- Microsoft Corporation v. Almondnet, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 30, 2023 · IPR2022-01319 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding Beyda had been presented to the Office and Microsoft had not shown material Examiner error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Here, Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s evidence that Beyda was previously presented to the Office. Ex. 1004, 295. Thus, the first criterion of the Advanced Bionics framework (same art or arguments) is met. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8 (“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS),”). The second inquiry in the Advanced Bionics framework asks whether the Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8–9. As Patent Owner points out, “although the Petition admits that the Examiner considered Beyda during prosecution, it fails to make any allegation whatsoever that the Examiner erred (let alone erred in a material way) in his consideration of Beyda.” Prelim. Resp. 18. As to Narin, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “does not offer any explanation” why that reference is not “substantially the same” as art considered by the Examiner, “let alone how or why the Examiner materially erred in considering that art to not be invalidating.” Id. We agree that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Office erred in its evaluation of the cited art. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8–9 (“If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.”). Here, the Beyda prior art that was before the Examiner during the examination is identical to the art cited here.3 There is no argument or evidence before us that Beyda was concealed from the Examiner. The Examiner ultimately made a determination that the claims were patentable. Ex. 1004, 49, 92. As cautioned by Advanced Bionics, “[i]f reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 9. Advanced Bionics goes on to explain the rationale for this rule: “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. Having considered the record presented by Patent Owner and the absence of any substantive showing from Petitioner, we are not persuaded of material Examiner error. Petitioner’s assertion that the prior art references in the Petition “were not substantively considered during the prosecution of the ’139 Patent, or in the prior CBM challenge,” without further explanation, is insufficient. In summary, applying the two-part framework of Advanced Bionics, we are persuaded to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C § 325(d).” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,671,139 - Alarm.Com, Inc. v. Vivint, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00728 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been presented during prosecution and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“GMBH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”), the Board applied a two-part framework in considering whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d): “(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“After considering the Petition and associated evidence, we exercise” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision and to the extent necessary, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 6 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). On this record, we determine that no terms or phrases in the claims require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,349,262 - ADT LLC v. Vivint, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2022 · IPR2022-00612 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been considered and no material examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Because (1) Saylor ’265 was made of record by the examiner and contains essentially the same disclosure as Saylor, (2) we find that the disclosures of Gregory relied upon by Petitioner are duplicative of Kellen and Thomson evaluated and distinguished during examination, and (3) Petitioner extensively relies on Saylor and Gregory in each of the asserted grounds of unpatentability, we determine that the Petition presents the same or substantially the same prior art that was previously presented to” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“the time of the alleged invention would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or computer engineering (or equivalent experience), and at least two years of professional experience in remote monitoring and control systems, Internet of Things (‘IoT’), home security systems, building automation systems, machine-to-machine (‘M2M’) communications, or other similarly relevant industry experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not provide its own assessment regarding the level of skill in the art, or otherwise dispute Petitioner’s assertion. See Prelim. Resp. Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes specific claim constructions for any terms. Pet. 5; see Prelim. Resp. On this record, we determine that no terms or phrases in the claims require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,349,262 - Panduit Corp. v. Corning Optical Communications LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 6, 2022 · IPR2021-01562 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR for claims 1–30 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments had been considered and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“interest to this proceeding. Pet. 75; Paper 9, 2. Patent Owner argues the “Petition’s identification of the real parties-in-interest is fatally defective” because “the RPI identified in the Petition is different from the real parties in interest identified in the Power of Attorney.” Prelim. Resp. 41–42 (citing Pet. 75). In an Updated Mandatory Notice, Petitioner identifies Panduit Corp., The Siemon Company, FS.Com, Inc., and Reichle & De-Massari Holding AG as the real parties in interest. Paper 17, 2. To the extent that the identification of the real parties in interest in the Petition may have been defective because it differed from Petitioner’s Powers of Attorney (see Papers 1–4), that defect has been cured in Petitioner’s Updated Mandatory Notice.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“part of the Advanced Bionics framework, that the Petition “presents to the Office the same or substantially the same art previously presented to the Office.” See Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 7.” slip op. at 16
