- R-Pac International Corporation v. Adasa IncInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01416 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–20 under §325(d), finding the challenges relied on previously presented or cumulative art and Petitioner failed to show material Examiner error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Id. at 8.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION Taking a holistic view of the totality of the information presented, we determine that the challenges set forth in the Petition are based on the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously presented to the Examiner. Moreover, Petitioner does not direct us to information sufficient to establish a material Examiner error. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion under Section 325(d) and do not institute an inter partes review. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for an inter partes review, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), of claims 1–20 of the ’967 patent is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 28
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,798,967 - Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 19, 2023 · IPR2023-01033 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–30, finding substantially the same art had been presented to the Office and no material error was shown under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6, 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8, 17– 18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph)).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“presented to the Office, and (2) Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Office erred. We therefore conclude that it is appropriate to exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the Petition. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“enzyme complex” and “nucleic acid insert element.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner, for its part, states that “[n]o terms require construction for considering institution.” Prelim. Resp. 18. We determine that neither of the two limitations identified by Petitioner requires an express construction for purposes of this Decision. It bears mentioning, however, that the ’357 patent states that “[t]he insertional enzyme can be a transposase.” Ex. 1001, 3:47–48. There is no dispute that Grunenwald discloses the use of a transposase and, thus, an insertional enzyme complex. See Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17, 93–94, 162); Prelim. Resp. 13 (“Grunenwald further defines ‘transposase’ to mean ‘an enzyme that is capable of forming a functional complex . . . and catalyzing insertion or transposition of the transposon end-containing composition into the double-stranded target DNA with which it is incubated in an in vitro transposition reaction.” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 93)).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“express construction of the term “chromatin.” The ’357 patent itself provides a definition, stating: The term “chromatin,” as used herein, refers to a complex of molecules including proteins and polynucleotides (e.g. DNA, RNA), as found in a nucleus of a eukaryotic cell. Chromatin is composed in part of histone proteins that form nucleosomes, genomic DNA, and other DNA binding proteins (e.g., transcription factors) that are generally bound to the genomic DNA. Ex. 1001, 12:61–67. This is the meaning that we apply in this Decision.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,738,357 - Risen (Suzhou) Pharma Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Alzheon, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 13, 2023 · PGR2022-00051 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, finding no reasonable likelihood of unpatentability under §§ 101 and 112(a), and denying Grounds 4–6 under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence, we determine that the information presented fails to demonstrate it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’742 patent is unpatentable for ineligibility, lack of written description, or non-enablement. We also exercise our discretion to deny institution of post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“tramiprosate “showed a significant overall treatment effect” in “an APOE4+ sub-group,” including APOE4 homozygotes; “therapeutic interventions applied earlier in the course of AD more likely might achieve the goal of disease modification;” and that “AD would be optimally treated before significant cognitive impairment, during its pre-symptomatic or pre-clinical stages …”) (emphases removed). Accordingly, Caltagirone was previously presented to the Office and we also find that Caltagirone’s disclosures are substantially similar to, or cumulative of, other references previously considered by the Examiner.” slip op. at 49
