- Ericsson Inc. / Nokia Of America Corporation v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 2, 2022 · IPR2022-00725 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–6 and 11–16 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the challenges were not compelling.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”); 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board has held that the advanced state of a parallel district court action is a factor that may weigh in favor of denying a petition under § 314(a). See NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 58 & n.2 (Nov. 2019) (“Trial Practice Guide”)2. We consider the following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the ’000 patent claims a filing date before March 16, 2013, the effective date of the relevant amendment, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf. 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“implemented by a base station. As Petitioner points out, Classon describes a multicarrier communications system that includes a “base site” and “receiving platforms” (also referred to as “transmission targets”), which we find are a base station and mobile stations. Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1005, code (57), ¶¶ 23, 27, 28, 31, Fig. 4). The parties dispute whether Classon (in light of the background knowledge of a skilled artisan or, in light of TR 25.858) teaches transmitting control information indicating whether a mobile station is to transmit one channel quality indicator (CQI) for each subcarrier block within a communication frequency band or one CQI for all subcarrier blocks within the communication frequency band instead of multiple CQIs for multiple subcarrier blocks within the communication frequency band, as recited in claim 1 (and similarly recited in claim 11). For the reasons given below, the case Petitioner advances is less than compelling.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Patent Owner’s argument has merit. Paragraphs 37–40 of Classon describe the base station determining what mode to use for communication based on the information (including CQI information) sent by the mobile units. Paragraph 41 states that “such channel quality information will preferably already be available to the base site” but that, if it is not available, “the base site can transmit 73 a message to the relevant transmission target or targets and request a reply that includes the relevant channel quality information.” Also, paragraph 41 states that “[w]ays in which such information can be provided to the base site will be described below in more detail.” This appears to be a reference to Classon’s description of the mobile stations, not the base station, determining that they are of “type 1” or “type 2” and sending channel quality information to the base station based on that determination, after which the base station determines whether to use the first mode or second mode in communications. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 45–51. Thus, rather than supporting Petitioner’s position, the context around paragraph 41 appears in friction with that position. Petitioner does not explain how the base station determines a transmission mode (and thus a requested amount of CQI information) without first having that information from the mobile stations. Instead, it is reasonable to read paragraph 41 as requesting of the mobile stations information that the mobile stations deem appropriate; in other words, that the mobile stations determine whether to send a CQI value for each subcarrier or information on average channel quality. Even if it is sufficient to go forward on a theory that Classon implicitly teaches the claimed control message, the evidence Petitioner advances for this position is not compelling.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 325(D) Petitioner argues that we should not deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Pet. 56. Patent Owner argues that we should. Prelim. Resp. 23– 28. Because we deny the Petition for other reasons, we do not reach whether we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under § 325(d).” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,137,000 - Immersion Systems LLC v. Midas Green Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 31, 2022 · PGR2021-00104 · APJ Frederick C Laney · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR challenging claims 1, 5, 6, and 10, exercising discretion under § 324(a) based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Thus, a jury trial is scheduled to occur in the related district court litigation approximately four months prior to when a final written decision would be statutorily due in this post-grant review, and the district court has indicated that any changes to the schedule, including the trial date, are disfavored. We find these facts weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution under this factor.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundOther
“For example, under Petitioner’s Ground 1, although Petitioner’s and its witness’s (Dr. Mudawar’s) interpretations of the prior art as teaching the claimed subject matter are not unreasonable, the interpretations are not particularly clear or strong. Pet. 14–27. Petitioner pieces together portions from Best, Krajewski, and/or Cray that do not explicitly disclose the claimed subject matter, relying instead on Dr. Mudawar to interpret the references’ disclosures as meeting specific claim limitations. Id. Further, Petitioner, for the most part, asserts that each limitation of, for example, independent claim 1, is individually disclosed by one or more of Best, Krajewski, and/or Cray without clearly explaining how one reference’s disclosed apparatus or system would be specifically modified by the ordinarily skilled artisan in view of the teachings of the others. Id. Moreover, when discussing a motivation to combine Best, Krajewski, and/or Cray, Petitioner relies on the fact that they are directed to analogous art and then, primarily, that the features they teach would achieve the same advantages extolled by the ’446 patent itself for its claimed invention, which is not strong support that the prior art would have been combined or modified absent some improper hindsight. Id. at 30–35. Thus, although Petitioner may have made a sufficient showing for” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,820,446 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Evolved Wireless LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · IPR2021-00950 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 14–16 and 18–20, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the ITC investigation was advanced and the preliminary merits were a closer call.