- Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01451 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: it exercised discretion as to claims 43–46, 49, 50, 62–69, and 72, and found no reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 55–58.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition. Patent Owner argues that we should decline to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the Petition raises the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that were presented previously to the Office. Prelim. Resp. 19–26. In particular, Patent Owner contends that each of the claims in the reexamination was rejected based on Eddison, under either 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and/or in combination with Jewkes under § 103(a), and that Petitioner relies upon Jewkes again under § 102(b) in its Petition. Id. at 23–26. Petitioner makes no attempt to explain why the references that form the bases for Petitioner’s challenge here are not the same or substantially similar prior art to that presented during the reexamination or why the arguments are not the same or substantially similar to those presented previously to the Office. Eddison and Jewkes were relied upon in the reexamination. See id. at 141–60 (Office Action (mailed Aug. 25, 2014)). Additionally, Tandberg was presented to the Office in conjunction with the original prosecution of the ’817 patent. See Ex. 2003; Prelim. Resp. 28.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Patent Owner makes a valid point. Section 1.530(k) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides: “Amendments not effective until certificate. Although the Office actions will treat proposed amendments as though they have been entered, the proposed amendments will not be effective until the reexamination certificate is issued and published.” This places us in a difficult position. If Patent Owner ultimately succeeds in the appeal of the reexamination, a certificate will issue and the amendments to claim 43 and its dependents will be “effective.” See id.; see Ex. 1007, 166 (showing the amendments to claim 43). Yet Petitioner provides no analysis of the amended limitations of claim 43. See, e.g., Pet. 16. Alternatively, if Patent Owner is unsuccessful in its appeal to the Federal Circuit, claim 43 and its dependents, as challenged in the reexamination, will be declared unpatentable. In either circumstance, any review we undertake of the unamended version of claim 43, and the claims depending therefrom, will be for naught. Accordingly, in light of the above circumstances, reviewing these claims on the record presented would waste judicial resources as well as the resources of the parties.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01450 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), citing overlapping prior art and arguments, the pending reexamination appeal, and resource conservation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“D. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Section 325(d) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides: “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Although Petitioner and Patent Owner present proposed constructions for several claim terms, no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. Pet. 15–21; Prelim. Resp. 10–23.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerGranted
“On August 29, 2016, Petitioner requested, via electronic mail, to file a motion to correct its identification of the real party in interest in this proceeding. In particular, Petitioner requested the addition of Baker Hughes Incorporated as a real party in interest. Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner would not oppose its request. In a responsive email on September 29, 2016, we authorized Petitioner to file a motion to correct the identified real party in interest. On October 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an Updated Mandatory Notice in which Petitioner stated that it “moves the Board to allow correction of Petitioner’s Real Part in Interest (‘RPI’) disclosure.” Paper 8, 1. Although Petitioner did not file a motion to correct as it had requested, we treat its updated mandatory notice as such and hereby grant Petitioner’s request. Accordingly, Baker Hughes Incorporated is a real party in interest in this proceeding as well.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Nu Mark LLC v. Fontem Holdings 1, B.V.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 15, 2016 · IPR2016-01309 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding the Brooks and Whittemore § 103(a) ground substantially the same as art and arguments previously considered by the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the content of Brooks is the same or substantially the same as the disclosures in the EP Publication and the ’875 patent. A comparison of Brooks, the EP Publication, and the ’875 patent demonstrates that the smoking article described in the EP Publication and the flavor delivery article described in the ’875 patent are the same in all material respects as the smoking article described in Brooks.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,863,752 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Research Corporation Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 24, 2016 · IPR2016-01248 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), because Mylan presented the same prior art and arguments it had previously presented.