- Guardant Health, Inc. v. University Of WashingtonInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00449 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the written-description priority arguments were substantially the same as those considered by the Office, and Petitioner did not show material error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Based on this record, we find Petitioner’s arguments challenging written description support are the same or substantially the same as those considered by the examiner during the prosecution of the ’045 application. 4. Material Error Having found that the condition in the first part of the two-prong framework is satisfied, we next evaluate whether Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in its prior consideration of those arguments. Advanced Bionics, 8. Based on the current record, we determine Petitioner has not met its burden to show the examiner materially erred.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached
“Specifically, Petitioner argues that the ’785 application lacks written description support for “converting” or “attaching” tags to “circulating DNA molecules,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 20. Id. at 17–30. Patent Owner argues that we should deny institution under § 325(d) “because the Office already found that the specification provides § 112 support for tagging circulating DNA.” Prelim. Resp. 10. For the reasons explained below, we find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive.5 5 As another basis for its priority arguments, Petitioner contends that the ’785 application does not enable methods for “converting” or “attaching” tags to “circulating DNA molecules.” Pet. 30. Patent Owner asserts that “[t]he Petition gives enablement only cursory treatment.” Prelim. Resp. 36. We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner disposes of the entire enablement argument in a single seven-line paragraph. See Pet. 30. It provides no meaningful analyses of the factors set forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION Petitioner’s anticipation and obviousness grounds rest on the priority date of the challenged claims. Because we decline to reconsider Petitioner’s challenge of priority date based on lack of written description support, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and decline to institute inter partes review of the ’699 patent. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied.” slip op. at 18
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,689,699 - Boehringer Ingelheim Animal Health USA Inc. v. Kansas State University Research FoundationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · PGR2022-00021 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution on Grounds 1–5 under § 325(d) and found Ground 6 had not shown any challenged claim more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“met (e.g., substantially the same art is presented), we move to part two of the framework, asking “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims.” Id. at 8. Factors (c), (e), and (f) of Becton, Dickinson fall within part two of the framework. Id. at 10 (“[F]actors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated material error by the Office.”). Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated error. Id. at 8–10. “If the petitioner fails to show that the Office erred, the Director may exercise his discretion not to institute.” Id. at 8–9. “At bottom, this [§ 325(d)] framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9 (“If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.”).” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“specific citations to evaluate its assertions, Petitioner does not direct our attention to any portion of the Nordgren Declaration providing information on why the partial sequences disclosed by the references teach or suggest the claimed 90% sequence homology. Pet. 76, 79 (citing Ex. 1026 at VII.C, ¶¶ 247–269). For example, Dr. Nordgren’s assertion “a POSITA would anticipate natural genetic variation of PorkNW2/USA/2009 ORF2 would bring it within the scope of the Claim 1 genera” is not supported by substantial evidence. Ex. 1026 ¶ 256. Claim 1, for example, recites a PCV3 protein and does not recite partial proteins. Without knowing what portion of complete proteins are disclosed by the references, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to predict the variation expected among a group of complete proteins to arrive at the claimed subject matter as is implied by Petitioner. Petitioner’s conclusory statements are insufficient to support a legal conclusion of obviousness. And while we agree with Petitioner that the protein sequences disclosed in the cited references do not necessarily have to be designated as PCV3 sequences, we determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that any of the PCV3 deposit references teach or suggest the recited sequences within the claimed range. Pet. 79. Therefore, Petitioner has not met its burden in showing that every claimed element is taught by its cited references, and we need not reach Petitioner’s argument on motivation to combine. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to carry its burden to show that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable based on Petitioner’s Ground 6.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (or “POSITA”) in the field of the ’274 Patent in the October 2015 to October 2019 timeframe would have held a Doctorate in Veterinary Medicine (D.V.M.) or equivalent, or a Ph.D. or equivalent in immunology, vaccinology, virology, molecular biology, animal science, and/or husbandry, or a closely related field. A POSITA would also have practical knowledge of immunology, including how vaccine candidates are first identified and then subsequently developed. The knowledge may come from the POSITA’s own experience, or it may come through research or work collaborations with other experienced individuals in the medical, pharmaceutical, or biotech industry, e.g., as members of a research team or group. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶ 34). Absent opposition from Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s definition because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board applies the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2019). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner contends that it “does not believe any term of the ’274 Patent needs to be construed in this proceeding.” Pet. 29. We agree and independently determine that it is unnecessary to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of rendering this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,954,274 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 22, 2022 · IPR2021-01520 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 9-11, 13, 18, and 19 under § 325(d), finding the same art had been evaluated and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“If “either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied,” we must then determine “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. “An example of a material error may include misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. at 8 n.9.” slip op. at 16