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“In evaluating whether to do so, we consider the following factors in assessing “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“B. Analysis Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (stating “[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”) (emphasis added); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). The advanced state of either a parallel district court action or a parallel ITC investigation may warrant exercising discretion on behalf of the Director to deny a petition for inter partes review. See NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“NHK”); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6, 8 (PTAB March 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 58 & n.2, available at” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner contends that Nokia discloses, “in the context of the disclosed handover operations, performing a contention free . . . RACH procedure (step 5 [of Nokia’s Figure 1]), wherein the identifier information necessary for the UE to communicate with the target base station during the RACH procedure was previously transmitted in a message from the source base station to the UE (e.g., Handover Command, Step 4).” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1037 ¶ 92). Petitioner motivates its reasoning for effecting a combination of Nokia with Hu by contending that a person of skill in the art “would recognize that the specific implementation of such a conventional, contention free RACH procedure as referenced in Nokia could be implemented using” a variety of known methods. Id. at 33. Such a person “would also have recognized,” Petitioner further contends, “that using conventional RACH procedures wherein each UE is assigned and uses its own different preamble would make the handover process quicker and more efficient by reducing contention between the mobile station and the other mobile stations on the RACH.” Id. Petitioner relies on such features to argue that “Hu discloses the full implementation level details of how such a conventional, contention free RACH procedure using allocated resources in the form of a dedicated code resource (i.e., a dedicated preamble) is performed.” Id. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s reading of Nokia, particularly that it discloses a contention-free RACH procedure. See Prelim. Resp. 36–43. Patent Owner correctly observes that the timing alignment in step 5 of Nokia’s Figure 1 “involves one of two different procedures: a ‘one or two step RACH procedure’ OR a ‘Non contention based access burst.’” Id. at 37. Patent Owner elaborates that, although Nokia teaches that the “UE receives allocation(s)” that can be used in an access burst in the second of these procedures, Nokia “does not even teach what an ‘access burst’ is or how it would be used in a non-contention-based manner—and certainly does not teach or suggest that the non-contention-based manner would involve a RACH procedure.” Id. at 38. Patent Owner further supports its position with “[o]ther contemporaneous submissions by Nokia [that] confirm this and explain what Nokia meant by a contention-free access burst procedure,” as well as LTE standards documents. Id. at 38–43 (citing Ex. 2009, 1–2; Ex. 2010 § 10.1; Ex. 2011 § 10.1.2.1; Ex. 2012 § 10.1.2.1). We have reviewed this evidence, and find on this record that it provides some support for Patent Owner’s position. The merits of this case thus present the “closer call” that favors exercising discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review under Fintiv.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial - Satco Products, Inc. v. The Regents Of The University Of CaliforniaInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 8, 2021 · IPR2021-00661 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1 and 2 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors weighed against review because of the advanced, overlapping ITC investigation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“The Fintiv factors “relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Fintiv, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6. A stay of parallel litigation pending resolution of a Board proceeding “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Id. That the E.D.N.Y. case was stayed “at its earliest stage,” however, does not “allay[] concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts” in view of the 1220 investigation. Additionally, the E.D.N.Y. case was stayed “pending completion” of the 1220 investigation, not because of any Board proceeding. Ex. 3002, 1. With dates set in the 1220 investigation for the ALJ’s initial determination and the ITC’s final determination, a stay seems highly unlikely, especially with the initial determination date about a week away. Hence, factor (1) weighs against institution. See Fitbit, Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips N.V., IPR2020-00771, Paper 14 at 16–17 (PTAB Oct. 19, 2020).” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). But we have discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” threshold standard for instituting trial. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached