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,444,456 - Google LLC v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 29, 2018 · IPR2017-02067 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: it declined review of claims 1–12, 14–17, 25, and 26 under §§ 315(d) and 325(d), and found no reasonable likelihood for claims 13, 18–24, and 27.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Here, our exercise of discretion to deny institution under §§ 315(d) and 325(d) is warranted for several reasons. To start with, the previous IPRs and the present Petition rely on Zydney as the primary reference against which the majority of the claim limitations are mapped. Petitioner has proffered no reasoning regarding how it has relied on Zydney in any way that differs materially from the previous IPRs. And Petitioner’s reliance on different secondary references does not remedy this shortcoming. Moreover, Petitioner, here, does not explain whether the secondary references in this case are used in a different manner or add anything materially different to the secondary references used in the previous IPRs. Further, Zydney is being considered on the merits in pending IPRs. In fact, two trials regarding the ’433 patent are ongoing, with Zydney as the hallmark, i.e., a distinctive feature, of those trials. See IPR2017-01427 and IPR2017-01428. Under these circumstances, we look to Petitioner to provide some reason that convinces us to institute yet another trial that features Zydney as prominently as the previously presented IPRs. Again, if there was a manner in which Petitioner here distinguishably relied on Zydney, Petitioner did not proffer that fact explicitly. Moreover, the time of filing of this Petition leads us to conclude that Petitioner gained the benefit of Patent Owner’s preliminary responses in the previous IPRs. Patent Owner filed those responses on September 9, 2017. Three days later Petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner, as the party with the knowledge of this fact, failed to allege that it did not gain the benefit of the preliminary responses in previous IPRs. We look to Petitioner to explain its delay in its filing. Petitioner provides no reason here. Finally, although not a dispositive fact, we note that in the previous IPRs, Patent Owner requested authorization to file a motion to amend challenged claims of the ’433 patent. This fact raises concerns regarding the complexity and potential for inconsistency inherent in allowing this proceeding to occur in tandem with ongoing trials that arise in large part from the considerable role Zydney plays each proceeding. Further, we are concerned not only with ensuring consistency across multiple trials focused on Zydney, but also with administrative efficiency because significant resources of the Board would be consumed reconciling arguments, issues, and evidence across multiple, independent trials,3 especially in light of the forthcoming motion to amend in the previous IPRs. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (indicating an agency, when deciding whether to take action in a particular matter, must determine whether its resources are best spent on one matter or another).” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“authority, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.122, to issue “any appropriate order regarding the additional matter[, i.e., this proceeding,] including providing for the stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination or any such matter.” See 35 U.S.C. § 315(d). We recognize that in exercising our discretion we determine the proper course of conduct in a proceeding (37 C.F.R. § 42.5) in a manner consistent with securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the proceeding (37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b)). Here, our exercise of discretion to deny institution under §§ 315(d) and 325(d) is warranted for several reasons. To start with, the previous IPRs and the present Petition rely on Zydney as the primary reference against which the majority of the claim limitations are mapped. Petitioner has proffered no reasoning regarding how it has relied on Zydney in any way that differs materially from the previous IPRs. And Petitioner’s reliance on different secondary references does not remedy this shortcoming. Moreover, Petitioner, here, does not explain whether the secondary references in this case are used in a different manner or add anything materially different to the secondary references used in the previous IPRs. Further, Zydney is being considered on the merits in pending IPRs. In fact, two trials regarding the ’433 patent are ongoing, with Zydney as the hallmark, i.e., a distinctive feature, of those trials. See IPR2017-01427 and IPR2017-01428. Under these circumstances, we look to Petitioner to provide some reason that convinces us to institute yet another trial that features Zydney as prominently as the previously presented IPRs. Again, if there was a manner in which Petitioner here distinguishably relied on Zydney, Petitioner did not proffer that fact explicitly.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“likelihood of prevailing with regard to its contention that claim 13 is anticipated by Zydney. In particular, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that Zydney’s software agent “displays a selectable control for generating an instant voice message using an intercom mode.” This is an anticipation challenge, which requires that the art disclose each and every limitation of the claim, in the same arrangement as claimed. Net MoneyIn, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Board cannot fill in the gaps and consider what an ordinary artisan might supplement or envisage. Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1372; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor, 851 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (The Board is not permitted to “fill in missing limitations simply because a skilled artisan would immediately envision them.”). The Petition sets forth that Zydney teaches a “selectable control” because the software agent permits a number of distinct modes of communication and that the originator selects a delivery mode, i.e., intercom mode. Pet. 1718. But with regard to the display of the “selectable control,” Petitioner states that “Zydney plainly teaches that its software agent’s user interface displays a selectable control for generating an instant voice message using an intercom mode based on the connectivity status (e.g., status of the recipient) of an intended recipient.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). In support, the Min Declaration mentions “display” in reference to selecting the recipients, stating, “Once the originator has selected the recipients from the display, Zydney’s system allows the originator to select a delivery option depending on which ‘core state’ the intended recipient is in—online or offline.” Id. This is insufficient support for demonstrating that Zydney discloses the display limitation of claim 13. Claim 13 recites that the “instant voice messaging application displays a selectable control for generating an instant voice message using an intercom mode.” Neither the Petition nor the Min Declaration addresses the display of the “selectable control for generating an instant voice message.” At best, the Min Declaration adduces to the display of a list of recipients and their selection. But there is no explanation as to the display of the “selectable control” in Zydney or citation of evidence that Zydney displays any selection such that it can generate a voice message in intercom mode. Without evidence that Zydney discloses the recited “display,” we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Zydney anticipates the claim. Therefore, Petitioner’s contention of unpatentability regarding claim 13 does not meet the reasonable likelihood institution threshold.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Board cannot fill in the gaps and consider what an ordinary artisan might supplement or envisage. Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1372; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor, 851 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (The Board is not permitted to “fill in missing limitations simply because a skilled artisan would immediately envision them.”). The Petition sets forth that Zydney teaches a “selectable control” because the software agent permits a number of distinct modes of communication and that the originator selects a delivery mode, i.e., intercom mode. Pet. 1718. But with regard to the display of the “selectable control,” Petitioner states that “Zydney plainly teaches that its software agent’s user interface displays a selectable control for generating an instant voice message using an intercom mode based on the connectivity status (e.g., status of the recipient) of an intended recipient.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). In support, the Min Declaration mentions “display” in reference to selecting the recipients, stating, “Once the originator has selected the recipients from the display, Zydney’s system allows the originator to select a delivery option depending on which ‘core state’ the intended recipient is in—online or offline.” Id. This is insufficient support for demonstrating that Zydney discloses the display limitation of claim 13. Claim 13 recites that the “instant voice messaging application displays a selectable control for generating an instant voice message using an intercom mode.” Neither the Petition nor the Min Declaration addresses the display of the “selectable control for generating an instant voice message.” At best, the Min Declaration adduces to the display of a list of recipients and their selection. But there is no explanation as to the display of the “selectable control” in Zydney or citation of evidence that Zydney displays any selection such that it can generate a voice message in intercom mode. Without evidence that Zydney discloses the recited “display,” we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Zydney anticipates the claim. Therefore, Petitioner’s contention of unpatentability regarding claim 13 does not meet the reasonable likelihood institution threshold.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,995,433 - Alarm.Com Inc. v. Vivint, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 30, 2016 · IPR2015-01967 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds, finding the grounds cumulative of a parallel petition and relying on § 325(d) because the prior art had been presented to the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“b. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), “[i]n determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Here, Suzuki and Godden were among a very small number of references that the Examiner uncovered in a pre-issuance search and considered before allowing the challenged claims. See Ex. 1103, 41. Petitioner produces no evidence of any kind to support its belief that the Examiner misapprehended Suzuki. In the absence of such evidence, we are unwilling to assume that, after having uncovered a very limited amount of relevant art, the Examiner failed to consider at least that art, either alone or in combination, with respect to the filed claims. See Pet. 21. Therefore, we determine that the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. For this additional reason, we decline to institute an inter partes review, based on either of claims 1–8, 14, 16, 19–26, 32, 34, 37–44, 50, and 52 of the ’713 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Suzuki or of any of claims 1–54 of the ’713 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as rendered obvious by Suzuki and Godden, alone or in combination with other references. See Funai Elec. Co. v. Gold Charm Ltd., Case IPR2015-01491, slip op. at 4–6 (PTAB Feb. 18, 2016) (Paper 18) (denying rehearing of denial of institution on grounds based on a reference considered during the original prosecution).” slip op. at 21