- Other 314aNot reached
“III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under § 314(a) or § 325(d) to deny institution. See Prelim. Resp. 13–43; Prelim. Sur-reply 1–8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 325(d). Petitioner argues that we should decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution. See Pet. 8–12; Prelim. Reply 1–10. For the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution. Because we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution, we do not reach discretionary denial under § 314(a).” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,686,193 - Apotex Inc. / Apotex Corp. v. Auspex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 9, 2022 · IPR2021-01507 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–3 under § 325(d), finding the petition relied on substantially the same art or arguments previously presented and did not show material Examiner error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of the prior art or arguments. Id. In general, only if the same, or substantially the same, art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, do we turn to whether Petitioner has established a material error. Id. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 24
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,524,733 - Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. The United States Of America, As Represented By The Secretary, Department Of Health & Human ServicesInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 2, 2022 · IPR2021-01484 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–9, 13, 17, and 19 as obvious over Milone and Kalled under § 103, exercising discretion under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Electromedizinishe Gerӓte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–10 (Feb. 13, 2020) (“Advanced Bionics”) (precedential), the Board addresses § 325(d) applying a “two-part framework.” In the first part of the framework, we ask whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 22 previously were presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics at 8. Factors (a), (b), and (d) of Becton, Dickinson come into play under this first part of the framework. Id. at 8–10. If either condition of the framework’s first part is met (e.g., substantially the same art is presented), we move to part two of the framework, asking “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims.” Id. at 8. Factors (c), (e), and (f) of Becton, Dickinson fall within part two of the framework. Id. at 10 (“[F]actors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated material error by the Office.”). Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated error. Advanced Bionics at 8–10. “If the petitioner fails to show that the Office erred, the Director may exercise his discretion not to institute inter partes review.” Id. at 8–9. “At bottom, this [§ 325(d)] framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9 (“If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.”). B.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition, but states that the person of ordinary skill in the art would “[t]ypically” . . . have had an M.D. or a Ph.D. in immunology, biochemistry, cell biology, molecular biology, or a related discipline, with at least two years of experience in conducting laboratory research on chimeric T cell receptors.” Prelim. Resp. 44 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 20). According to Patent Owner, the ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had knowledge of the scientific literature and have skills relating to chimeric T cell receptors and methods of using such receptors” and “may have worked as part of a multidisciplinary team” and been able to draw on the specialized skills of, for example, an immunologist, and/or a clinical oncologist. See id. at 43–44. Considering the record before us, both parties present reasonable definitions of one of ordinary skill in the art. For the purpose of this proceeding, we consider one of ordinary skill in the art as having had an M.D. or a Ph.D. in immunology, biochemistry, cell biology, molecular biology, or a related discipline, with at least two years of experience in conducting laboratory research on chimeric T cell receptors and/or the use of CAR-T immunotherapy. Consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed definition, the ordinarily skilled artisan may have worked as part of a 20 multidisciplinary team and been able to draw on the specialized skills of, for example, an immunologist, and/or a clinical oncologist.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for patent owner
“We do not find Petitioner’s argument persuasive for the reasons set forth on pages 34–40 of the Preliminary Response. Most particularly, we note that the phrase “[a] chimeric antigen receptor (CAR)” occurs solely in the preamble of independent claim 24. Terms in a preamble, however, are not generally construed as limiting. See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). More specifically, “when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention,” the preamble is not considered a limitation. Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the present case, we find it plausible—if not likely—that the Examiner gave no weight to the terms in the preamble of claim 24 such that the remaining language did not expressly or implicitly require either a 32 transmembrane domain, or a “T-cell activation moiety” specific to CAR constructs. The Examiner appears to have recognized, however, that CAR constructs differ from Kalled’s antibodies at least in having a transmembrane domain as expressly recited in claims 29 and 30. See Ex. 2005, 605, 745–749 (allowing amended claims). This view is underscored by the Examiner’s decision not to reject claims 34 and 38 as anticipated by Kalled. See Ex. 2005, 604. Notably, claims 34 and 38 recite SEQ ID Nos 4–12, each of which encodes a complete CAR construct and, thus, implicitly includes a transmembrane domain. See id. at 589 (claiming a CAR comprising the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID Nos: 4–12 (claim 34) or a nucleic acid encoding the same (claim 38)); Ex. 1001, 9:49–53; Ex. 2001 ¶ 92.12” slip op. at 32
