- Intel Corporation v. Interdigital, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 1, 2025 · IPR2024-01441 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all four grounds for claims 1–8 under § 325(d), finding the art or arguments previously presented and no material Examiner error shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework for evaluating arguments under Section 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Both Petitioner and Patent Owner argue that the Board can determine whether to grant or deny institution without construing any claim terms. Pet. 16; Prelim. Resp. 17. They represent, however, that the construction of the term “sparse de-noising filter” is contested in the co-pending investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 at the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”). Pet. 13; see Prelim. Resp. 6–8. In that litigation, four constructions were proposed for that term: ITC Complainants’ proposal, ITC” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,674,556 - Darfon Electronics Corp. v. Michael ShipmanInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2022 · IPR2022-01008 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding the asserted art cumulative of art previously presented to the Office and no material Office error shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In evaluating arguments under § 325(d), we use [a] two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“(a) THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition (35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). Petitioner challenges claims 1–20 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in twelve grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 7). Generally, Patent Owner contends that the Petition should be denied as to all challenged claims (see Prelim. Resp.). We do not reach whether Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim. For reasons discussed below, we discretionarily deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,942,581 - Guardant Health, Inc. v. University Of WashingtonInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00449 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the written-description priority arguments were substantially the same as those considered by the Office, and Petitioner did not show material error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Based on this record, we find Petitioner’s arguments challenging written description support are the same or substantially the same as those considered by the examiner during the prosecution of the ’045 application. 4. Material Error Having found that the condition in the first part of the two-prong framework is satisfied, we next evaluate whether Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in its prior consideration of those arguments. Advanced Bionics, 8. Based on the current record, we determine Petitioner has not met its burden to show the examiner materially erred.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached
“Specifically, Petitioner argues that the ’785 application lacks written description support for “converting” or “attaching” tags to “circulating DNA molecules,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 20. Id. at 17–30. Patent Owner argues that we should deny institution under § 325(d) “because the Office already found that the specification provides § 112 support for tagging circulating DNA.” Prelim. Resp. 10. For the reasons explained below, we find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive.5 5 As another basis for its priority arguments, Petitioner contends that the ’785 application does not enable methods for “converting” or “attaching” tags to “circulating DNA molecules.” Pet. 30. Patent Owner asserts that “[t]he Petition gives enablement only cursory treatment.” Prelim. Resp. 36. We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner disposes of the entire enablement argument in a single seven-line paragraph. See Pet. 30. It provides no meaningful analyses of the factors set forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION Petitioner’s anticipation and obviousness grounds rest on the priority date of the challenged claims. Because we decline to reconsider Petitioner’s challenge of priority date based on lack of written description support, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and decline to institute inter partes review of the ’699 patent. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied.” slip op. at 18
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,689,699 - Apotex Inc. / Apotex Corp. v. Auspex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 9, 2022 · IPR2021-01507 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–3 under § 325(d), finding the petition relied on substantially the same art or arguments previously presented and did not show material Examiner error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of the prior art or arguments. Id. In general, only if the same, or substantially the same, art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, do we turn to whether Petitioner has established a material error. Id. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 24
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,524,733 - Passage Bio, Inc. v. The Trustees Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Regenxbio, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 6, 2021 · PGR2021-00073 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–15, finding the § 112 arguments substantially repeated prosecution arguments without material Office error and exercising discretion under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Under § 325(d), in determining whether to institute a post-grant review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition 1 U.S. Patent No. 7,906,111 B2, issued March 15, 2011 (Ex. 1019, “the ’111 patent”). The ’111 patent is in the same family as the challenged ’441 patent. See infra, Section II.A.1. 2 Petitioner contends that “[w]hile Petitioner discusses the ’111 prior art patent, other printed publications – all within the ’441 patent’s family – are also prior art because they published more than one-year prior to October 2, 2018.” Pet. 73 n.14. 6 or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Our § 325(d) analysis employs a two-prong framework: (1) whether the arguments presented in the petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office; and (2) if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in its prior consideration of those arguments. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Electromedizinishe Gerӓte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6, 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). When analyzing the second prong, “[i]f reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.” Id. at 9. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id.” slip op. at 6
