- Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 22, 2022 · IPR2021-01520 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 9-11, 13, 18, and 19 under § 325(d), finding the same art had been evaluated and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“If “either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied,” we must then determine “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. “An example of a material error may include misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. at 8 n.9.” slip op. at 16
- Other 314aNot reached
“III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under § 314(a) or § 325(d) to deny institution. See Prelim. Resp. 13–43; Prelim. Sur-reply 1–8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 325(d). Petitioner argues that we should decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution. See Pet. 8–12; Prelim. Reply 1–10. For the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution. Because we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution, we do not reach discretionary denial under § 314(a).” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,686,193 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01270 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 2–5, 11–14, 22, 23, and 26–28 under § 325(d) because substantially the same prior art was previously presented and material Office error was not shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“applicant, such as on an [IDS].” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8. Because it was submitted in an IDS during prosecution of the ’380 patent, Sourcefire qualifies as art that was “previously presented” to the Office.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“Bionics framework, and based on the particular circumstances here, we conclude that the same or substantially the same prior art as in the Petition was presented previously to the Office, and Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we determine that discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is appropriate. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 18
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,735,380 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01156 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1, 6–10, 15–21, 24, 25, 29, and 30, because the same prior art was previously presented and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“presented to the Office. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,735,380 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2022 · IPR2021-01155 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–20 under § 325(d), finding the asserted art and arguments were previously presented and Petitioner failed to show material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Examiner during prosecution of the ’343 patent and that Mantripragada is cumulative to Buck, which was considered during prosecution of the ’343 patent. We further find that Patent Owner’s argument during prosecution that the packet transformation function is configured “to prevent an exfiltration operation” resulted in allowance of the claims of the ’343 patent, which overlaps with the argument that Patent Owner makes in this case against Petitioner’s challenges. Prelim. Resp. 35–36. Petitioner has not shown that the two-stage filtering process was a basis for the Examiner’s allowance of the claims of the ’343 patent over the cited prior art. We, therefore, find that the same or substantially the same prior art, and the same or substantially the same arguments, previously were presented to the Office under the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Petitioner’s declarant testifies regarding the prosecution history of the ’343 patent. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–90. He concludes that “the ’343 Patent claims were apparently allowed because the Examiner concluded that the prior art of record failed to disclose a two-stage packet filtering process,” mirroring Petitioner’s argument. Id. ¶ 90. Petitioner’s declarant does not indicate how the facts support this conclusion. As mentioned, Patent Owner’s argument during prosecution leading to allowance was that the ’343 patent’s claims recite applying the packet transformation function configured to prevent an exfiltration operation. Ex. 1002, 1614–1615, 1639. Petitioner’s declarant does not explain sufficiently where in the prosecution history Patent Owner argued that a two-stage packet filtering process distinguished the ’343 patent’s claims over the prior art, or where the Examiner allowed the claims because of two-stage packet filtering. Accordingly, lacking evidentiary support, the declarant’s testimony is entitled to little or no weight on this point. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Thus, we see no additional evidence or facts in the Petition that warrant reconsideration of the prior art. Therefore, we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims under the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework.” slip op. at 18
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,567,343 - Nikon Corporation v. Carl Zeiss AG And ASML Netherlands B.V.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 1, 2019 · IPR2018-00686 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Nikon’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–5, 7–10, 16, 24, and 30–33 based on § 325(d) and the priority-date analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) provides that: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically 1 The Petition, in an apparent typographic error, omits claim 5 from its listing of challenged claims on page 1. identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. (Emphasis added.) See Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In the Institution Decision, we denied institution of Ground 1 based on our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Inst. Dec. 17. Specifically, we determined that the Kaifu reference relied on by Petitioner was considered during prosecution. Id. Petitioner asserts that we misapprehended or overlooked its arguments regarding why its contentions as to Kaifu were not considered by the Examiner.” slip op. at 3