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“D. Statutory Disclaimer After the filing of the Petition in this proceeding, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer, disclaiming claims 9 and 11–15 of the ’742 patent, effective October 7, 2022. Prelim. Resp. 12; Ex. 2001, 1. “No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e). We do not analyze the validity of claims 9 and 11–15 based on Petitioner’s challenges (e.g., Grounds 2 and 3) because these claims have been statutorily disclaimed.” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at least an M.D. or Ph.D. degree in a biomedical science or equivalent field. They would also have several years of clinical experience treating and/or conducting clinical trials of drugs for AD patients, or professional experience working in clinical trial design and execution related to drugs for AD or supervising such work. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62) (internal citation omitted). Patent Owner does not contest the characterization offered by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization as it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’742 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Mayo · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,191,742 - Risen (Suzhou) Pharma Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Alzheon, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2022-01200 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–14 under § 325(d), finding the petition relied on substantially the same art and arguments previously presented and did not show material examiner error.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“ApoE4+ patient with AD using tramiprosate over the Caltagirone reference, which disclosed treatment of ApoE4+ “all-comers” (containing at least one ApoE4 allele, either heterozygous or homozygous) with tramiprosate. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 204–208. When Patent Owner responded to the Examiner by highlighting data (i.e., Figure 8 of the specification giving rise to the ’029 patent) showing a notable increase in cognitive function in patients with two ApoE4 alleles (homozygous) who were administered tramiprosate as compared to the ApoE4 “all-comers” (mixed homozygous/heterozygous population), the Examiner suggested narrowing the pending claims to treatment of ApoE4 homozygotes. Ex. 1002, 342. Patent Owner submitted amended claims requiring selection of patients for treatment who were homozygous for ApoE4, and argued: The presently amended claims . . . select only ApoE4 homozygotes for treatment with tramiprosate or a prodrug thereof, necessarily omitting ApoE4 heterozygotes from such treatment. . . . Caltagirone fails to teach or suggest a patient selection strategy that would limit tramiprosate treatment to patients having two ApoE4 alleles and, in fact, teaches away from such selection. Kong fails to contradict or overcome these deficiencies in Caltagirone. Kong does not refer to any patient selection strategy, much less one that would limit tramiprosate prodrug treatment to ApoE4 homozygotes. The Office's reliance on Kong is solely for its teaching of a tramiprosate prodrug. Thus, the combination of Caltagirone and Kong, taken under the Office’s interpretation, suggests treatment of all ApoE4+ patients with a prodrug of tramiprosate. This falls far short of suggesting the presently claimed patient selection and treatment strategy which selects only ApoE4 homozygotes for treatment and does not treat ApoE4 heterozygotes. Id. at 338–39 (emphasis added). The Examiner acknowledged the” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“skilled artisan”) at the time of the invention would have had at least an M.D. or Ph.D. degree in a biomedical science or equivalent field. They would also have several years of clinical experience treating and/or conducting clinical trials of drugs for AD patients, or professional experience working in clinical trial design and execution related to drugs for AD or supervising such work. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Patent Owner does not contest the characterization offered by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization as it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’029 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office (Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10). Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of that art or arguments (Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10). Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office (Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10). “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown” (Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 9).” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot reached
“Babic ascertained that “different effects of a drug could be observed in different subpopulations of patients based on ApoE4 carrier status”” and that “drug effects in homozygous carriers could be greater than those in the heterozygous carriers and non-carriers who did not respond to the drug.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 107. As stated, this testimony does not support Petitioner’s contention that an ordinary artisan would have been motivated “to select homozygous ApoE4 carriers for treatment with any drug for which response has been correlated to ApoE4 carrier status.” See Pet. 41 (emphasis added). In particular, we find an insufficient factual basis for Petitioner’s contention that results obtained for galantamine, an acetylcholinesterase inhibitor (Ex. 1003 ¶ 105) would have motivated an ordinary artisan to replace the galantamine taught in Babic with tramiprosate (homotaurine), a GABA receptor agonist that works by a different mechanism (Ex. 1007, 582). We have also considered Dr. Ruffalo’s testimony that the ordinary artisan would have been motivated to replace Babic’s galantamine with tramiprosate as taught in Caltagirone or Val-APS as taught in Kong. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 276–277. Dr. Ruffalo posits that Babic’s disclosures would have motivated the ordinary artisan to analyze Caltagirone’s data to ascertain if tramiprosate is more effective in homozygotes, and to replace galantamine with tramiprosate or Val-APS as taught in Kong because of their improved safety profiles as compared to galantamine, and because the replacement drugs target the underlying disease and not symptom amelioration as does galantamine. Id. Dr. Ruffalo also posits that the prior art would have imparted the following knowledge to the ordinary artisan: because the effect of tramiprosate was dependent on the required ApoE4 allele, homozygotes having the highest number of ApoE4 allele copies would derive, at the very least, as much benefit as from the drug as the heterozygotes having only one copy of the allele, and most likely the homozygotes would have the greatest therapeutic response to tramiprosate since they have the maximum number of copies of the required allele. Having done this simple assessment, A POSA would conclude that tramiprosate would be expected to exhibit a greater therapeutic effect in homozygotes and thus would have been motivated to treat homozygotes with tramiprosate, including in an oral dosage form as taught by Aisen. Id. Dr. Ruffalo further posits that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in administering tramiprosate to treat homozygous ApoE4 patients because they “would almost certainly have the greatest response to the drug.” Id. ¶ 286. Patent Owner argues that the Examiner previously examined the issue of whether ApoE4 genotypes in treatment decisions should be considered during prosecution, with respect to Caltagirone, where ApoE4 genotypes were included, and Sleegers (Ex. 1002, 685, 1137), where studies led away from such inclusion. Prelim. Resp. 30–31. We find Sleegers’ disclosure” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,471,029 - Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. The United States Of America, As Represented By The Secretary, Department Of Health & Human ServicesInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 2, 2022 · IPR2021-01484 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–9, 13, 17, and 19 as obvious over Milone and Kalled under § 103, exercising discretion under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Electromedizinishe Gerӓte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–10 (Feb. 13, 2020) (“Advanced Bionics”) (precedential), the Board addresses § 325(d) applying a “two-part framework.” In the first part of the framework, we ask whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 22 previously were presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics at 8. Factors (a), (b), and (d) of Becton, Dickinson come into play under this first part of the framework. Id. at 8–10. If either condition of the framework’s first part is met (e.g., substantially the same art is presented), we move to part two of the framework, asking “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims.” Id. at 8. Factors (c), (e), and (f) of Becton, Dickinson fall within part two of the framework. Id. at 10 (“[F]actors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated material error by the Office.”). Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated error. Advanced Bionics at 8–10. “If the petitioner fails to show that the Office erred, the Director may exercise his discretion not to institute inter partes review.” Id. at 8–9. “At bottom, this [§ 325(d)] framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9 (“If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.”). B.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition, but states that the person of ordinary skill in the art would “[t]ypically” . . . have had an M.D. or a Ph.D. in immunology, biochemistry, cell biology, molecular biology, or a related discipline, with at least two years of experience in conducting laboratory research on chimeric T cell receptors.” Prelim. Resp. 44 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 20). According to Patent Owner, the ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had knowledge of the scientific literature and have skills relating to chimeric T cell receptors and methods of using such receptors” and “may have worked as part of a multidisciplinary team” and been able to draw on the specialized skills of, for example, an immunologist, and/or a clinical oncologist. See id. at 43–44. Considering the record before us, both parties present reasonable definitions of one of ordinary skill in the art. For the purpose of this proceeding, we consider one of ordinary skill in the art as having had an M.D. or a Ph.D. in immunology, biochemistry, cell biology, molecular biology, or a related discipline, with at least two years of experience in conducting laboratory research on chimeric T cell receptors and/or the use of CAR-T immunotherapy. Consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed definition, the ordinarily skilled artisan may have worked as part of a 20 multidisciplinary team and been able to draw on the specialized skills of, for example, an immunologist, and/or a clinical oncologist.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for patent owner