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Petitioner further asserts that the challenged claims lack utility. Pet. 68–72. Institution of post-grant review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under § 314(a), “the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”).6 6 Even though SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, we see no reason to interpret the statute governing post-grant reviews differently. 26 In exercising that discretion, we are guided by the statutory requirement, in promulgating regulations for post-grant review, to consider the effect of any regulations on “the efficient administration of the Office [and] the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings,” 35 U.S.C. § 326(b), as well as the requirement to construe our rules to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Under the Office Guidance, “if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.” Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018).7 Here, we determine that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is sufficiently implicated that instituting review on all grounds would undermine the statutory purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Accordingly, we deny the entire Petition. SAS Q&A’s, Part D, Effect of SAS on Future Challenges that Could Be Denied for Statutory Reasons, answer to Question D1 (June 5, 2018).8” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAOther
“As an initial matter, we agree with Patent Owner that “the only functional requirement of the claims is the ability to form a functional 19 capsid.” Sur-reply 8; see also Pet. 21 (proposing that we construe the term “AAV capsid protein” to mean “a protein that can form an AAV capsid”). More importantly, contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the examiner, during the prosecution of the ’218 application and priority applications, specifically considered the formation of the capsid. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 5172 (“[T]he lack of characterization of the capsid protein at the time of filing means one could not know which of the 736 amino acids or 2208 nucleotides could be modified without affecting the ability to form a ‘capsid’ protein.”); Ex. 1011, 1374, 2198 (“The specification teaches only SEQ ID NO: 123 and does not provide those variable amino acids nor any fragments such that a person of skill in the art would recognize those amino acids that are related by 95% to SEQ ID NO: 123 and have capsid formation and function.”); Ex. 2023, 11 (“[T]he specification teaches only that SEQ ID NO: 123 is essential to form a capsid.”).” slip op. at 19
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,695,441 - NVIDIA Corporation v. Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 4, 2016 · IPR2016-00134 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, exercising discretion against the follow-on petition and alternatively rejecting it under § 325(d) because Hsu and Yamakawa were substantially the same.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“Given the undisputed facts as noted above, it would be unjust to Patent Owner to institute review in this proceeding. Petitioner has provided no rationale on why it waited until November 4, 2015, more than five months after filing of the first petition on June 1, 2015, in IPR2015-01318, to file the Petition in this proceeding, given that Petitioner was aware of Hsu at least by May 8, 2015. Notably, in IPR2015-01318, Patent Owner’s preliminary response was filed on September 10, 2015. On the other hand, not instituting review in this proceeding would not be unjust to Petitioner, because Petitioner was aware of Hsu when the first petition was filed on June 1, 2015, in IPR2015-01318, and subsequently waited too long to file the second petition relying on Hsu with no apparent justification. Under the circumstances of this case, as explained above, we hold Petitioner accountable for its own actions and inactions. Given the limited resources of the Board, we exercise our discretion not institute review in this proceeding, which is the second petition filed by Petitioner against claims 1– 8 and 10–15 of the ’675 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“discussion of Hsu, we find that Yamakawa and Hsu are substantially the same insofar as claims 1–8 and 10–15 of the ’675 patent are concerned. In IPR2015-01318, Petitioner asserted that claims 1–8 and 10–15 of the ’675 patent are anticipated by Yamakawa. In this proceeding, Petitioner asserts that claims 1–8 and 10–15 of the ’675 patent are anticipated by Hsu. Neither assertion is based on any inherency argument, and both assertions rely on a direct reading of each claim limitation onto the prior art. Nothing in either Yamakawa or Hsu had to be specially construed and neither Yamakawa nor Hsu sets forth any special definition of terms. With respect to the challenged claims, we are not cognizant of any necessary disclosure that is provided by Hsu but not Yamakawa. The differences between Hsu and Yamakawa have not been shown to be significant with respect to the challenged claims. The types of steps said to be disclosed by Hsu are the types of steps said to be disclosed by Yamakawa, and vice versa. If Yamakawa anticipates the challenged claims, it would be expected that the same assertion would be made about Hsu, and the same is true the other way around.” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,252,675 - Toyota Motor Corporation v. Cellport Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 28, 2015 · IPR2015-01423 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments had been presented in an earlier IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“unpatentability in this proceeding are the same as those grounds of unpatentability in IPR2015-00634. The Petition in IPR2015-00634 was filed on February 5, 2015, prior to filing of the Petition in this proceeding on June 19, 2015. Despite the substitution of CAN for RS-485, the prior art and arguments presented in this proceeding are substantially the same as those previously presented in IPR2015-00634. Each of Boatwright, Mansell, Hotto, Guy, and Thompson is applied in the same manner in this case, i.e., based on the same teachings therein, against the same claims of the ’479 patent, as it was previously applied in IPR2015-00634. Although in this case Petitioner has replaced RS-485 with CAN, both RS-485 and CAN disclose a standard for a bus useable to connect multiple devices. CAN was published in 1992, whereas RS-485 was published in 1983. The teaching that is required from each to cure the deficiency of the other prior art references is the same.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 5,479,479
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.