- Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00573 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7 or 11 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’772 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’772 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) pertaining to the ’772 patent “would have had an educational background of, engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to determine whether or not to institute a trial. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,481,772 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00619 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 36–37. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,686,871 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00617 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 6–8, 10–13, and 15 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 39. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here. 2 Congress amended § 103 when it passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). Petitioner asserts that the version amended by the AIA applies here. Pet. 23. 3 We use Petitioner’s nomenclature in which Petitioner collectively refers to the Vasell patent (Ex. 1004) and its corresponding provisional applications (Exs. 1015, 1016) as “Vasell.” 4 Erez Zadok, Ph.D. submitted a declaration on behalf of Petitioner. See Ex. 1003.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,893,095 - PTAB · Aug 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00479 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were obvious over Erskine, Scherzer, or Scherzer and Gillett.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“III. CONCLUSION Based on the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’634 patent challenged in the Petition. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’634 patent (July 2018), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a similar major with at least two years of experience in the field; or a master’s degree with specialization in the field,” where “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience may also meet this standard.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–13). Petitioner further argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had knowledge of “[d]esigning and using systems that include endpoint devices (e.g., client devices) and servers for establishing network connections and data transfer,” “[r]ecognizing and applying the client-server architecture,” and “[u]sing and applying concepts from known telecommunication and networking frameworks, protocols and standards, including TCP/IP, IEEE 802.11, VoIP, cellular systems and other known frameworks and standards.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 14). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’634 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’634 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s definition and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 4–29 (describing in the “Background” section of the ’634 patent a “network connection between two endpoints” and known methods of reaching “full effective bandwidth capacity” in a network).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner notes that it proposed a construction for the claim term “geographical area” in the district court case, but states that it “do[es] not believe proposing a construction for the term is necessary in this proceeding because the relied upon teachings of the prior art references are consistent with examples of ‘geographical area’ included in the ’634 patent [S]pecification.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Board need not engage in express claim construction at this stage of the proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 5. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Erskine teaches or suggests the second requirement of limitation [1c], i.e., “initiating the next network connection . . . with a transmission bandwidth based on the parameter values for the past network connection.” Petitioner’s theory is that (1) the QoS parameters in Erskine are for a “past” connection from one zone to another, (2) the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth is “based on” the QoS parameters, and (3) a new call only proceeds if the transmission bandwidth needed for the call added to the current bandwidth being used over the interzone link is less than the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth, so Erskine therefore teaches a call with a transmission bandwidth determined “based on” the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth (which in turn is determined “based on” the QoS parameters). See Pet. 27–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–60 (similar testimony from Dr. Crovella). As Patent Owner points out, however, Erskine only makes “a binary, accept/reject decision as to whether to allow a new call to proceed based on a comparison between the bandwidth needed for the call and a predetermined ‘sliding maximum interzone bandwidth value.’” See Prelim. Resp. 6–7. Specifically, the additional bandwidth that would be needed for the call is added to the current bandwidth being used on the interzone link; if the sum of those values is less than the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth for the link, the call “proceeds”; otherwise, it is “blocked.” Ex. 1004, col. 4, ll. 36–40, col. 6, l. 55–col. 7, l. 10, col. 8, ll. 36–43, col. 9, ll. 9–26, col. 10, ll. 23–25 (the sum is compared to the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth “to determine whether enough bandwidth is available to proceed with the new call”), Fig. 3 (steps 308, 310, and 312). Erskine repeatedly refers to the bandwidth for the new call as the amount of bandwidth that is “necessary” or “required” to handle the call. See, e.g., id. at col. 1, ll. 43–57 (“an amount of bandwidth necessary to handle the new call”), col. 6, ll. 61–64 (“the additional bandwidth required (of the new call)”), col. 8, ll. 36–40 (“the bandwidth necessary for the new call”), col. 9, ll. 16–21 (“the anticipated additional bandwidth necessary for the new call”), 54–56 (“the bandwidth amount the new call will utilize (if connected)”), col. 10, ll. 21–23 (same), 41–43 (same), col. 12, ll. 1–2 (“an amount of bandwidth necessary to handle the new call”). It is that value—determined prior to the addition and comparison to the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth—that will be used for the new call if it is allowed to “proceed[].” Id. at col. 6, ll. 64–67 (if the sum is less than the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth, the call “proceeds” and “the QoS table is updated with the additional bandwidth used by that call”). Erskine does not describe the transmission bandwidth for the new call as being based on any parameter values for a past network connection, but rather as “whatever bandwidth the system determined is necessary for the additional call.” See Prelim. Resp. 8–9. In other words, the transmission bandwidth needed for a new call is predetermined and independent of whatever the sliding maximum interzone bandwidth is currently. See id.