“We do not find Petitioner’s argument persuasive for the reasons set forth on pages 34–40 of the Preliminary Response. Most particularly, we note that the phrase “[a] chimeric antigen receptor (CAR)” occurs solely in the preamble of independent claim 24. Terms in a preamble, however, are not generally construed as limiting. See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). More specifically, “when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention,” the preamble is not considered a limitation. Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the present case, we find it plausible—if not likely—that the Examiner gave no weight to the terms in the preamble of claim 24 such that the remaining language did not expressly or implicitly require either a 32 transmembrane domain, or a “T-cell activation moiety” specific to CAR constructs. The Examiner appears to have recognized, however, that CAR constructs differ from Kalled’s antibodies at least in having a transmembrane domain as expressly recited in claims 29 and 30. See Ex. 2005, 605, 745–749 (allowing amended claims). This view is underscored by the Examiner’s decision not to reject claims 34 and 38 as anticipated by Kalled. See Ex. 2005, 604. Notably, claims 34 and 38 recite SEQ ID Nos 4–12, each of which encodes a complete CAR construct and, thus, implicitly includes a transmembrane domain. See id. at 589 (claiming a CAR comprising the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID Nos: 4–12 (claim 34) or a nucleic acid encoding the same (claim 38)); Ex. 1001, 9:49–53; Ex. 2001 ¶ 92.12” slip op. at 32
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,765,342 - Triplet Therapeutics, Inc. v. Board Of Supervisors Of Louisiana State University And Agricultural And Mechanical CollegeInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 8, 2021 · PGR2021-00059 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–15: grounds 2–5 lacked a supported reason to combine, and ground 1 repeated arguments considered by the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have the authority and discretion to determine whether to institute a post grant review. 35 U.S.C. § 324; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). We may not institute a post-grant review unless “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating that the challenged claims are unpatentable over the cited prior art in asserted grounds 2–5. With regard to ground 1, Petitioner’s written description ground, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments are substantially the same as those previously presented to and considered by the Office, and we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and decline to institute post-grant review of the ’542 patent on that ground alone.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments regarding whether the ’542 patent provides § 112 written description support for the challenged claims are substantially the same as those considered by the Examiner during the prosecution of the ’542 patent. As set forth above, the Examiner repeatedly rejected the pending claims because (1) the claims were overly broad in light of the guidance provided in the specification that was limited to the working examples specific to exon 7 of a gene encoding a MLH3 subunit (Ex. 1006, 623–24); (2) the claims did not enable the oligonucleotides to “hybridize[] to a complementary target nucleic acid sequence of a gene or gene product to modulate the expression of a component of a mismatch repair (MMR) complex” based on the disclosure of the specification, which was limited to the working examples (id.); and (3) the claims did not enable a pharmaceutical composition of the recited nucleotide base length range for the entire scope of the claims based on the disclosure of the specification, which was limited to the working examples (id. at 1183–84). The rejections were based on a broad reading of the claims as interpreted by the ordinarily skilled artisan, and required analysis of whether there is sufficient support in the specification for the entire scope of the claims. Applicant overcame these issues by narrowing the claims until the Examiner agreed that the support present was sufficient.” slip op. at 36
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not found
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s allegations regarding the skilled artisan’s reasons to combine are conclusory and insufficiently supported by evidence. Petitioner cites Dr. Wood’s testimony to explain why the skilled artisan would have understood that Fuselier’s suggestion to “switch[] isoforms of MLH3” could be accomplished by manipulating pre-mRNA splicing to delete exon 7. Petitioner’s discussion on pages 59–60 quotes phrases from Dr. Wood’s referenced testimony, see Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 213–216, but the rationale appearing in the Petition merely comprises repetitive generalized statements akin to “Morcos is a powerful tool that can accomplish what Fuselier suggested.” See Pet. 59–60. Dr. Wood’s underlying testimony lacks key explanation as to the understanding of the ordinary artisan at the time of the invention. What Petitioner has not provided, as Patent Owner argues, are the reasons 1) why Fuselier’s suggestion to “switch[] isoforms” would have led the artisan to pursue deletion of exon 7; and 2) why the artisan would have selected Morcos’ time. See Prelim. Resp. 55–56.