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,765,342 - Ii-Vi, Inc. v. Nextgen Innovations, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01358 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–21 under § 325(d), finding the grounds presented substantially the same art and arguments previously considered and no material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“In evaluating the exercise of discretion to deny institution under Section 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 18
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,887,795 - Ii-Vi, Inc. v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01359 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–11 and 13–23 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments were previously presented and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“GMBH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”), the Board applied a two-part framework in considering whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d): “(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics at 8.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III. CONCLUSION We conclude that, for each of Petitioner’s challenges, it is appropriate to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the Petition with respect to those grounds. We accordingly exercise that discretion for the Petition as a whole and deny institution of an inter partes review. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 33
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,263,723 - Ecofasten Solar, LLC / Wencon Development, Inc. D/B/A Quickmount PV Corporation et al. v. Unirac, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 8, 2022 · IPR2021-01379 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR for claims 3–7, 9, 10, 13, and 15–23 under § 325(d), finding the same or substantially the same art or arguments had previously been presented to the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“and Nobuyuki[] are the same or substantially the same as art previously considered by the Office, in either original prosecution or during reexamination.” Prelim. Resp. 30. Patent Owner asserts that the first part of the Advanced Bionics two-part framework for determining if denial of institution under § 325(d) is proper is satisfied. We agree, based on our analysis above. Specifically, we determine that under Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d), the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. Turning to the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework, Petitioner also argues that the “Examiner erred in a manner material to patentability by adopting a narrow construction of ‘one or more clamps variably positionable on the dual track rail and footing grid’ that is inconsistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 19. We disagree. We discussed the Board’s appeal decision in the previous section of this Decision. The Board affirmed the entirety of the RAN decision by the Reexamination Examiner, including construction of the phrase Petitioner argues was construed in error. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show error. Thus, under Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f), Petitioner has not demonstrated a material error by the Office.” slip op. at 41
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“Accordingly, based on our analysis of the Becton, Dickinson factors and the guidelines in Advanced Bionics, we exercise our discretion and deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. III. CONCLUSION Taking into consideration the arguments in the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we exercise our discretion and deny institution of an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 42
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner also argues that the “Examiner erred in a manner material to patentability by adopting a narrow construction of ‘one or more clamps variably positionable on the dual track rail and footing grid’ that is inconsistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 19. We disagree. We discussed the Board’s appeal decision in the previous section of this Decision. The Board affirmed the entirety of the RAN decision by the Reexamination Examiner, including construction of the phrase Petitioner argues was construed in error. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show error. Thus, under Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f), Petitioner has not demonstrated a material error by the Office.” slip op. at 41
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,434,362 - Intel Corporation v. Acqis LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 2, 2022 · IPR2021-01095 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 10–16 and 22–27 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same arguments were previously presented and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In determining whether to institute an inter partes review, we “may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,756,359 - Intel Corporation v. Acqis LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 2, 2022 · IPR2021-01094 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding substantially the same arguments had been presented to the Office and Intel had not shown material error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Section 325(d) provides that in determining whether to institute an inter partes review, we “may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” To determine whether to deny institution under § 325(d), we use the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“3. Summary We determine, on this record, that substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office. Further, we also disagree with Petitioner that the Office’s purported treatment of the arguments were unreasonable. As set forth under Advanced Bionics, if reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. As a result, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny the Petition in this case. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny the Petition. IV. ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,756,359
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.