- Vovomart (HK) Enterprises Co., Ltd. / HK Sanodesk Co., Ltd. et al. v. Office Kick, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 12, 2023 · PGR2022-00048 · APJ James A Tartal · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding the same or substantially the same art had been presented to the Office and Petitioner showed no material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“previously presented to the Office under our framework for evaluating discretionary denial under Section 325(d), we next consider whether Petitioner “has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8; see also id. at 8–9 (further explaining that if “petitioner fails to make a showing of material error,” generally discretion will be exercised to deny institution of review). In the second part of our framework, we consider (i) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (ii) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in evaluating the asserted prior art; and (iii) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art. See id. at 9 n.10, 10– 11 (citing factors (c), (e), and (f) of Becton, Dickinson). For the reasons that follow, we find that Petitioner does not demonstrate an error material to patentability.” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,160,367 - Atrium Medical Corporation v. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2022 · IPR2021-01200 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been presented to the Office and no material error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Section 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Pet. vi. Although both citations above refer to “Herts” as an author, it is apparent that the citations to the two articles provide different article titles, different publications, and different publication dates. Accordingly, Petitioner’s assertion that “Bardport specifically identifies Herts as ‘on the subject’ of, and ‘of help’ regarding, the use of power injectors with Bard’s venous access port assembly,” is incorrect, because the article Petitioner relies on as Herts is not the article cited in Bardport authored by “Herts.” See Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1012, 27–28; Ex. 1038, 1–2). Mr. Leschinsky’s testimony regarding Bardport on this point is likewise incorrect. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 94. Mr. Leschinsky states that “[i]t is my opinion that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to combine the 9 The identical question and answer appears on multiple pages of Exhibit 1012. See Ex. 1012, 21–22, 27–28, 33–34. teachings of Herts . . . because Bardport itself acknowledges Herts’ findings,” and “in response to a ‘frequently asked question’ titled ‘[c]an catheters be used in the Radiology Department with the Power Injector?’ Bardport cites to Herts.” Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 21–22). As explained above, Bardport does not cite to Herts, the reference relied upon by Petitioner, but instead refers to a different article identifying “Herts” as the author.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,947,022 - Atrium Medical Corporation v. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2022 · IPR2021-01199 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds under § 325(d), finding the art previously presented to the Office and no material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Section 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board has discretion to deny a request for institution when the information presented shows that the petitioner raises “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously presented to the Office,” for example, during patent examination or” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“See Pet. 54 (citing Ex. 1012, 27–28; Ex. 1038, 2). Mr. Leschinsky’s testimony regarding Bardport on this point is likewise incorrect. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 100. Mr. Leschinsky states that “[i]t is my opinion that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Herts . . . because Bardport itself acknowledges Herts’ findings,” and “in response to a ‘frequently asked question’ titled ‘[c]an catheters be used in the Radiology Department with the Power Injector?’ Bardport cites to Herts.” Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 21–22). As explained above, Bardport does not cite to Herts, the reference relied upon by Petitioner, but instead refers to a different article identifying “Herts” as the author.” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,785,302 - Atrium Medical Corporation v. Bard Peripheral Vasulcar, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 10, 2022 · IPR2021-01197 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 8, 9, and 11 under § 325(d), finding the same art had been presented before and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“In evaluating the exercise of discretion to deny institution under Section 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyOther
“5 It is specifically this portion of Melsky that Petitioner cites as teaching a power-injectable access port, as claimed. See Pet. 27, 31, 36; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66, 70, 74 (analyzing Melsky and concluding it teaches a power injectable port, as claimed). We note that Melsky never expressly mentions a power injectable port. See generally Ex. 1008. Petitioner’s witness relies on Melsky’s disclosure that its port can withstand pressures of 200 psi or more as inherently disclosing a power injectable port; however, the witness merely concludes this without citation to supporting evidence. This is meager evidence of an alleged inherent disclosure intended to be a foundation of Petitioner’s challenges in this proceeding. “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“conclusory expert testimony is inadequate to support an obviousness determination on substantial evidence review.”).” slip op. at 16