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“invention in the field of antisense technology “would have had knowledge of the scientific literature and have skills relating to approaches for utilizing synthetic oligonucleotides to manipulate gene expression” and “have been well-experienced in laboratory techniques and strategies for designing and making SSOs, conducting in vitro and in vivo testing, and application of SSOs in research.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30, 31). Petitioner adds that the artisan “would have had knowledge of laboratory techniques and strategies in creating nuclease-resistant SSOs, and using such SSOs to manipulate gene expression to force expression of selected isoforms of a M.D. or a Ph.D. in physiological science, biochemistry, molecular biology, chemistry, or a related discipline, with at least five years of experience in SSOs design and manipulation” and may have “worked as part of a multidisciplinary team” to permit input by others on the team with specialized skills to assist in solving problems. Id. Patent Owner does not contest the skill level provided by Petitioner for the purpose of deciding institution (Prelim. Resp. 4), and we adopt it as reasonably consistent with the level of skill represented by the ’542 patent and the art of record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,669,542 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 1, 2018 · IPR2016-01440 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–20, and 28–42 were not shown unpatentable because Myers did not establish axial translation, and Myers with Bostock did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“radially” in the Petition. In its Reply, Petitioner equates “radially” to “outwardly” and “axially” to “downwardly.” Pet. Reply 7. Patent Owner contends that “axially and radially” would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art “to refer to movement relative the body and oriented relative to the axis of the body.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2018 ¶ 82). In particular, Patent Owner contends that “axial” refers to “movement along or parallel to the axis of the body, and that “radial” refers to “the direction perpendicular to the axis of the body.” PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner contends its interpretation is consistent with the Specification of the ’099 patent and is supported by both its expert, Mr. Underwood, and Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Shale. Id. at 18–21 (citations omitted). For example, Mr. Shale testified that “‘[r]adially’ basically means left to right within the tubular body,” and “‘axially’ means up and down within the tubular body.” Ex. 2021, 189:5–7. Patent Owner further notes that Figures 4, 5, 11, and 12 of the ’099 patent illustrate arms 520 moving axially and radially relative to body 510. PO Resp. 20. In its Reply, Petitioner argues that “[c]ontrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, claim 1 of the ’099 [p]atent does not require that the body 10 be the frame of reference for the axial and radial movement.” Pet. Reply 13 n.3. Petitioner, however, cites no persuasive evidence to counter Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, Mr. Shale agreed that “radially” corresponds to “outward from the body,” and that “axially” corresponds to “up and down of the body.” Ex. 2021 190:4–19. Consistent with Mr. Shale’s testimony, Petitioner’s analysis purports to show that Myers discloses movement of moveable arms (slips 30) “both axially and radially relative to the body 10 [of Myers].” Pet. 19– 20. Petitioner is not alleging movement of the slips of Myers relative to a feature other than the body of Myers or in some other frame of reference. See Tr. 10:1–21. Thus, based on the evidence discussed above, we determine “translates axially and radially,” as recited in claim 1, means “moves parallel to and perpendicular to the body” and does not encompass movement consisting of only rotation about a pivot point. slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The steps discussed above address how slips 30 of Myers are deployed, but do not explain expressly whether slips 30 move axially relative to body 10 during deployment. With regard to the slips, Myers further provides that: [Slips 30] are positively movable laterally relative to the expander upon relative longitudinal movement between the expander and slips by inclined spline connections between the slips and expander, provided by oppositely directed side tongues 32 on each slip sliding in companion grooves 33 in the expander on opposite sides of slots 34 in the expander in which the slips are disposed. The lower ends of the slips 30 are coupled for movement longitudinally with one another by being connected to a slip ring 35 having generally T-shaped slots 36 therein receiving companion T-shaped heads 37 on the lower portions of the slips. Thus, the slips 30 move longitudinally jointly with the slip ring 35, although they are still permitted to move radially or laterally inwardly and outwardly of the slip ring, upon relative longitudinal movement between the slips 30 and expander 26. Ex. 1004, 3:2–17. In this passage, the movement of the slips includes “longitudinal movement,” which we understand generally corresponds to a vertical direction, as opposed to lateral movement in a horizontal direction. However, the movement is described relative to expander 26, not relative to body 10. See Pet. 13 (using “lateral” consistent with the horizontal extent and “longitudinal” consistent with the vertical extent). Thus, this passage also does not explain expressly whether slips 30 move axially relative to the body during deployment.