- Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GMHBInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01222 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding substantially the same prior art or arguments had been presented to the Office and no material examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“stated in the Petition, standing alone, supports a finding of material examiner error, that argument is not developed adequately and, therefore, is unpersuasive on this record. Pet. 84–85. Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the Office erred, for example, by “misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art whose teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. Where “the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive under” Becton, Dickinson factors (e) and (f). Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. As explained above, when assessing factor (e), we consider whether Petitioner “point[s] out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art.” Supra 8. When assessing factor (f), in turn, we look for some explanation of how or why “the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments.” Id. Petitioner addresses neither of those issues adequately, if at all. Pet. 81–85; Prelim. Reply 5–10. The closest Petitioner comes to addressing those issues is by observing, “the obviousness analysis” in the Petition “is supported by expert testimony, which the Examiner did not have.” Pet. 85. That observation is undeveloped by further analysis and, therefore, is ineffective to show that the Examiner materially erred by failing to discuss the same prior art combinations advanced in the Petition, or that “additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art” previously presented to the Office. Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8 at 18.” slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“institute review. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, Preliminary Reply, Preliminary Sur-reply, and evidence of record, we exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for patent owner
“namely, whether the claimed invention is entitled to a priority date of July 22, 2010, based on certain German priority documents, thereby disqualifying Jarisch as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). See Pet. 15–18 (discussing priority to the German applications), 22–23 (asserting Jarisch as prior art under § 102(e)), 85 (arguing that the examiner did not consider Jarisch because of an error in priority); Ex. 1002–176, Part 1, 278. Pet. 15–18 (arguing that the challenged claims are not entitled to priority based on the German priority documents), 85 (arguing the examiner applied an incorrect priority date, based on the German priority documents, to antedate Jarisch); Prelim. Resp. 4–6, 16–22; Prelim. Reply 8–10; Prelim. Sur-reply 7–10. Petitioner focuses only on whether the examiner erred in assessing that argument. Pet. 85. Petitioner does not, and cannot, submit that the Office never considered the issue during patent prosecution, at least with respect to applications in the priority chain of the ’177 patent. The Office, in fact, expressly considered whether “Jarisch is not prior art” because the challenged claims are “entitled to a priority date of 22 July 2010” based on the German priority documents. Ex. 1002–176, Part 1, 278 (prosecution history for the grandparent application). The Office also expressly responded to Patent Owner’s argument on that point as follows: “This urging is not deemed persuasive.” Id. This issue represents a second, significant argument previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“B. Discretionary Denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner also argues that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in light of parallel district court litigation involving the parties and the ’177 patent. Prelim. Resp. 36–44; Prelim. Sur-reply 1–4. Because we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and deny the Petition, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 28
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,858,177 - Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01223 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–16 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art or arguments had been presented to the Office and no material Examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“First, we assess whether the Examiner considered the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments asserted in the Petition and, if so, we resolve whether Petitioner shows sufficiently that the Examiner erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). In applying the two-part framework articulated in Advanced Bionics,” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,870,531 - Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01221 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–15 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same prior art or arguments had been presented to the Office and no material Examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“the same prior art or arguments asserted in the Petition and, if so, we resolve whether Petitioner shows sufficiently that the Examiner erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“challenged claims and (2) that the claimed invention, including the feature relating to barcode location, would not have been obvious over the combination of prior art references applied by the Examiner, including Jarisch. Id. at 393–404. Where both alternatives were before the Examiner, it is not at all clear that “the Examiner applied an incorrect priority date” or otherwise accepted that Jarisch does not qualify as prior art. Pet. 85.” slip op. at 23
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,858,176 - Clearh2o, Inc. v. Ceva Animal Health Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 26, 2020 · IPR2020-00039 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied ClearH2O’s rehearing request and left institution denied for claims 1–15 under all five § 103 grounds, finding no misapprehension or overlooked matter.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We disagree for the following two reasons. First, the Petition does not rely on Goff for disclosing the Third Limitation. Rather, the Petition relies on Lewis for disclosing the Third Limitation. Pet. 24 (Limitation 1.6). In addressing the Third Limitation, the Petition provides in its entirety: Lewis states that “The gel is sprayed over the top of the chicks in a uniform fashion to better ensure uniform distribution of the gel.” As shown in FIG. 1 of Lewis, the tray 14 is located beneath nozzle 18 so that the drops of gel 28 (i.e., beadlets) are distributed onto the hatchlings. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 11). The Petition makes no reference to Goff in addressing the Third Limitation, so we do not agree with Petitioner’s assertion that we failed to properly consider Goff in addressing this” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Second, and as explained in our Decision, Petitioner’s reliance on Goff is strikingly similar to the examiner’s reliance on Bartlett, Kurtz, and Peterson. See Dec. 26, 28. During prosecution, the examiner relied on Lewis for disclosing a majority of the claimed limitations, and relied on Bartlett, Kurtz, and Peterson for teaching nozzles “of approximately uniform size arranged approximately evenly apart along a manifold.” See id. at 26 (citing Ex. 2001, 149, 317, 358, 409); see also id. at 7–10 (summarizing office actions dated July 30, 2010, October 15, 2010, February 24, 2011, and June 21, 2011, and January 4, 2012). In the Petition, Petitioner also relied primarily on Lewis, relying on Goff for “describ[ing] an apparatus for spraying animals that includes spray nozzles 18 evenly spaced along a linear manifold (top member 16).” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:72–105, 2:20–58, Fig. 1); see also id. at 18–24 (relying primarily on Lewis in challenging claim 1). Petitioner does not persuade us that we misapprehended or overlooked anything in our determination that Goff is cumulative to the art cited during prosecution, namely, Bartlett, Kurtz, and Peterson. See Dec. 26. Accordingly, Petitioner’s first argument is unavailing.” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“This argument, however, is untimely as it was not presented in the Petition. A Request for Rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments and evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.”). In the Petition’s statement as to why we should institute review despite the similarities with the prosecution history, Petitioner only argues, Goff, Lee, and Lopez were not considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ‘185 patent. While Lewis and Johnston were made of record during prosecution of the ‘185 patent, the Examiner did not consider either reference in combination with the other presently identified prior art references. Each ground of rejection presented herein therefore includes one or more prior art references that were not considered during examination. Pet. 5. Because the Petition did not argue that the examiner erred in overlooking Johnston, such as by forgetting Johnston, Petitioner’s argument in the Request is untimely. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,794,185 - Clearh2o, Inc. v. Ceva Animal Health Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 18, 2020 · IPR2020-00039 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–15 under § 325(d), finding the asserted art and arguments substantially similar or cumulative to those considered during examination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“§ 314(a) (stating “[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); see also Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). The exercise of our discretion to institute an inter partes review is informed by 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), which requires us to “take into account whether, and reject the petition . . . because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In evaluating whether to exercise our discretion under § 325(d), we weigh the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, slip op. at 17–18 (Paper 8) (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential-in-part, indentations added for clarity). Upon reviewing the factors enumerated in Becton, Dickinson, we find that, on balance, the factors weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“We have authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and the evidence presented, for the reasons described below, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,794,185 - Avita Medical Limited v. Renovacare Sciences Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 18, 2017 · IPR2017-01243 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds, finding the petition relied on the same or substantially the same prior art previously considered by the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Our discretion pursuant to § 325(d) involves a balance between several competing interests. “On the one hand, there are the interests in conserving the resources of the Office and granting patent owners repose on issues and prior art that have been considered previously.” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, Case IPR2016-01876, slip op. at 7 (PTAB Apr. 3, 2017) (Paper 8). “On the other hand, are the interests of giving petitioner the opportunity to be heard and correcting any errors by the Office in allowing a patent—in the case of an inter partes review—over prior art patents and printed publications.” Id.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,610,430 - Kranos Corporation D/B/A Schutt Sports v. Riddell, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2017 · IPR2017-01530 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds under §325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments had been presented in an earlier petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“on behalf of the Director, may take into account whether, and reject a petition because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Because the 1530 Petition now before us presents substantially the same prior art, and substantially the same arguments, as asserted in the petition in IPR2016-01650 (see Ex. 3002) (the “1650 Petition”), we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and deny institution of a trial.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,938,818 - Neil Ziegmann / N.P.Z., Inc. v. Carlis G. StephensRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01860 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part, reaffirmed denial of IPR under § 325(d), and granted the request for an expanded panel.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“[dissatisfied] party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“arguments” is self-evident, so we focus on the next part, “substantially the same prior art or arguments.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added). We conclude that a set of prior art or arguments may be considered “substantially the same” if they are “cumulative to or substantially overlap with issues previously considered by the Office with respect to the patent.” 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). In order for a party to bring this issue to the Office’s attention, the focus of the “substantially” analysis should be on the differences (or lack thereof) between the prior art and arguments presented in the petition, and those “previously . . . presented to the Office.” A party making assertions relevant to Section 325(d) should identify such differences (or lack thereof), whether substantive or procedural, and explain the relevance of those differences (or lack thereof).