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“written description. To satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, the specification must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal brackets omitted) (en banc) (quoting Vas–Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Thus, the specification must reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that the inventor possessed, at the time of filing, the subject matter that he or she has claimed. Id. “[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id. Whether a specification complies with the written description requirement is a question of fact. Id. at 1351, 1355. Entitlement to a filing date extends only to subject matter that is disclosed, not to that which is obvious. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We determine that because the open ended term “comprising” was used in the original claim reciting “a” signal, the recitation of “a” signal and “one or more” signals would have the same scope. An indefinite article, such as “a,” in patent parlance encompasses “one or more” when used, as here, in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase “comprising.” KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Unless the claim is specific as to the number of elements, the article ‘a’ receives a singular interpretation only in rare circumstances when the patentee evinces a clear intent to so limit the article.” Id. Thus, the claim as amended, which removes the open ended preface “comprising” and changes the modifier of “select signals” from “a” to “one or more,” does not change the scope of the claim in that respect. It merely is a different phrasing. Thus, as we stated in the Institution Decision, any description of a system with one signal would necessarily support a claim to one or more signals. Inst. Dec. 28. Additionally, the claim, as amended, does not suggest there is choice between alternatives that would meet this claim. For example, the claim does not require a choice between a first type of signal and a second type of signal. The claim recites “one” signal, which can be optionally accompanied (“or”) by “more” signals.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,728,574 - Telebrands Corp. v. Tinnus Enterprises, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 7, 2018 · PGR2017-00024 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · PGR · Rehearing
The Board denied Telebrands’ rehearing request, leaving institution of post-grant review denied under § 325(d) because the arguments did not show the Board overlooked or misapprehended the record.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“review the decision for an “abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing [the] decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in” the briefing. Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Kamrin’s testimony and Petitioner’s arguments presented in the Petition, but, ultimately, determined that the testimony and Petitioner’s arguments, as a whole, did not meaningfully distinguish the record from that present before the Examiner during prosecution. Dec. 8–14. As stated in the Decision, we considered Dr. Kamrin’s testimony, including his testimony regarding Donaldson’s disclosure (e.g., Figures 2–5). Dec. 12–13. Moreover, in our Decision, we discussed at length the Examiner’s review of the prior art of record, including Donaldson, during the prosecution of the ’779 patent. Dec. 10–14. In doing so, we explained that the Examiner considered the same exact issue, presented in the Petition, of whether the prior art references of record in prosecution (including Donaldson) expressly or inherently disclosed the “elastic ring” recited in the challenged claims. Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 1008, 87–88); see Ex. 1008, 87 (“Because it is not true that all elastic bands have the same elastic force as an inherent property, it cannot be presumed that all elastic bands would function the same way.”). More specifically, we noted that the Examiner reviewed and considered the Donaldson reference, and determined that “[n]one of the prior art teaches the subject matter” of the claimed “elastic ring.” Dec. 11; Ex. 1008, 87.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,533,779 - Telebrands Corp. v. Tinnus Enterprises, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 30, 2017 · PGR2017-00024 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, finding the § 103 and written-description challenges previously considered under § 325(d), and the remaining written-description and indefiniteness challenges insufficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that we should exercise our discretion in denying institution of review based on Petitioner’s § 103 challenges because the same art and arguments were considered by the Examiner during the original prosecution. There is no dispute that Saggio and Lee were expressly considered by the Examiner and discussed in the Examiner’s Reasons for Allowance in the May 24, 2016 Notice for Allowance. See Ex. 1008, 86–88. In the Notice of Allowance, the Examiner considered expressly the teachings of Saggio and Lee, and explained in detail that neither one of these disclosed the claimed “elastic fastener.” Id. Moreover, the Examiner expressly also considered Donaldson and found that it was “cumulative with Lee [ ] in that both references disclose that moving mechanical components must be used to detach the balloons.” Id. at 17.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on our review of the record, including the claim language and the Specification of the ’779 patent, we agree with Patent Owner’s position. Here, the restriction of the claimed elastic ring is limited such that the balloon, if filled with a sufficient amount of water, is detachable by (1) gravity or (2) by gravity combined with a manually applied acceleration of the tube. Further, we agree with Patent Owner’s explanation that a person of ordinary skill in the art would know when the amount of water has reached a “sufficient amount,” because the elastic rings would allow detachment by gravity or by gravity and manually applied acceleration of the tube. See Prelim. Resp. 42. Indeed, the claim language itself provides the conditions” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the effective filing date of the ’779 patent (“POSA”) was a person having general knowledge about, and experience with, expandable containers, including, without limitation, balloons, and at least an associate’s degree in a technical science or engineering. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 10–14). For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and determine that a POSA would have been a person having a general knowledge about, 2 Claims 38, 46, 54, and 60 issued as claims 4, 7, 10, and 13. and experience with, expandable containers, including, without limitation, balloons, and at least an associate’s degree in mechanical engineering, or the equivalent. This level of skill is consistent with the types of problems and solutions described in the ’779 patent and cited prior art.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyOther