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is subject to the Board’s discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). By statute, “[i]n determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). For the reasons discussed above, the current Petition presents the same prior art and arguments previously presented by the same Petitioner in IPR2016-01101. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review in this case under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denial - PTAB · Oct 19, 2016 · IPR2016-00379 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and declined to institute review of claims 1–6 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments had been presented previously.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Petitioner relies primarily on the same prior art that the examiner relied on during examination. See Dec. 9 (noting Petitioner and examiner both relied on Van Lommen1). Because, under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), we have discretion to reject a Petition if “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office,” Petitioner has not established that we abused our discretion in denying the Petition because substantially the same prior art was previously before the Office. See § 325(d) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,545,040 - PTAB · Jul 1, 2016 · IPR2016-00379 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–6 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same prior art and arguments had been presented during prosecution.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“the Petition under § 325(d) because Petitioner’s obviousness challenge is based on (i) the same primary reference addressed during prosecution, including by the Board in an appeal; and (ii) the same arguments regarding that primary reference and how it allegedly would have been modified. Prelim. Resp. 56–60. Upon reviewing the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the prosecution history of the ’040 patent, we agree. During prosecution, the examiner rejected the claims as obvious over Van Lommen. Here, Petitioner also relies primarily on Van Lommen to argue the claims are obvious. We, therefore, find that substantially the same prior art was previously presented to the Office. We also find that substantially the same arguments were previously presented to the Office, including to the Board. Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have selected Compound 84 of Van Lommen as a base compound for investigation and would have been motivated to stereochemically separate the stereoisomers of Compound 84 using the chromatography techniques disclosed in the secondary prior art references. Pet. 33. As Patent Owner notes, however, the examiner repeatedly stated that “the skilled artisan would have seen optical isomer separation as a routine procedure leading to the compounds claimed herein.” Prelim. Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 1002, 48, 73, 88, 113). Thus, Petitioner asserts substantially the same argument that the examiner asserted during prosecution.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The claims recite a composition “consisting of” the claimed compound. The parties agree that the transitional phrase “consisting of” is a term of art in patent law that “closes” the claim and excludes other elements, steps, or ingredients not specified in the claim. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 23. 4 Armstrong et al., Separation of Drug Stereoisomers by the Formation of β- Cyclodextrin Inclusion Complexes, 232 SCIENCE 1132–35 (1986) (Ex. 1007). expected impurities or additional components or steps that are unrelated to the invention. Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we determine that the term “consisting of” does not exclude the presence of ordinary expected impurities or the presence of additional components that are unrelated to the invention.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsOther
“concluding the applicants’ evidence of unexpected results sufficient, and implicitly finding a sufficient nexus between the evidence and the claimed invention. See In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“For objective evidence of secondary considerations to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.”) (quoting Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Finally, Petitioner argues that it has submitted “ample evidence” that the compounds of claims 1 and 2 would be the intended and expected result of combining the asserted references, and that claims 3–6 would not be an unexpected result of the suggested combination. Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1050 ¶¶ 50, 56, 66, 73, 74, 81, 93, 106; Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 60–68, 93, 100). But Petitioner’s cited evidence relates to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered separating and studying the stereoisomers of compound 84 to be ordinary and routine. See, e.g., Ex. 1050 ¶ 73 (“A POSITA at the time would have had an expectation that this stereochemical resolution could be easily achieved using known and commercially available techniques, without undue experimentation.”); Ex. 1052 ¶ 93 (“[I]t is my opinion that a POSITA at the time of the ’040 Patent’s priority date, would have been motivated to carry out standard new-drug investigation on each of the purified stereochemical forms in order to determine the effectiveness of each stereochemical form, to determine whether the drug could be administered as a racemic mixture or whether a purified enantiomer was required, to determine the interactions between