the non-contention-based manner would involve a RACH procedure.” Id. at 38. Patent Owner further supports its position with “[o]ther contemporaneous submissions by Nokia [that] confirm this and explain what Nokia meant by a contention-free access burst procedure,” as well as LTE standards documents. Id. at 38–43 (citing Ex. 2009, 1–2; Ex. 2010 § 10.1; Ex. 2011 § 10.1.2.1; Ex. 2012 § 10.1.2.1). We have reviewed this evidence, and find on this record that it provides some support for Patent Owner’s position. The merits of this case thus present the “closer call” that favors exercising discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review under Fintiv.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial - Marketdial, Inc. v. Applied Predictive Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 3, 2021 · CBM2020-00025 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1–35 under Fintiv because the district court had already held the same claims invalid under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“institution decision.” Prelim. Resp. 6–7 (citing Snap, Paper 8). We agree. There will be no trial as to patent infringement because the district court already concluded that all claims of the ’916 patent are invalid under § 101. Patent Owner indicates that it will appeal that decision once the remainder of the district court case concludes. Id. at 3. The statutory deadline for a final written decision in this proceeding would be one year from institution. Under the particular factual circumstances of this case, we find that this factor strongly weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached
“3 Because we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), we need not decide other issues presented by the Petition, such as whether the ’916 patent is eligible for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptNot reached
“3 Because we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), we need not decide other issues presented by the Petition, such as whether the ’916 patent is eligible for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
§ 101 eligibilityDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,571,916 - Tco As v. NCS Multistage Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 18, 2021 · PGR2020-00078 · APJ Lynne H Browne · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–21 and 28–49 under § 324(a), finding likely duplication with parallel litigation and weak merits on most challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“g. Holistic Analysis of Fintiv Factors We undertake a holistic analysis of these factors, considering “whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In this case, all of the factors weigh in Patent Owner’s favor except for the first factor, which is neutral, and the fifth factor, which weighs against denial. Specifically, the overlap of the parallel proceedings, including the stipulation by Patent Owner, and the weakness of the merits of Petitioner’s petition outweigh the factors in favor of exercising discretion to institute inter partes review. A balancing of the facts and circumstances as discussed above leads us to conclude, on this record, that the inefficient duplication of efforts here is likely. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh in favor of denying institution under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).” slip op. at 27
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“g. Holistic Analysis of Fintiv Factors We undertake a holistic analysis of these factors, considering “whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In this case, all of the factors weigh in Patent Owner’s favor except for the first factor, which is neutral, and the fifth factor, which weighs against denial. Specifically, the overlap of the parallel proceedings, including the stipulation by Patent Owner, and the weakness of the merits of Petitioner’s petition outweigh the factors in favor of exercising discretion to institute inter partes review. A balancing of the facts and circumstances as discussed above leads us to conclude, on this record, that the inefficient duplication of efforts here is likely. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh in favor of denying institution under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundOther
“unpatentable over Rogers and Entchev. Pet. 105–112. Patent Owner also alleges that claims 4 and 32 are unpatentable over Rogers, Entchev, and Lembcke and that claims 19–21 and 47–49 are unpatentable over Rogers, Entchev, and Fishbeck. Id. at 113–114. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “does not show a motivation to combine Entchev and Rogers.” Prelim. Resp. 40. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “has not shown or even argued that a POSA would have sought to incorporate the bridge plug of Entchev into a process that does not include a settlement location for the pieces of the bridge plug, like Rogers.” Id. at 42. Patent Owner asserts further that Petitioner has not “shown that a POSA would have combined the debris catching features in Entchev with Rogers.” Id. We find Patent Owner’s assertions credible. Upon our initial review of this ground, we find that Petitioner’s reasoning in support of the proposed combination is weak, which suggest that the merits of the challenges relying on the combination of Rogers and Entchev are weak, which weighs in favor of denying institution.” slip op. at 26