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,944,634 - Therabody, Inc. v. Datafeel Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 21, 2025 · PGR2025-00026 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show claim 4 more likely than not unpatentable on either obviousness or § 112 ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). Upon considering the arguments and evidence, we conclude that the information presented shows it is not more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’174 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’174 patent and prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our analysis below would be the same regardless of whether we adopt Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proffered level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms need construction. Pet. 14; Prelim. Resp. 6. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of our analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“of Choi to support its argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Choi’s infrared lamp housing to define a concave shape as claimed. See Pet. 61–62. With only this explanation and evidence from Petitioner and Dr. Jenson, however, we cannot not discern how these portions of Choi would have so apprised an ordinarily skilled artisan. For example, the side view of the infrared lamp housing, illustrated in Figure 5 reproduced below, shows the housing having a convex, rather than concave, shape. See Ex. 1008, Fig. 5. Furthermore, paragraphs 20 and 48 refer to the housing’s “circular” shape and outer periphery and also “tubular” shape. See id. ¶¶ 20, 48. But these descriptions, either alone or together with Figure 5, also do not support adequately a finding that Choi’s housing is concave. Choi’s teachings in paragraphs 20 and 46 regarding the lamp housing guiding or directing infrared light from the lamp to irradiate the skin of a user, without more, are similarly deficient. See id. ¶¶ 20, 46. And although Dr. Jensen appears to equate “concave” with “inner circular,” he does not provide the basis for his testimony or explain what “inner circular” means, particularly in the context of distinguishing a convex shape from a concave shape. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 197. Accordingly, we determine there is insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conclusory statements that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Choi’s infrared lamp housing to define a concave shape as claimed.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,036,174 - Rec Solar Holdings As v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00592 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petitions under § 314(a); no trial was instituted.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“First, the projected final written decision due date for each of these proceedings is October 17, 2026. DD Req. 6. The district court’s scheduled trial date is June 1, 2026, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin in June 2026. Id. at 6–7. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in these proceedings will issue before the district court trial occurs, resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the 1 Citations are to papers in IPR2025-00592. Patent Owner filed similar papers in IPR2025-00593, IPR2025-00594, and IPR2025-00595. 2 In IPR2025-00593, Petitioner filed a motion for joinder to IPR2024-01040. In IPR2025-00594, Petitioner filed a motion for joinder to IPR2024-01038. In IPR2025-00595, Petitioner filed a motion for joinder to IPR2024-01194. parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions. This weighs strongly in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“01039, the proceeding that Petitioner seeks to join, is January 14, 2026. As such, it is likely that a final written decision will issue before the district court trial occurs. This is true for all of the proceedings Petitioner seeks to join, and generally counsels against discretionary denial. However, given that the present proceedings would not be instituted in the absence of the proceedings Petitioner seeks to join, there are little to no efficiencies to be gained by joining Petitioner to the proceedings already in progress. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“Petitioner filed the Petition and an accompanying motion for joinder to IPR2024-01039, a proceeding that the Board instituted on January 14, 2025. Canadian Solar Inc. v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd., IPR2024-01039, Paper 13 (PTAB Jan. 14, 2025).2 The Board first determines whether to institute a proceeding before considering a motion for joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Accordingly, discretionary considerations are first reviewed for the Petition on its own, and then reviewed if joinder were to be granted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,222,516 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00244 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that Costa disclosed or suggested claim 11.H’s required arrangement, and the dependent claims did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In view of these deficiencies, the Petition fails to identify the proposed grounds for review with particularity as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) with respect to the limitations of independent claim [11.H]. Petitioner presents no arguments or evidence with respect to the dependent claims challenged under this ground that would remedy the defects noted above with respect to independent claim 11. See generally Pet. Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of claims 11, 12, or 14–19 would have been obvious over Costa.” slip op. at 23