stereoisomers if administered together, and to determine the effective amounts of each compound necessary for treatment of hypertension.”). The Board, however, assumed examiner established a prima facie case of obviousness. Ex. 1002, 199. Nevertheless, the Board still found the unexpected results evidence presented by the applicants to be sufficient. Finally, although the prior panel expressly set forth the deficiencies in the examiner’s position with respect to the evidence of unexpected results, the Petition is silent as to those deficiencies. In particular, Petitioner has not offered sufficient evidence to show why an ordinary artisan “would have expected the RSSS stereoisomer to have such [potentiating] properties” or to show “that the potentiating property, described in the declaration, is insignificant.” See Ex. 1002, 200. Because Petitioner has not addressed these issues, we are not inclined to reconsider the Board’s prior decision. Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that readjudicating substantially the same prior art and arguments as those presented during prosecution would not be an efficient use of Board resources.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,545,040 - PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2016-00932 · APJ William M Fink · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claim 12 under § 325(d), finding the grounds relied on the same art and substantially the same arguments previously found insufficient; it dismissed joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). In particular, “[i]n determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In making this determination, we may consider whether Petitioner uses our prior Decision to bolster challenges it advanced unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Unilever, Inc. v.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDenied
“§ 325(d). Because we deny the Petition, we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder as moot.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,714,966 - PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2016-00931 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claim 12 under § 325(d), finding the Shoubridge grounds reused substantially the same art and arguments previously found insufficient; it dismissed joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“at issue here challenging claim 12 as unpatentable over Shoubridge alone and Shoubridge in view of DirectPlay rely on the same prior art and substantially the same arguments that we found insufficient in the 1972 IPR. Although Shoubridge alone was not raised as a basis for challenging claim 12 in the 1972 IPR, it was raised as a basis for challenging claim 1, from which claim 12, among other claims, depends. 1972-Decision 11–12. Moreover, the claim mapping provided for claim 12 in the instant petition relies on nearly identical disclosures in Shoubridge as relied upon for claim 1 in the previous petition. Compare Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1205, 2 ¶ 11–3 ¶ 1) (mapping Shoubridge’s disclosures of broadcasting a user packet on outgoing links to claim 12’s “broadcast channel for a game of interest”), with 1972-Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1205, 2 ¶ 11–3 ¶ 1) (mapping Shoubridge’s disclosures of broadcasting a user packet on outgoing links to claim 1’s “send[ing] data to the other participants”). Petitioner presents no persuasive reason why it could not have challenged claim 12 based on Shoubridge alone in the 1972 IPR. Similarly, regarding the challenge to claim 12 based on Shoubridge in view of DirectPlay, Petitioner previously presented this prior art as DirectPlay in view of Shoubridge. See 1972-Pet. 27 (“DirectPlay is presented as the primary reference.”). As an initial matter, characterizing the instant grounds as Shoubridge in view of DirectPlay instead of the other way around is itself of “no significance.” See In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1961). Significantly, Petitioner relies in large part upon the same disclosures in DirectPlay, e.g., pages 21–24, in contending that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Shoubridge and DirectPlay. Pet. 33–34. We recognize that Petitioner now adds citation to additional disclosures at pages 47, 50, and 51 of DirectPlay. Id. at 31. Petitioner contends this additional evidence rebuts Patent Owner’s alleged mischaracterization of DirectPlay as limited to static networks. Id. at 8–9. However, Petitioner provides no persuasive reason that it could not have anticipated Patent Owner’s argument given Shoubridge’s teaching that “flooding results in very low network utilization, and therefore better routing strategies need to be sought.” See 1972-Decision 22 (quoting Ex. 1205, 4). Consequently, we find this to be a “second bite at the apple” (Prelim. Resp. 11–12) used to bolster previously unsuccessful arguments. See Unilever, slip op. at 7–8; Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Techs., LLC, Case CBM2015-00047, slip op. at 12–13 (PTAB June 15, 2015) (Paper 7) (new indefiniteness argument); Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., v. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, Case No. IPR2015-00820, slip op. at 4 (PTAB May 15, 2015) (Paper 12) (new reference).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“§ 325(d). Because we deny the Petition, we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder as moot. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), an inter partes review is not instituted for claim 12 of U.S. Patent No. 6,701,344 B1; and FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,701,344 - Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2016 · IPR2016-00301 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1-5, 7-10, 12-22, and 25-31 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art or arguments had been presented before.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In determining whether to exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d), we have reviewed the timeline of the Petition’s filings. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on December 9, 2015, approximately two months after the Board issued the decisions denying institution in the ’973 IPR. The reliance on Radia in the instant Petition appears, therefore, to be an attempt to bolster the unsuccessful challenge previously presented regarding Hendel’s alleged disclosure of the limitations of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 16–18 (arguing Petitioner used prior Institution Decisions as a roadmap); see also id. at 14–16 (arguing Petitioner fails to explain why Radia could not have been presented in an earlier petition). Under § 325(d), our determination here rests on whether the same or substantially the same prior art was presented previously. Finding that Hendel was presented previously in the ’973 IPR, and that the instant Petition relies on bolstering Hendel guided by our Decision in the ’973 IPR, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and deny institution of inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the instant Petition raises the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments as those previously presented to the Office. In light of the circumstances of the present case, we exercise our discretion not to institute inter partes review of the ’577 patent.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,377,577 - Great West Casualty Company / Bitco General Insurance Corporation et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 9, 2016 · IPR2016-00453 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 11–20, exercising discretion under § 314(a) because this was an unjustified serial petition and separately rejecting it under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“patent, using substantially the same prior art, and filed so long apart that Petitioner received the benefit of having studied Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response in an earlier petition. That is especially so if Petitioner, at the time of filing of the earlier petition was aware of or should have been aware of the prior art references newly cited and applied in the later petition. To that end, Petitioner does not assert that it was unaware of Nazem prior to filing the instant Petition or any earlier petition. The potential inequity based on a petitioner’s filing of serial and similar attacks against the same claims of the same patent, while having the opportunity to adjust litigation positions along the way based on either patent owner’s contentions responding to prior challenges or the Board’s decision on prior challenges, is real and cannot be ignored. This is not to say, however, that multiple petitions against the same claims of the same patent are never permitted. Rather, each case depends on its own facts. We look to and consider, in each case, as we do here, what rationale a petitioner offers for filing multiple petitions and for the time elapsed between those filings. Generally, however, we are unpersuaded that the possibility of an adverse claim construction alone, especially where the possibility of the adverse claim construction was expressly a result of assertions made by a patent owner in the previous proceeding, is sufficient to justify serial petitions.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Emphasis added. As admitted by Petitioner, all of the grounds in the instant Petition and the petition in IPR2015-01706 rely primarily on MyLibrary. Furthermore, the only reference cited additionally in the instant proceeding is Nazem, and Nazem mentions, on multiple occasions, variations of “MyYahoo” or “my.yahoo.com.” Ex. 1047, Figs. 1, 3, 4, 5A, 5B; 2:63-3:2; Appendices A and B. Moreover, Petitioner asserts the following: For example, one such prior art personalized portal, referenced by MyLibrary as an inspiration, was the MyYahoo system, Ex. 1005 at 1, a system described in U.S. Patent No. 5,983,227 to Nazem et al. (issued Nov. 9, 1999) (Ex. 1047). Ex. 1047 at Face, Fig. 5a (“MyYahoo!”). Pet. 21. A person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to add content, such as disclosed in Nazem, to the personalized web pages of MyLibrary because MyYahoo was an inspiration for the system of MyLibrary, thereby suggesting the additional MyYahoo functionality would work well with MyLibrary. Pet. 22. Given these articulated connections between the substance of MyLibrary and Nazem, we have no trouble determining that presenting MyLibrary and Nazem in this proceeding is “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments” as was presented previously to the Office in IPR2015-01706, with MyLibrary alone.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review of any of claims 11–20 of the ’177 patent, and also reject the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). IV. ORDER It is ORDERED that no trial or inter partes review is instituted for any claim of the ’177 patent on any ground in this proceeding.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,516,177
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.