“essentially the same argument about the ’557 patent’s effective filing date for its challenge based on Nakamura-959 and Nakamura-949 as for its invalidity defense based on insufficient written-description support for claim 1. See Pet. 7, 12–21, 37; Ex. 2004, 29–33; Ex. 2005, 245–48; Ex. 2014, 64–65, 70. As we understand the arguments, resolving the ’557 patent’s effective filing date does not require interpreting any part of § 1.57. See Pet. 12–21; Prelim. Resp. 29–31. Instead, the issue turns on whether the ’154 application supports claim 1 according to § 112’s first paragraph. See Pet. 12–21; Prelim. Resp. 29–31. Also, the challenges based on Tanda present a similar issue whether the ’447 provisional supports claim 1 according to § 112’s first paragraph. See Pet. 12–21, 61; Prelim. Resp. 29–31, 36–37. “[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Under the circumstances here, the ITC can apply the test for sufficiency of disclosure to the ’154 application and the ’447 provisional just as well as the Board.” slip op. at 27
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,658,557 - Tco As v. NCS Multistage Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 18, 2021 · PGR2020-00078 · APJ Lynne H Browne · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–21 and 28–49 under § 324(a), finding likely duplication with parallel litigation and weak merits on most challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“g. Holistic Analysis of Fintiv Factors We undertake a holistic analysis of these factors, considering “whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In this case, all of the factors weigh in Patent Owner’s favor except for the first factor, which is neutral, and the fifth factor, which weighs against denial. Specifically, the overlap of the parallel proceedings, including the stipulation by Patent Owner, and the weakness of the merits of Petitioner’s petition outweigh the factors in favor of exercising discretion to institute inter partes review. A balancing of the facts and circumstances as discussed above leads us to conclude, on this record, that the inefficient duplication of efforts here is likely. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh in favor of denying institution under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).” slip op. at 27
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“g. Holistic Analysis of Fintiv Factors We undertake a holistic analysis of these factors, considering “whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In this case, all of the factors weigh in Patent Owner’s favor except for the first factor, which is neutral, and the fifth factor, which weighs against denial. Specifically, the overlap of the parallel proceedings, including the stipulation by Patent Owner, and the weakness of the merits of Petitioner’s petition outweigh the factors in favor of exercising discretion to institute inter partes review. A balancing of the facts and circumstances as discussed above leads us to conclude, on this record, that the inefficient duplication of efforts here is likely. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh in favor of denying institution under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundOther
“unpatentable over Rogers and Entchev. Pet. 105–112. Patent Owner also alleges that claims 4 and 32 are unpatentable over Rogers, Entchev, and Lembcke and that claims 19–21 and 47–49 are unpatentable over Rogers, Entchev, and Fishbeck. Id. at 113–114. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “does not show a motivation to combine Entchev and Rogers.” Prelim. Resp. 40. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “has not shown or even argued that a POSA would have sought to incorporate the bridge plug of Entchev into a process that does not include a settlement location for the pieces of the bridge plug, like Rogers.” Id. at 42. Patent Owner asserts further that Petitioner has not “shown that a POSA would have combined the debris catching features in Entchev with Rogers.” Id. We find Patent Owner’s assertions credible. Upon our initial review of this ground, we find that Petitioner’s reasoning in support of the proposed combination is weak, which suggest that the merits of the challenges relying on the combination of Rogers and Entchev are weak, which weighs in favor of denying institution.” slip op. at 26
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,465,445 - U.S. Venture, Inc. v. Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 17, 2020 · IPR2020-00728 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution for claims 16–17 based on the Fintiv factors and its § 314(a) discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burdens and requirements of a request for rehearing are stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“the evidence laid out an approximate time frame for when the trial would likely be held. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2003); see also id. at 8–9 (citing PO Resp. 35; Ex. 1026) (Discussing the Court’s Procedures and timeline for trial after the docket call). Thus, we determined that this factor favored denying institution under our analysis of the factors under Fintiv. Id. at 9.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner acknowledges that the proposed combination of the references relies on “us[ing] the cumulative totals of the flow rates of the unblended components in the Hoffman compensation process” (id.), however Patent Owner identifies that Hoffman appears to teach away from using the flow rates of the unblended components in its calculations because of the uncertainty in the flow rate of the blended line. Prelim. Resp. 19, 21– 22. Contrary to Petitioner’s position, it is not Patent Owner’s burden to show why “a person of ordinary skill in the art would be discouraged from measuring flow rates upstream for use in the Hoffman compensation process” (Reh. Req. 9), but rather, Petitioner bears the burden to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would measure flow rates upstream for use in the Hoffman compensation process in view of the all of the teachings of the references (35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (Institution only authorized if “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”)). Petitioner’s arguments do not show that we misapprehended or” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageNot reached
