- Roche Molecular Systems Inc. v. Illumina, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2015 · IPR2015-01091 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Institution
The Board denied joinder and denied institution on claims 1–22, citing substantially the same arguments previously presented and the petition’s belated, duplicative filing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“circumstances of each proceeding. See Unified Patents, Inc. v. Personalweb Techs., LLC and Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, Case IPR2014-00702, slip. op. at 4 (PTAB Jan. 13, 2015) (Paper 12). In the instant proceeding, we agree with Patent Owner that joinder with IPR2014-01093 would not promote the efficient resolution of those proceedings. After carefully considering both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s evidence and argument, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. As noted by Patent Owner, Roche announced the acquisition of Ariosa at least as early as December 2, 2014. Ex. 2017. And as also noted by Patent Owner, at that time, Roche was aware that “Ariosa . . . [was] embroiled in a number of patent infringement lawsuits, including with . . . Illumina[ ] and Illumina’s Verinata Health business, and Roche will continue to defend the company in court, Zambrowski said, adding that Roche ‘went into this agreement with our eyes wide open.’” Id. Given that Petitioner had announced the acquisition of Ariosa as early as December 2, 2014, noting that it went into the agreement to acquire Ariosa with its eyes wide open, Petitioner has not provided a persuasive reason as to why it waited until April 24, 2015, to file the instant Petition.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“We approach our discretion to deny a petition on a case-by-case basis. As explained above, one factor that favors denial of the instant Petition is that it raises “substantially the same” arguments as the Petition in IPR2014- 01093. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). We have compared the prior art and arguments raised in the instant Petition to those raised in the Petition filed in IPR2014- 01093. Based on the information presented, we are persuaded that the instant Petition raises, at minimum, “substantially the same . . . arguments” that “previously were presented to the Office” in the Petition filed in IPR2014-01093. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). That is one factor, contributing to the totality of circumstances in this case, that informs our decision to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 14
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Another factor that tips the balance in favor of denying institution of inter partes review is the timing of the filing of the instant Petition. As noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner had the advantage of the Patent Owner’s response in IPR2014-01093 (Prelim. Resp. 20), as well the depositions of Patent Owner’s expert in that proceeding, which were conducted by counsel for Roche (id. at 8). Essentially, the only reason that Petitioner has provided for waiting until April of 2015 to file the instant Petition is that it did not complete its acquisition of Ariosa until January 12, 2015. However, as discussed above, Petitioner was aware of the possibility of acquiring Ariosa as early as June of 2014, and announced its acquisition as early as December of 2014. Petitioner has not provided any persuasive reason as to why it could not have filed the Petition earlier, much less why the Petition could not have been filed within one month of institution of IPR2014-01093. On this record, we are persuaded that our resources are better spent addressing matters other than Petitioner’s belated, and essentially, second attempt to raise a plurality of duplicative grounds against the same patent claims. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (when deciding whether to take action in a particular matter, an agency must determine whether its resources are best spent on one matter or another). Petitioner provides no persuasive reason why we should institute inter partes review in light of the above facts. Based on the totality of circumstances before us, we exercise our discretion and deny institution of inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 316(b), 325(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b).” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,955,794 - PNC Bank, N.A. v. Secure Axcess, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 10, 2015 · CBM2015-00039 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review for claims 1–32, exercising discretion under §§ 324(a) and 325(d) because PNC’s petition repeated substantially similar arguments and prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the AIA grants broad discretion to determine the course that best balances the parties’ competing interests in these proceedings. We recognize the need to balance permitting Petitioner to present new evidence and arguments in multiple petitions against protecting Patent Owner from harassment in the form of repetitive, serial petitions challenging the same patent. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011) (AIA proceedings “are not to be used as tools for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). We also are mindful of the need for efficiency. It is more efficient for the parties and the Board to address a matter once rather than multiple times.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Petitioner fails to provide, however, evidence or analysis as to why a diligent search would not have discovered the prior art relied upon in this Petition. Petitioner’s unsupported, conclusory statements are not persuasive in view of the relationship between the prior art asserted in the two Petitions. In CBM2014-00100, the SHTTP reference asserted in CBM2014-00100 is the SHTTP standard by the Internet Engineering Task Force. CBM2014- 00100 Pet. viii, 20. In the present Petition, the Petitioner indicates that “cited prior art relates to Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (SHTTP) and browsers implementing SHTTP.” Pet. 17. Although not the same references, Petitioner challenges the same claims using the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments. Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the AIA grants broad discretion to determine the course that best balances the parties’ competing interests in these proceedings. We recognize the need to balance permitting Petitioner to present new evidence and arguments in multiple petitions against protecting Patent Owner from harassment in the form of repetitive, serial petitions challenging the same patent. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011) (AIA proceedings “are not to be used as tools for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). We also are mindful of the need for efficiency. It is more efficient for the parties and the Board to address a matter once rather than multiple times.” slip op. at 19
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the AIA grants broad discretion to determine the course that best balances the parties’ competing interests in these proceedings. We recognize the need to balance permitting Petitioner to present new evidence and arguments in multiple petitions against protecting Patent Owner from harassment in the form of repetitive, serial petitions challenging the same patent. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011) (AIA proceedings “are not to be used as tools for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). We also are mindful of the need for efficiency. It is more efficient for the parties and the Board to address a matter once rather than multiple times.” slip op. at 19
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,631,191 - Daicel Corporation v. Celanese International CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 26, 2015 · IPR2015-00171 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted in part, instituting review of claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 for anticipation and claim 57 for obviousness.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 42 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 43, 44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 27–35. In sum, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 are anticipated by the ’095 patent. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureReference is prior artInherency foundInstituted
“the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 99. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 99 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and acetaldehyde would be present in the overhead distillation streams. Id. ¶¶ 101–102. Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 42 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 43, 44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 27–35. In sum, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 are anticipated by the ’095 patent. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“terms, and we agree, for purposes of this decision, that claim 42 does not require a specific quantity of DME in the distillation overhead. We do not agree with Petitioner, however, that the Singh and ’507 patent disclosures are identical with respect to the addition of water to distillation column 22. As indicated in our Decision, both Singh and the ’507 patent describe adding small amounts of water to column 22 for the purpose of inhibiting impurity formation. See Dec. 5–6. The ’507 patent, however, includes additional description of adding water to column 22 for the purpose of producing DME in the distillation overhead. See id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 11). This additional description of adding water to produce DME in the distillation overhead does not refer back to the description of adding water as an inhibitor (see Ex. 1002, 10:9–32), or otherwise indicate that the small amounts of water used to inhibit impurity formation in the ’507 patent and Singh processes would produce DME in a distillation overhead. In addition, for the reasons explained in our Decision (Dec. 25–26), Petitioner has not persuaded us that the prosecution history of the ’507 patent includes an admission by Patent Owner that the addition of any amount of water to the distillation step would result in DME in an overhead stream. See Req. Reh’g 10. In sum, Petitioner has not convinced us that our Decision was based on an erroneous claim interpretation or that we overlooked evidence that the addition of any amount of water in the steps common to the Singh and the ’507 patent processes would necessarily result in the presence of DME in a distillation overhead. With respect to Petitioner’s assertions regarding Akinori, we note the Petition relied on Akinori as evidence that DME was necessarily produced in the ’095 patent process. See Pet. 43. Petitioner did not explain how Akinori was relevant to show the presence of DME in the distillation overhead of Singh. For the above reasons, the Request for Rehearing is denied as to the challenge based on Singh in view of the ’095 patent and Akinori.” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,076,507
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.