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,465,445 - U.S. Venture, Inc. v. Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 17, 2020 · IPR2020-00728 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution for claims 16–17 based on the Fintiv factors and its § 314(a) discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burdens and requirements of a request for rehearing are stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“the evidence laid out an approximate time frame for when the trial would likely be held. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2003); see also id. at 8–9 (citing PO Resp. 35; Ex. 1026) (Discussing the Court’s Procedures and timeline for trial after the docket call). Thus, we determined that this factor favored denying institution under our analysis of the factors under Fintiv. Id. at 9.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner acknowledges that the proposed combination of the references relies on “us[ing] the cumulative totals of the flow rates of the unblended components in the Hoffman compensation process” (id.), however Patent Owner identifies that Hoffman appears to teach away from using the flow rates of the unblended components in its calculations because of the uncertainty in the flow rate of the blended line. Prelim. Resp. 19, 21– 22. Contrary to Petitioner’s position, it is not Patent Owner’s burden to show why “a person of ordinary skill in the art would be discouraged from measuring flow rates upstream for use in the Hoffman compensation process” (Reh. Req. 9), but rather, Petitioner bears the burden to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would measure flow rates upstream for use in the Hoffman compensation process in view of the all of the teachings of the references (35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (Institution only authorized if “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”)). Petitioner’s arguments do not show that we misapprehended or” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageNot reached
“argument concerning the construction of the term “in-line blending.” Id. at 13.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,207,686 - Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 2, 2020 · PGR2020-00034 · APJ Amanda F Wieker · PGR · Rehearing
The Board denied Supercell’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution based on the Fintiv factors and the parallel district court proceeding.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“this factor. At the time of our Decision, trial was scheduled in the parallel proceeding for December 7, 2020, approximately nine months before our final written decision would have been due, if we were to institute trial. Dec. 10–11. As such, this gap in timing created a cognizable risk of inconsistent results and duplication of efforts, which weighed toward denying institution. Id. at 6, 11–12. Additionally, the Decision notes that some uncertainty exists regarding trial dates, as Petitioner again argues in its Request. Id. at 11; Req. Reh’g 3–4. However, the Decision goes on to determine that even if trial in the parallel proceeding was delayed by two months, consistent with Petitioner’s prior requested delay, the proximity of the trial date to our final written decision would still favor denying institution. Dec. 12 (citing Ex. 2002, 2). As such, Petitioner has not shown that the Board misapprehended the trial date.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Thus, unlike the Request, the Petition did not contend that a skilled artisan would have found it obvious that “[Cho’s communication] may comprise one player specifying, to the server, information identifying another player to be involved in the game.” Compare id. at 46–47, with Req. Reh’g 6–7 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the Petition simply stated that a skilled artisan would understand that Cho taught transmissions through a server, but did not state that it would have been obvious, in light of Cho’s teachings, for this transmission to include first information. As discussed in our Decision, the Petition’s reliance on GSB to supply the transmission of “first information” fails because Petitioner has not explained persuasively why it would have been obvious to transmit GSB’s first information when Cho already establishes a communication between players and because Petitioner fails to explain “how the additional transmission of identifying information would simplify communications or allow easier connection, over the communication that Cho already establishes.” Dec. 24.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aDecided for patent owner
“different posture of PGR proceedings as compared to IPR proceedings, when exercising discretion to deny institution. As summarized above, the Decision discusses that common statutory language exists in § 314(a)— directed toward IPR proceedings—and in § 324(a)—directed to post-grant review proceedings. See supra § I.A; Dec. 5–7. The Decision also discusses the common policy justifications implicated when determining whether to institute either an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding. Id. at 7. The Decision then goes on to recognize and discuss certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings. Id. Despite these differences, we determined that the Board’s binding precedential case law set forth in NHK Spring and Fintiv applies to this PGR proceeding. Id. In doing so, we additionally evaluated certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings, when considering the Fintiv Order factors. See, e.g., id. at 12, 15–17, 20–21. Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in doing so.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,300,385 - Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 6, 2020 · IPR2020-00203 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1, 6, and 7, exercising § 314(a) discretion because Fintiv factors favored denial amid overlapping, advanced district court litigation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “[I]n evaluating the factors, the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“concerns and the possibility of conflicting decisions. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 12. Therefore, “if the petition includes the same or substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in the parallel proceeding, this fact has favored denial.” Id. In this case, although the obviousness ground asserted here is not identical to either ground in Petitioner’s final invalidity contentions, both of the references relied on in the Petition are asserted in the underlying litigation. As illustrated by Patent Owner’s comparison of citations in the Petition with those in Petitioner’s preliminary invalidity contentions in district court, substantial overlap exists between the disclosures of Waldroup and Nakayama relied on in the two proceedings. See Prelim. Resp. 8–9 (comparing Pet. 25–58 with Ex. 2004, 1–39). Thus, arguments and evidence regarding the teachings of Waldroup and Nakayama in the Petition are substantially the same as those in the underlying litigation. Although there may be some differences in the reasoning presented in the various obviousness grounds for combining the prior art teachings, we nevertheless find the assertion of Waldroup and Nakayama in both proceedings may result in duplication of work and create the potential for inconsistent decisions.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,408,193 - Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., Ltd. / Broad Ocean Motor LLC et al. v. Nidec Motor CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00762 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied joinder and denied institution because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b), despite finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 19 were anticipated.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied
“Petitioners were served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’349 patent on September 25, 2013. The Petition was filed on February 20, 2015, more than a year later. Notwithstanding our determination that the Petition meets the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we conclude that institution of an inter partes review is barred by § 315(b).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Section 315(c) provides: If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. In our view, the phrase “join as a party” indicates that only a person who is not already a party to an instituted inter partes review can be joined to the proceeding. A person cannot be joined as a party to a proceeding in which it is already a party. That the statute uses the expansive term “any person” is of little moment because the overall language of the statute places unambiguous limits on the term. Specifically, the phrase “join as a party” excludes a person who is already a party.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstituted
“We conclude that Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on their contention that Hideji discloses performing sinewave commutation using independent values of Q and d axis currents in the manner recited in each of independent claims 1, 16, and 19. Thus, we conclude that Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on their challenge of claims 1–3, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 19 as anticipated by Hideji. B. Time Bar Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) Section 315(b) provides: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c). Petitioners were served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’349 patent on September 25, 2013. The Petition was filed on February 20, 2015, more than a year later. Notwithstanding our determination that the Petition meets the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we conclude that institution of an inter partes review is barred by § 315(b).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“contention that Hideji discloses “performing sinewave commutation, using independent values of Q and d axis currents, in response to one or more control signals received from the system controller to produce continuous phase currents in the permanent magnet motor for driving the air-moving component,” recited in each of independent claims 1, 16, and 19. Pet. at 19– 26. Patent Owner contends that Hideji fails to disclose the use of independent values of Q and d axis currents: “In fact, Hideji discloses that it employs calculations in the rotating frame of reference in which Q and d axis currents depend on each other.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioners observe that Figure 2 of Hideji illustrates that three-phase / two-phase coordinate conversion part 36 outputs separate values for Iq and Id, i.e. the Q and d axis currents.3 Pet. 23–24. Hideji discloses that 3 We note that the labels “Iq” and “Id” output from part 36 of Hideji are identified directly as such in the original Japanese reference. Ex. 1003, 8. [t]he three-phase/two-phase coordinate conversion part 36 converts the coordinates of the alternating current Iu and Iv introduced by the current input part 35 to a revolving coordination system (d-q coordination system) on the rotor of the brushless DC motor 30A, and calculates flux current Id (d-axis current) and torque current Iq (q-axis current). Ex. 1005 ¶ 35. Petitioners reason that such transformation results in separate, independent values of Q and d axis currents determined from control signals received from the system controller. Pet. 23. Petitioners support this reasoning with testimony by Dr. Ehsani. Ex. 1009 ¶ 38. Patent Owner responds that “the values coming from part 36 are at best a transform into the rotating frame of reference of actual measured currents” and that “[t]hey are not the demanded currents generated by the controller.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Notwithstanding the explicit identification of these values as “Iq” and “Id” in the original Japanese reference, Patent Owner also contends that they “are not values one of ordinary skill would refer to as Iq and Id.” Id. at 23. In addition, Patent Owner contends that “[i]t is the current control part 40 output that is used to create the continuous phase sine wave commutated currents for the motor after being transformed back out of the rotating frame of reference,” reasoning that “[i]f Iq and Id are not independent at this step, the ‘motor controller’ is not using ‘independent values of Q and d axis current’ to perform ‘sine wave commutation.’” Id. at 24. Patent Owner contends that such inputs are not independent, noting” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,626,349
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.