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“C. ASSERTED OBVIOUSNESS OVER MYERS AND BOSTOCK Petitioner contends claims 4, 33, and 34, each of which depends from claim 1, would have been obvious over Myers and Bostock. Pet. 24–26. According to Petitioner, “[e]ach of claims 4, 33, and 34 recites biasing either a sleeve or a movable arm to a collapsed position.” Id. at 24. Petitioner relies on Bostock as disclosing a spring for biasing. Id. As to the limitations of claim 1 from which claims 4, 33, and 34 depend, including the requirement of “one moveable arm translates axially and radially,” Petitioner relies only on the contentions it set forth under its anticipation analysis with respect to claim 1. Because Petitioner does not rely on Bostock to teach the recited feature “one moveable arm translates axially and radially,” does not argue the feature would have been obvious over the combination, and, for the reasons provided above, has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Myers teaches the feature, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4, 33, and 34 of the ’099 patent would have been obvious over Myers and Bostock.” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Mr. Shale expresses the opinion that “slips 30 move both axially and radially relative to the body 10, along ‘generally T-shaped slots 36’ that are linear and angled relative to the axial direction,” we find that testimony to be conclusory and entitled to little weight, in part because this testimony does not account for the upward movement of setting sleeve 40. See Ex. 1010 ¶ 53 (quoting Ex. 1004, 3:11); see also In re Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Accordingly, we find Mr. Shale’s declaration fails to provide persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that Myers discloses “one moveable arm translates axially and radially,” as required by claim 1, beyond what Myers, itself, discloses. We find more persuasive Mr. Underwood’s testimony, on behalf of Patent Owner, that Myers fails to disclose axial movement of slips 30. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 90–107. According to Mr. Underwood: slots [36 of Myers] are shown as angled relative to the slip ring 35. However, though the slips may move downward (axially) relative to the slip ring 35 as the slips move outward (radially), the slip ring 35 at the same time moves upward (axially) relative to the body. As such, the angle of the slots 36 within the slip ring 35 is not, itself, indicative of the overall movement of the slips. Id. ¶ 91. Mr. Underwood further reasons that “as the slip ring moves upwardly, the movement of the slips relative to the body in the axial direction is zero due to the slips sliding downward in the slots 36 relative to the slip ring 35 in equal proportion.” Id. ¶ 94. Mr. Underwood also” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,314,099 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,314,099 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01451 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: it exercised discretion as to claims 43–46, 49, 50, 62–69, and 72, and found no reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 55–58.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition. Patent Owner argues that we should decline to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the Petition raises the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that were presented previously to the Office. Prelim. Resp. 19–26. In particular, Patent Owner contends that each of the claims in the reexamination was rejected based on Eddison, under either 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and/or in combination with Jewkes under § 103(a), and that Petitioner relies upon Jewkes again under § 102(b) in its Petition. Id. at 23–26. Petitioner makes no attempt to explain why the references that form the bases for Petitioner’s challenge here are not the same or substantially similar prior art to that presented during the reexamination or why the arguments are not the same or substantially similar to those presented previously to the Office. Eddison and Jewkes were relied upon in the reexamination. See id. at 141–60 (Office Action (mailed Aug. 25, 2014)). Additionally, Tandberg was presented to the Office in conjunction with the original prosecution of the ’817 patent. See Ex. 2003; Prelim. Resp. 28.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Patent Owner makes a valid point. Section 1.530(k) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides: “Amendments not effective until certificate. Although the Office actions will treat proposed amendments as though they have been entered, the proposed amendments will not be effective until the reexamination certificate is issued and published.” This places us in a difficult position. If Patent Owner ultimately succeeds in the appeal of the reexamination, a certificate will issue and the amendments to claim 43 and its dependents will be “effective.” See id.; see Ex. 1007, 166 (showing the amendments to claim 43). Yet Petitioner provides no analysis of the amended limitations of claim 43. See, e.g., Pet. 16. Alternatively, if Patent Owner is unsuccessful in its appeal to the Federal Circuit, claim 43 and its dependents, as challenged in the reexamination, will be declared unpatentable. In either circumstance, any review we undertake of the unamended version of claim 43, and the claims depending therefrom, will be for naught. Accordingly, in light of the above circumstances, reviewing these claims on the record presented would waste judicial resources as well as the resources of the parties.