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under our Rules, we have broad discretion to institute an inter partes review as to some asserted grounds and not others. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized our discretion in this regard when it stated that “under [37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a)], it is clear that the Board may choose to institute some grounds and not institute others as part of its comprehensive institution decision.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., No. 2015-1072, 2016 WL 798192, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2016). This discretion applies to grounds asserted in a single petition, as well as to those asserted in parallel petitions challenging the same claims of the same patent, as presented here. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b); see Asustek Comput. Inc. v. Exotablet, Ltd., Case IPR2015- 00043, slip op. at 9–10 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015) (Paper 6). Thus, for example, we determine not to institute on grounds in the instant Petition that have not been shown to be necessary to address all of the challenged claims or to be superior to other grounds, upon which we instituted review in the parallel proceeding, i.e., Case IPR2015-01965. Consequently, in view of our decision to institute review on all of the challenged claims on grounds asserted in the parallel petition, and on this record, we decline to institute inter partes review on any asserted grounds in the instant Petition.” slip op. at 20
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,884,713 - PTAB · Feb 18, 2016 · IPR2015-01491 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and upheld its § 325(d) denial of institution on claims 1–3 and 5–8 over Sasuga because the same art and arguments had been presented during prosecution.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. It is not an abuse of discretion to have performed an analysis or reached a conclusion with which Petitioner disagrees, and mere disagreement with our analysis or conclusion is not a proper basis for rehearing.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“Examiner included in the Notice of Allowance entered on December 24, 2003, the following statement of reasons for allowance: 3. The prior arts [sic] of record do not anticipate or render obvious to one skilled in the art a liquid crystal display comprising various elements as claimed, more specifically one of the upper and lower frame including a stepped protrusion (draw) for fixing one of the liquid crystal display and the intermediate frame. 4. The closest reference 5,680,183 (Sasuga) teaches an LCD including a shield case with conventional means, i.e., fixing pawls. Further, [other cited references] are related a [sic] liquid crystal display device that includes intermediate frame. However, all of the above references alone or in combination fail to teach or suggest the claimed stepped protrusion (draw) (shown in Figs. 4 and 5 of the instant application) for fixing (supporting) one of the liquid crystal display or the intermediate frame to one of the upper frame and the lower frame. Ex. 1006, 6 (“Allowable Subject Matter”). Notably absent from the Examiner’s statement is any reference to the Applicant’s argument at page 9 of the Amendment dated November 12, 2003, that the stepped protrusion or draw “may have a shape (not hooked shaped)” (Ex. 1005, 35). Accordingly, we disagree with Petitioner’s premise that “[t]he Examiner accepted Applicant’s argument regarding construction of the terms ‘stepped protrusion’ and ‘stepped draw,’ which limited the terms to ‘non-hook shaped’ parts,” and “[b]ased on that construction, the Examiner withdrew the rejection based on Sasuga.” Req. Reh’g 1. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that the prior assertion of Sasuga was withdrawn based on a completely contrary claim construction and that we erred in concluding the grounds presented were the same as those considered during prosecution. Id. at 6–7. Indeed, even if the Examiner had explicitly adopted the Applicant’s construction, that would not necessarily compel a different result here. Section 325(d) provides, in relevant part, only that, “[i]n determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under . . . chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Accordingly, our discretion under section 325(d) is not limited to cases in which we concur with or adopt a claim construction previously applied by the Office. Because we do not disagree with any explicit claim construction by the Examiner in this case, we need not decide here whether, or to what extent, consideration of prior claim construction should be considered in deciding whether or not a petition or request should be rejected under section 325(d).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialDecided for patent owner
“Lastly, we are also not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument titled “The Board’s Decision Is Arbitrary And Capricious Because The Discretionary Standard Applied By Each Panel Is Not Consistent.” Req. Reh’g 8 (boldface omitted); see also id. at 8–10. That other panels of this Board have on occasion, in non-precedential decisions premised on different facts than are presented here, chosen not to reject a petition or request where the same or substantially the prior art or arguments previously presented to the Office does not render our decision arbitrary and capricious. As explained in Microsoft Corp. v. Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC, Case IPR2015- 00483 (PTAB July 15, 2015) (Paper 10) and quoted by Petitioner (id. at 9), section 325(d) “does not require any particular outcome.” Microsoft Corp., slip op. at 14–15.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,734,927
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.