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Taker Magazine (Ex. 1027) and the Declaration of Neil Ziegmann (Ex. 1024) that purportedly show that the Examiner’s determination was erroneous. We note that Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony is discounted, in that he is an interested party in this proceeding. Cf. Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he level of interest of the testifying witness is an important consideration when such testimony is offered to corroborate another witness’s testimony.”). Moreover, even when accorded some weight, we are unpersuaded that the Fur Taker advertisement and Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony come close to showing that the Examiner’s determination concerning nexus was erroneous. In particular, the vast majority of the evidence concerning secondary considerations in the prosecution history has not been challenged by Petitioner, and, thus, for the reasons set forth above, is treated as undisputed fact. To hold otherwise would allow Petitioner to make an end-run around Section 325(d) by merely submitting any piece of new evidence, no matter how minor or inconsequential.” slip op. at 27
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,881,447 - Robert Bosch Tool Corporation v. Sd3, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 22, 2017 · IPR2016-01754 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding the petition presented substantially the same prior art and arguments previously considered during prosecution.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“similarities between the prior art references presented here, in this Petition, as compared to the prior art substantively considered by the Examiner, we determine that the evidence weighs in favor of a determination that the prior art asserted in the Petition was previously considered by the Office. We are persuaded that the prior art of Nieberle, either in view of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art or Bielinski, and Lokey, either in view of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill or Bielinski, as asserted in this proceeding in grounds 1–4 against claims 1–8 and 10–17 are “the same or substantially the same prior art” as that specifically relied on and considered substantively by the Examiner, and overcome by Applicant, during prosecution of the underlying patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“machine safety would have known could achieve the claimed speed and distance. This testimony, following his desired acceleration calculation however, fails to state affirmatively that it was even possible by explosive devices and capacitors to achieve the claimed time and distance performance characteristics asserted in the calculation. More importantly, Mr. Main’s testimony fails to persuasively explain how any known explosives or capacitors available to one of skill in the art at the time of invention, would have achieved such an acceleration and a mechanical actuation of the “moveable component 1/32nd of an inch within approximately 3 milliseconds or less after the dangerous condition is detected” as called for in claims 1, 13, and 16 of the ’279 patent. By way of another example, Mr. Main’s declaration refers to a spring loaded actuator disclosed by Bielinski, the secondary reference combined with Nieberle in ground 2, and asserts that it “could have provided sufficient energy (depending on size, etc.), and it would have been obvious to use it.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 258. Even assuming that Mr. Main is forthrightly stating that the “sufficient energy” developed by Bielinski’s actuator could actuate a moveable member to move 1/32nd of an inch in 3 milliseconds or less, nowhere in his declaration can we find that Mr. Main provides any persuasive technical reasoning or analysis to support this allegation. Id. (citing Ex. 1003, V.B.9).” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“IV. CONCLUSION We conclude that the facts and evidence do not establish a sufficient or persuasive reason for the Board to again consider the same prior art, the same claims, and substantially the same arguments as substantively considered in the examination of the application leading to the ’279 patent. Further, because we are guided by our analysis above to exercise our discretion in this threshold matter under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and deny institution in this case, we need not reach a different threshold issue raised by Patent Owner in their Preliminary Response, that is whether Petitioner is time-barred by an ITC investigation, (Inv. No. 337-TA-965), under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,011,279 - Neil Ziegman / N.P.Z., Inc. v. Carlis G. StephensInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 24, 2016 · IPR2015-01860 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 12–15 under § 325(d), finding the petition presented substantially the same prior art and arguments previously considered by the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Petitioner’s favor and against denying the instant Petition under § 325(d). Foremost among them include that the ’447 patent has not previously been before the Board, and Petitioner has not challenged previously the ’447 patent in a proceeding before the Office. Nevertheless, we determine that these factors are outweighed by the following countervailing factors. The same primary reference asserted by the Petitioner was previously presented to, and considered by, the Office in the same substantive manner as advocated for by Petitioner. Petitioner identifies the same difference between the primary reference and claims 12–15 as identified expressly and unambiguously by the Office, and, thus, asks the Board to, essentially, second-guess the Office’s previous decision on substantially the same issue. And in requesting that second-guess, Petitioner asks the Board to reconsider evidence of secondary considerations that, again, the Office expressly determined was sufficient to overcome the expressly and unambiguously identified difference between the primary reference and claims 12–15. Indeed, given the relative clarity of the already-considered difference in scope between the primary reference and claims 12–15, we need not resort to undue speculation to conclude that the proceeding will devolve into a resource-consuming dispute concerning evidence with regards to secondary considerations, again, on an issue already and unambiguously presented previously to and considered by the Office. Under these facts, we are unpersuaded that adjudicating such a dispute on an already-considered issue is an efficient use of Board resources.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, we conclude that the Petition presents substantially the same art or arguments as those previously presented to the Office, and, thus, exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review as to claims 12–15.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,881,447
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.