- BurdenDenied
“3. Analysis A petition is required to identify “with particularity[ ] the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). The “petition . . . must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). Our rules require that a petition include fully developed arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (the “petition . . . must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). The petition must include both an adequate explanation of how the claims should be construed as well as how the construed claims are unpatentable over the asserted prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), (b)(4). Additionally, the “petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). A petition should also “explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, based on our rules, we only consider fully developed arguments set forth in the petition.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached
“arguments. See, e.g., id. at 34–35 (arguing that “on” does not require overlap in the Z direction but “includes both objects that are merely touching (in any dimension) and objects that are in proximity to each other but not touching” (citing Ex. 1078, 1; Ex. 1001, 8:3–12)); see also id. at 36–38 (arguing that if “on” is construed to mean “directly on or on with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween,” then Costa’s second stacked layer 232, 242 and third channel structure (173) are “directly on” each other, because their edges are directly touching each other). The Petition, however, does not clearly present any of the claim construction arguments set forth in the Opposition Brief. See Paper 22 (not clearly identifying where the Petition provides the proposed claim construction); see generally Pet.; see also Pet. 33, 43, 56 (arguing “on” does not require “directly on” and permits intermediate layers but not presenting any of the other claim construction arguments set forth in the Opposition Brief). Nor did the Petition provide any particularized argument as to how Costa discloses or suggests a second stacked layer disposed on the third channel structure applying any of the claim constructions proposed in the Opposition Brief. See generally Pet. (presenting no argument that Costa’s second stacked layer 232, 242 is “on” semiconduction portion layer 173 (the asserted third channel structure) because they touch each other as shown above in Petitioner’s annotation of Costa Figure 21A). We will not consider any arguments not sufficiently set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (“the petition must set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“the petition must set forth . . . [h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable”).” slip op. at 19
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“Because we determine that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits, we do not address Patent Owner’s parallel petitions argument.” slip op. at 23
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,886,291 - Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,181,743 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00155 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, or 19 were unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).1 For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, and 19 of the ’187 patent is unpatentable based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex.2001 ¶¶ 60–64). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The failure to use the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[ ] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process.” Id. at 1351. “The [tribunal] must first identify the claimed function.” Id. “Then, the [tribunal] must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. There may be multiple claimed functions, each with disclosed corresponding structure. See id. at 1351–52.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner that the term “automatically” in “to automatically disengage the first and second catch structures” means that it is not just the force applied by the user that disengages the first and second catch structures, but also the bias of the mouthpiece that helps to disengage the first and second catch structures. In the first instance, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim itself recites that, upon actuation, the mouthpiece assembly is “release[d]” to “move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Ex. 1001, 21:59–64. This meaning is supported by the Specification which states: “In some examples, the mouthpiece assembly is biased toward the dispensing configuration and thus moves automatically under its bias upon release by the user-release mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 1:64–67. We further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of “automatic” is that the user operation alone is not responsible for the action. For example, in one dictionary cited by Petitioner, “automatic” is defined as “2: having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism.” See Ex. 2007, 1.11 The district court construction is consistent therewith. The district court identified two functions, the first of which is the same as that of the ’028 patent, i.e., “Automatically disengaging the first and second catch structures upon actuation of the user release mechanism and thereby releasing the mouthpiece assembly to move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Section II.C.1, supra. In discussing that function, the district court states: “While a user may impart force upon user engagement portion 260 to release the mouthpiece, the bias of the mouthpiece towards the dispensing configuration causes the mouthpiece to move automatically, satisfying the requirements of Claim 1.” Ex. 2002, 16. We conclude that the term “automatically” in “adapted to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,684,187
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.