“Petitioner argues that the present record is different than the one before the Examiner. Pet. 80. In particular, Petitioner asserts that the testimony of Dr. Kamrin was not before the Examiner. Id. Petitioner contends that “one of the issues in this petition is inherency of the prior art references, which benefits from the consideration of expert testimony.” Id. at 81. Nonetheless, having reviewed the record, we disagree with Petitioner’s position. The technology here does not appear to be particularly complex, and the Examiner’s explanation shows that he expressly considered the issues of inherency, and offered detailed findings why the functional limitations related to the elastic fastener were not necessarily present in the art at issue. See Ex. 1008, 87–88. Although not referred to expressly in the Examiner’s explanation, the Information Disclosure Sheet considered by the Examiner includes the Petitions in PGR2016-00030 and PGR2016-00031, which contain similar explanations of inherency to those at issue in this case. See PGR2016-00031, Paper 2, 43–45 (Petition discussing inherency issue with respect to Lee). Although the Examiner’s explanation does not refer to those papers expressly, the fact that those papers were listed on an IDS is, nevertheless, circumstantial evidence that Petitioner’s inherency arguments were considered when the Examiner provided his explanation concerning inherency. See Ex. 1008, 87 (“Because it is not true that all elastic bands have the same elastic force as an inherent property, it cannot be presumed that all elastic bands would function the same way.”). Moreover, as Patent Owner notes, Dr. Kamrin fails to even address Donaldson’s use of a mechanical means, i.e., a spring, to release the balloon. Prelim. Resp. 32. Thus, we are not persuaded that Dr. Kamrin’s testimony meaningfully distinguishes the record that is before us from the record that was before the Examiner.” slip op. at 12
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,533,779 - Neil Ziegmann / N.P.Z., Inc. v. Carlis G. StephensRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01860 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part, reaffirmed denial of IPR under § 325(d), and granted the request for an expanded panel.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“[dissatisfied] party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“arguments” is self-evident, so we focus on the next part, “substantially the same prior art or arguments.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added). We conclude that a set of prior art or arguments may be considered “substantially the same” if they are “cumulative to or substantially overlap with issues previously considered by the Office with respect to the patent.” 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). In order for a party to bring this issue to the Office’s attention, the focus of the “substantially” analysis should be on the differences (or lack thereof) between the prior art and arguments presented in the petition, and those “previously . . . presented to the Office.” A party making assertions relevant to Section 325(d) should identify such differences (or lack thereof), whether substantive or procedural, and explain the relevance of those differences (or lack thereof).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Taker Magazine (Ex. 1027) and the Declaration of Neil Ziegmann (Ex. 1024) that purportedly show that the Examiner’s determination was erroneous. We note that Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony is discounted, in that he is an interested party in this proceeding. Cf. Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he level of interest of the testifying witness is an important consideration when such testimony is offered to corroborate another witness’s testimony.”). Moreover, even when accorded some weight, we are unpersuaded that the Fur Taker advertisement and Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony come close to showing that the Examiner’s determination concerning nexus was erroneous. In particular, the vast majority of the evidence concerning secondary considerations in the prosecution history has not been challenged by Petitioner, and, thus, for the reasons set forth above, is treated as undisputed fact. To hold otherwise would allow Petitioner to make an end-run around Section 325(d) by merely submitting any piece of new evidence, no matter how minor or inconsequential.” slip op. at 27
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,881,447 - Apple Inc. v. Immersion CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00896 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–7 and 23–29, rejecting the Rosenberg grounds under §325(d) and declining institution under §314(a) due to the repeated, evolving challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Section 325(d) provides, in pertinent part In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphases added). It is undisputed that Rosenberg ’373 and Rosenberg ’846 asserted by Petitioner in this case are the same prior art references previously presented by Petitioner in IPR2016-01372. As discussed above, Petitioner challenges the same claims on the same grounds which were previously considered and denied in IPR2016-01372. See 1372 Dec. on Inst. 41–45.” slip op. at 8
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“(a) whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent; (b) whether the petitioner knew or should have known of the prior art asserted in the later petition when it filed its earlier petition; (c) whether at the time of filing of the later petition, the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the earlier petition; (d) the length of time that elapsed between when the petitioner had the patent owner’s or Board’s analysis on the earlier petition and when petitioner filed the later petition; and (e) whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation why we should permit another attack on the same claims of the same patent.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,659,571 - Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Eagle View Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 18, 2017 · IPR2016-01775 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on the Hsieh and Applicad obviousness ground for all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding the petition repeated substantially the same art or arguments as the first petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Petitioner argues that because we did not reach the merits of the First Petition, Petitioner should be allowed to present more specific evidence regarding public accessibility in the Second Petition to allow the Board to reach the merits of Petitioner’s challenge. Second Pet. 5–6. Absent a good reason, a subsequently filed petition that only corrects defects identified by a Board decision in a prior petition typically is not granted. See, e.g., Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., Case IPR2014-00581, slip op. at 12–13 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) (Paper 8); NetApp Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., IPR2015-00776, slip op. at 8 (PTAB Sept. 8, 2015) (Paper 13).” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,078,436
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.