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,959,615 - Agamatrix, Inc. v. Dexcom, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 13, 2019 · IPR2018-01717 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 14–69 under § 325(d), finding that the same prior art had previously been presented to the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Examiner found that the prior art, including Berner, failed to disclose applying a voltage to the electrochemical sensor, wherein applying the voltage comprises at least one process selected from the group consisting of switching, cycling, and pulsing a voltage applied to the electrochemical glucose sensor. Ex. 1002, 259. The Examiner explicitly found that Berner “teaches the switching of a voltage to the electrodes, but disclosed such a feature as part of an iontophoretic electrodes embodiment for collection purposes.” Id. AgaMatrix now relies on the same disclosure in Berner of application of a voltage to the iontophoretic electrodes as evidence of disclosure of the applying and the switching, cycling, and pulsing claim elements that the Examiner found missing in Berner.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,750,460 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 1, 2018 · IPR2016-01440 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–20, and 28–42 were not shown unpatentable because Myers did not establish axial translation, and Myers with Bostock did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“radially” in the Petition. In its Reply, Petitioner equates “radially” to “outwardly” and “axially” to “downwardly.” Pet. Reply 7. Patent Owner contends that “axially and radially” would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art “to refer to movement relative the body and oriented relative to the axis of the body.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2018 ¶ 82). In particular, Patent Owner contends that “axial” refers to “movement along or parallel to the axis of the body, and that “radial” refers to “the direction perpendicular to the axis of the body.” PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner contends its interpretation is consistent with the Specification of the ’099 patent and is supported by both its expert, Mr. Underwood, and Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Shale. Id. at 18–21 (citations omitted). For example, Mr. Shale testified that “‘[r]adially’ basically means left to right within the tubular body,” and “‘axially’ means up and down within the tubular body.” Ex. 2021, 189:5–7. Patent Owner further notes that Figures 4, 5, 11, and 12 of the ’099 patent illustrate arms 520 moving axially and radially relative to body 510. PO Resp. 20. In its Reply, Petitioner argues that “[c]ontrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, claim 1 of the ’099 [p]atent does not require that the body 10 be the frame of reference for the axial and radial movement.” Pet. Reply 13 n.3. Petitioner, however, cites no persuasive evidence to counter Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, Mr. Shale agreed that “radially” corresponds to “outward from the body,” and that “axially” corresponds to “up and down of the body.” Ex. 2021 190:4–19. Consistent with Mr. Shale’s testimony, Petitioner’s analysis purports to show that Myers discloses movement of moveable arms (slips 30) “both axially and radially relative to the body 10 [of Myers].” Pet. 19– 20. Petitioner is not alleging movement of the slips of Myers relative to a feature other than the body of Myers or in some other frame of reference. See Tr. 10:1–21. Thus, based on the evidence discussed above, we determine “translates axially and radially,” as recited in claim 1, means “moves parallel to and perpendicular to the body” and does not encompass movement consisting of only rotation about a pivot point. slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The steps discussed above address how slips 30 of Myers are deployed, but do not explain expressly whether slips 30 move axially relative to body 10 during deployment. With regard to the slips, Myers further provides that: [Slips 30] are positively movable laterally relative to the expander upon relative longitudinal movement between the expander and slips by inclined spline connections between the slips and expander, provided by oppositely directed side tongues 32 on each slip sliding in companion grooves 33 in the expander on opposite sides of slots 34 in the expander in which the slips are disposed. The lower ends of the slips 30 are coupled for movement longitudinally with one another by being connected to a slip ring 35 having generally T-shaped slots 36 therein receiving companion T-shaped heads 37 on the lower portions of the slips. Thus, the slips 30 move longitudinally jointly with the slip ring 35, although they are still permitted to move radially or laterally inwardly and outwardly of the slip ring, upon relative longitudinal movement between the slips 30 and expander 26. Ex. 1004, 3:2–17. In this passage, the movement of the slips includes “longitudinal movement,” which we understand generally corresponds to a vertical direction, as opposed to lateral movement in a horizontal direction. However, the movement is described relative to expander 26, not relative to body 10. See Pet. 13 (using “lateral” consistent with the horizontal extent and “longitudinal” consistent with the vertical extent). Thus, this passage also does not explain expressly whether slips 30 move axially relative to the body during deployment.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“C. ASSERTED OBVIOUSNESS OVER MYERS AND BOSTOCK Petitioner contends claims 4, 33, and 34, each of which depends from claim 1, would have been obvious over Myers and Bostock. Pet. 24–26. According to Petitioner, “[e]ach of claims 4, 33, and 34 recites biasing either a sleeve or a movable arm to a collapsed position.” Id. at 24. Petitioner relies on Bostock as disclosing a spring for biasing. Id. As to the limitations of claim 1 from which claims 4, 33, and 34 depend, including the requirement of “one moveable arm translates axially and radially,” Petitioner relies only on the contentions it set forth under its anticipation analysis with respect to claim 1. Because Petitioner does not rely on Bostock to teach the recited feature “one moveable arm translates axially and radially,” does not argue the feature would have been obvious over the combination, and, for the reasons provided above, has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Myers teaches the feature, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4, 33, and 34 of the ’099 patent would have been obvious over Myers and Bostock.” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Mr. Shale expresses the opinion that “slips 30 move both axially and radially relative to the body 10, along ‘generally T-shaped slots 36’ that are linear and angled relative to the axial direction,” we find that testimony to be conclusory and entitled to little weight, in part because this testimony does not account for the upward movement of setting sleeve 40. See Ex. 1010 ¶ 53 (quoting Ex. 1004, 3:11); see also In re Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Accordingly, we find Mr. Shale’s declaration fails to provide persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that Myers discloses “one moveable arm translates axially and radially,” as required by claim 1, beyond what Myers, itself, discloses. We find more persuasive Mr. Underwood’s testimony, on behalf of Patent Owner, that Myers fails to disclose axial movement of slips 30. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 90–107. According to Mr. Underwood: slots [36 of Myers] are shown as angled relative to the slip ring 35. However, though the slips may move downward (axially) relative to the slip ring 35 as the slips move outward (radially), the slip ring 35 at the same time moves upward (axially) relative to the body. As such, the angle of the slots 36 within the slip ring 35 is not, itself, indicative of the overall movement of the slips. Id. ¶ 91. Mr. Underwood further reasons that “as the slip ring moves upwardly, the movement of the slips relative to the body in the axial direction is zero due to the slips sliding downward in the slots 36 relative to the slip ring 35 in equal proportion.” Id. ¶ 94. Mr. Underwood also” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,314,099 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,314,099 - PTAB · Sep 5, 2017 · IPR2017-00072 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its discretionary denial of institution because the petition presented the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Sabbaghian, disclosing an adjustable socket wrench, and Baker, disclosing a tube pointer, were not considered during prosecution. See Pet. 37, 41. Petitioner relies on Sabbaghian and Baker as disclosing dies arranged to form a variable-sized polygonal aperture, the only claimed feature Petitioner argues is missing from the alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art. Pet. 3– 4, 37–43. According to Petitioner, “the polygonal-shaped die configuration is nothing new,” and “[f]or more than a century, skilled artisans have used such a configuration.” Id. at 4. Petitioner concedes that “[t]he die configuration disclosed in Sabbaghian and Baker is not unique. Such a die configuration is common in the prior art.” Id. at 93 (under the heading “The Claimed Die Configuration Was Ubiquitous In The Prior Art”). Although Sabbaghian and Baker were not considered, Petitioner notes that during examination Whitesell was applied as disclosing a crimper with a “substantially regular polygonal shape.” Pet. 22. Similarly, Tuberman was considered during prosecution as teaching a device with “an aperture of a substantially regular polygonal shape.” See Prelim. Resp. 19 (quoting Ex. 1002, 45). For the foregoing reasons we determine that the alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art and Morales were previously presented to the Office. Additionally, the Petition further presents information from Sabbaghian and Baker, generally described by Petitioner as “ubiquitous” in the prior art, which we find to be the same or substantially the same as information considered during prosecution in the context of other references, including Whitesell and Tuberman. Id. at 10–11. According to Petitioner, “[t]he only distinction between the AAPA and the challenged claims is the shape and arrangement of the blades that form the claimed ‘polygonal aperture.’” Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 94). Petitioner argues that Whitesell can be distinguished from the asserted prior art in this proceeding because it does not teach “the straight-sided die/polygonal aperture limitation.” Req. Reh’g. 7. However, Petitioner does not dispute that Tuberman discloses this feature. See id. at 7–8. Thus, Petitioner has not shown a substantial difference between the art previously considered by the Office and the alleged prior art asserted in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner argues that the Examiner did not apply Tuberman in combination with the alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art. According to Petitioner, “the Examiner applied Tuberman individually as an anticipatory reference,” and “[i]t is irrelevant to speculate why the Examiner did not make a combination that is so readily apparent.” Req. Reh’g. 8, 11.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,915,560 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01451 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: it exercised discretion as to claims 43–46, 49, 50, 62–69, and 72, and found no reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 55–58.