“argument concerning the construction of the term “in-line blending.” Id. at 13.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,207,686 - Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 2, 2020 · PGR2020-00034 · APJ Amanda F Wieker · PGR · Rehearing
The Board denied Supercell’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution based on the Fintiv factors and the parallel district court proceeding.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“this factor. At the time of our Decision, trial was scheduled in the parallel proceeding for December 7, 2020, approximately nine months before our final written decision would have been due, if we were to institute trial. Dec. 10–11. As such, this gap in timing created a cognizable risk of inconsistent results and duplication of efforts, which weighed toward denying institution. Id. at 6, 11–12. Additionally, the Decision notes that some uncertainty exists regarding trial dates, as Petitioner again argues in its Request. Id. at 11; Req. Reh’g 3–4. However, the Decision goes on to determine that even if trial in the parallel proceeding was delayed by two months, consistent with Petitioner’s prior requested delay, the proximity of the trial date to our final written decision would still favor denying institution. Dec. 12 (citing Ex. 2002, 2). As such, Petitioner has not shown that the Board misapprehended the trial date.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Thus, unlike the Request, the Petition did not contend that a skilled artisan would have found it obvious that “[Cho’s communication] may comprise one player specifying, to the server, information identifying another player to be involved in the game.” Compare id. at 46–47, with Req. Reh’g 6–7 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the Petition simply stated that a skilled artisan would understand that Cho taught transmissions through a server, but did not state that it would have been obvious, in light of Cho’s teachings, for this transmission to include first information. As discussed in our Decision, the Petition’s reliance on GSB to supply the transmission of “first information” fails because Petitioner has not explained persuasively why it would have been obvious to transmit GSB’s first information when Cho already establishes a communication between players and because Petitioner fails to explain “how the additional transmission of identifying information would simplify communications or allow easier connection, over the communication that Cho already establishes.” Dec. 24.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aDecided for patent owner
“different posture of PGR proceedings as compared to IPR proceedings, when exercising discretion to deny institution. As summarized above, the Decision discusses that common statutory language exists in § 314(a)— directed toward IPR proceedings—and in § 324(a)—directed to post-grant review proceedings. See supra § I.A; Dec. 5–7. The Decision also discusses the common policy justifications implicated when determining whether to institute either an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding. Id. at 7. The Decision then goes on to recognize and discuss certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings. Id. Despite these differences, we determined that the Board’s binding precedential case law set forth in NHK Spring and Fintiv applies to this PGR proceeding. Id. In doing so, we additionally evaluated certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings, when considering the Fintiv Order factors. See, e.g., id. at 12, 15–17, 20–21. Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in doing so.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,300,385 - Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 6, 2020 · IPR2020-00203 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1, 6, and 7, exercising § 314(a) discretion because Fintiv factors favored denial amid overlapping, advanced district court litigation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “[I]n evaluating the factors, the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“concerns and the possibility of conflicting decisions. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 12. Therefore, “if the petition includes the same or substantially the same claims, grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in the parallel proceeding, this fact has favored denial.” Id. In this case, although the obviousness ground asserted here is not identical to either ground in Petitioner’s final invalidity contentions, both of the references relied on in the Petition are asserted in the underlying litigation. As illustrated by Patent Owner’s comparison of citations in the Petition with those in Petitioner’s preliminary invalidity contentions in district court, substantial overlap exists between the disclosures of Waldroup and Nakayama relied on in the two proceedings. See Prelim. Resp. 8–9 (comparing Pet. 25–58 with Ex. 2004, 1–39). Thus, arguments and evidence regarding the teachings of Waldroup and Nakayama in the Petition are substantially the same as those in the underlying litigation. Although there may be some differences in the reasoning presented in the various obviousness grounds for combining the prior art teachings, we nevertheless find the assertion of Waldroup and Nakayama in both proceedings may result in duplication of work and create the potential for inconsistent decisions.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,408,193
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.