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01450 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), citing overlapping prior art and arguments, the pending reexamination appeal, and resource conservation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“D. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Section 325(d) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides: “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Although Petitioner and Patent Owner present proposed constructions for several claim terms, no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. Pet. 15–21; Prelim. Resp. 10–23.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerGranted
“On August 29, 2016, Petitioner requested, via electronic mail, to file a motion to correct its identification of the real party in interest in this proceeding. In particular, Petitioner requested the addition of Baker Hughes Incorporated as a real party in interest. Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner would not oppose its request. In a responsive email on September 29, 2016, we authorized Petitioner to file a motion to correct the identified real party in interest. On October 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an Updated Mandatory Notice in which Petitioner stated that it “moves the Board to allow correction of Petitioner’s Real Part in Interest (‘RPI’) disclosure.” Paper 8, 1. Although Petitioner did not file a motion to correct as it had requested, we treat its updated mandatory notice as such and hereby grant Petitioner’s request. Accordingly, Baker Hughes Incorporated is a real party in interest in this proceeding as well.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Robert Bosch LLC / Daimler AG v. Orbital Australia Pty LtdInstitution deniedPTAB · May 13, 2016 · IPR2016-00083 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d) and dismissed the motion for joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“whether, in our discretion, the Petition in this case warrants inter partes review. Petitioner states in the Joinder Motion that its third Petition “raises the same grounds of unpatentability as the First and Second ’365 IPRs, with the same support from the same expert, the only change being the additional evidence supporting Bernhardt’s publication.” Motion for Joinder 1; see also id. at 6–7 (same). Petitioner also represents “[t]he Third ’365 IPR Petition is identical to the First and Second ’365 IPR petitions on the grounds related to Bernhardt.” Id. at 5 (citing IPR2016-00083, Paper 3 (Petition), 58). Petitioner states: If the Board elects not to institute trial on any grounds in IPR2015-01258 and IPR2015-01259, based on insufficient evidence being presented in those petitions to prove that Bernhardt is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the Board should grant this petition and institute trial on all grounds because this petition provides additional evidence sufficient to prove that Bernhardt was published and sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art prior to the ’365 patent’s earliest priority date.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that a review may not “be instituted unless the Director2 determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As we have recognized, “Congress did not mandate that an inter partes review must be instituted under certain conditions. Rather, by stating that the Director—and by extension, the Board—may not institute review unless certain conditions are met, Congress made institution discretionary.” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., Case IPR2013-00324, slip op. at 4 (PTAB Nov. 21, 2013) (Paper 19). In determining whether to institute an inter partes review, the Board may “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b); see 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“whether to join a party to an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c): JOINDER.–If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Thus, joinder in an inter partes review may be warranted in certain circumstances, but is not required in any. See Sony Corp. v. Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc., Case IPR2013-00386, slip. op. at 3 (PTAB July 29, 2013) (Paper 16) (“[t]he Board will determine whether to grant joinder on a caseby-case basis, taking into account the particular facts of each case, substantive and procedural issues, and other considerations”). The statute does, however, set forth at least one circumstance in which we do not have the discretion to join a party: if the Board determines that a later (in this case third) petition does not warrant institution. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“the Director . . . may join as a party . . . any person who properly files a petition . . . that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”).” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 5,655,365
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.