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition. Patent Owner argues that we should decline to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the Petition raises the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that were presented previously to the Office. Prelim. Resp. 19–26. In particular, Patent Owner contends that each of the claims in the reexamination was rejected based on Eddison, under either 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and/or in combination with Jewkes under § 103(a), and that Petitioner relies upon Jewkes again under § 102(b) in its Petition. Id. at 23–26. Petitioner makes no attempt to explain why the references that form the bases for Petitioner’s challenge here are not the same or substantially similar prior art to that presented during the reexamination or why the arguments are not the same or substantially similar to those presented previously to the Office. Eddison and Jewkes were relied upon in the reexamination. See id. at 141–60 (Office Action (mailed Aug. 25, 2014)). Additionally, Tandberg was presented to the Office in conjunction with the original prosecution of the ’817 patent. See Ex. 2003; Prelim. Resp. 28.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Patent Owner makes a valid point. Section 1.530(k) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides: “Amendments not effective until certificate. Although the Office actions will treat proposed amendments as though they have been entered, the proposed amendments will not be effective until the reexamination certificate is issued and published.” This places us in a difficult position. If Patent Owner ultimately succeeds in the appeal of the reexamination, a certificate will issue and the amendments to claim 43 and its dependents will be “effective.” See id.; see Ex. 1007, 166 (showing the amendments to claim 43). Yet Petitioner provides no analysis of the amended limitations of claim 43. See, e.g., Pet. 16. Alternatively, if Patent Owner is unsuccessful in its appeal to the Federal Circuit, claim 43 and its dependents, as challenged in the reexamination, will be declared unpatentable. In either circumstance, any review we undertake of the unamended version of claim 43, and the claims depending therefrom, will be for naught. Accordingly, in light of the above circumstances, reviewing these claims on the record presented would waste judicial resources as well as the resources of the parties.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01450 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), citing overlapping prior art and arguments, the pending reexamination appeal, and resource conservation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“D. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Section 325(d) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides: “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Although Petitioner and Patent Owner present proposed constructions for several claim terms, no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. Pet. 15–21; Prelim. Resp. 10–23.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerGranted
“On August 29, 2016, Petitioner requested, via electronic mail, to file a motion to correct its identification of the real party in interest in this proceeding. In particular, Petitioner requested the addition of Baker Hughes Incorporated as a real party in interest. Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner would not oppose its request. In a responsive email on September 29, 2016, we authorized Petitioner to file a motion to correct the identified real party in interest. On October 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an Updated Mandatory Notice in which Petitioner stated that it “moves the Board to allow correction of Petitioner’s Real Part in Interest (‘RPI’) disclosure.” Paper 8, 1. Although Petitioner did not file a motion to correct as it had requested, we treat its updated mandatory notice as such and hereby grant Petitioner’s request. Accordingly, Baker Hughes Incorporated is a real party in interest in this proceeding as well.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - T-Mobile US, Inc. / T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al. v. Tracbeam, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 25, 2016 · IPR2016-00745 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claim 17 under § 325(d) because the same prior art had been presented in an earlier petition, and denied joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims. Denial of a ground is a Board decision not to institute inter partes review on that ground.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). In particular, “[i]n determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). This is an instance in which Petitioner presents the same prior art in a second petition along with arguments to correct errors in a first petition.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Joinder, however, is appropriate only when the underlying petition sought to be joined warrants institution. According to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (emphasis added): If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. As explained below, we have considered the Petition and the Preliminary Response and determine that the Petition does not warrant the institution of an inter partes review. Accordingly, we do not reach whether the Petition is time barred or whether joinder otherwise would be appropriate. Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is denied as moot.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“1687 proceeding. Mot. for Joinder. Petitioner argues that the Petition is timely by virtue of its Motion for Joinder. Pet. 12–13; see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).”). Joinder, however, is appropriate only when the underlying petition sought to be joined warrants institution. According to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (emphasis added): If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. As explained below, we have considered the Petition and the Preliminary Response and determine that the Petition does not warrant the institution of an inter partes review. Accordingly, we do not reach whether the Petition is time barred or whether joinder otherwise would be appropriate.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,764,231
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.