- Google LLC v. Proxense, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-01318 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1, 5, 6, 8–11, 13, and 14 because the related original petition had already been instituted, and denied joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“claims 1, 5, 6, 8–11, 13, and 14 of U.S. Patent No. 8,646,042 B1 (“the ’042 patent”) (Paper 1) and a Motion for Joinder (“Motion”) (Paper 3) to join Microsoft’s instituted proceeding in IPR2024-00573 (“Microsoft IPR”), along with a Notice Ranking Multiple Petitions (“Notice”) (Paper 4). Petitioner also acknowledges that it previously filed a petition (“Original Petition”) for inter partes review of claims 1–6, 8–15, and 17–20 of the ’042 patent in IPR2024-00782. Notice 1. Thus, Petitioner “requests that action on this motion be held in abeyance until, and only if, the Board declines to institute Petitioner’s Original Petition.” Id.; see also Motion 1. The Board has instituted an inter partes review of the ’042 patent in IPR2024-00782. See IPR2024-00782, Paper 13. That is, we have not declined to institute Petitioner’s Original Petition in IPR2024-00782. Id. Accordingly, the condition on which Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for Joinder is based, i.e., “in abeyance until, and only if, the Board declines to institute [in IPR2024-00782],” has not come to pass. Therefore, we deny the Petition and the Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“Here, Petitioner acknowledges that it “has two concurrent petitions challenging the validity of the same patent.” Notice 1. Although Petitioner provides “a ranking of the petitions in the order in which it wishes the Board to consider the merits” and “a succinct explanation of the differences” (id.), Petitioner requests that “should the Board decide to institute only a single petition against the ’042 patent, . . . the Board institute Petitioner’s Original Petition (in IPR2024-00782).” Id. Since, as discussed above, the Board has instituted an inter partes review of the ’042 patent in IPR2024-00782, we deny the Petition and the Motion for Joinder in the current IPR.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“claims 1, 5, 6, 8–11, 13, and 14 of U.S. Patent No. 8,646,042 B1 (“the ’042 patent”) (Paper 1) and a Motion for Joinder (“Motion”) (Paper 3) to join Microsoft’s instituted proceeding in IPR2024-00573 (“Microsoft IPR”), along with a Notice Ranking Multiple Petitions (“Notice”) (Paper 4). Petitioner also acknowledges that it previously filed a petition (“Original Petition”) for inter partes review of claims 1–6, 8–15, and 17–20 of the ’042 patent in IPR2024-00782. Notice 1. Thus, Petitioner “requests that action on this motion be held in abeyance until, and only if, the Board declines to institute Petitioner’s Original Petition.” Id.; see also Motion 1. The Board has instituted an inter partes review of the ’042 patent in IPR2024-00782. See IPR2024-00782, Paper 13. That is, we have not declined to institute Petitioner’s Original Petition in IPR2024-00782. Id. Accordingly, the condition on which Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for Joinder is based, i.e., “in abeyance until, and only if, the Board declines to institute [in IPR2024-00782],” has not come to pass. Therefore, we deny the Petition and the Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,646,042 - Apple, Inc. v. Koss CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 12, 2021 · IPR2021-00686 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims because two petitions were unnecessary and the General Plastic factors did not justify the follow-on petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsDenied
“To that end, the CTPG states that “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” CTPG 59. Thus, “multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases.” Id. “Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns.” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(b)). “Nonetheless, the Board recognizes that there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary, including, for example, when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation,” although even then, granting two petitions “should be rare.” See id.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“Nevertheless, Petitioner’s stated reason for filing two petitions is that it could not challenge the large volume of asserted claims in one petition, not that it became aware of the prior art after filing the ’381 IPR petition. The implication is that Petitioner was ready to challenge those claims (and aware of the basis to do so) but for limitations on briefing space. As further evidence of Petitioner’s early knowledge of the prior art, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner was aware of Seshadri-818 and other references by the same inventor at least as early as January 2021, when Petitioner served invalidity contentions with those references in the District Court case. Prelim. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2023). Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner was aware of Seshadri at least as early as February 22, 2021, when it filed IPR2021-00546 advancing Seshadri as a reference. Id. at 26. Logically, Petitioner would have been aware of those references even earlier, as it would have spent significant time preparing its invalidity contentions and the Petition. In light of the evidence that Petitioner likely was aware of Seshadri before the filing of the Petition in March 2021, along with Petitioner’s silence as to its knowledge, this factor weighs against institution.” slip op. at 16
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,491,982 - Next Caller Inc. v. Trustid, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00961 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution in IPR2019-00961 and IPR2019-00962 because substantially overlapping district court litigation was advanced and scheduled to conclude before a Board decision.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“discretion under § 314(a) to deny a petition upon determining that institution would be an inefficient use of Board resources. NHK Spring, IPR2018- 00752, Paper 8 at 19–20. In particular, the Board determined that it was proper to exercise discretion to deny institution in a case having a parallel district court proceeding involving (i) the same patent/parties, (ii) the same claim construction standard, (iii) the same prior art references, and (iv) the same arguments as in the district court proceeding, which was scheduled to be completed before a final decision would have been due in the Board proceeding.7 See id. The Board determined that these circumstances supported denial of the petition under § 314(a), considering the AIA’s objective “to provide an effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation.” Id. at 20 (quoting Gen. Plastic8). We agree with TRUSTID that the case before us presents circumstances that support denial of institution under § 314(a). Prelim. Resp. 15–19.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“e. Additional Factor: Next Caller’s Delay Next Caller’s delay in filing the Petition weighs in favor of the Board exercising discretion to deny institution under § 314. As depicted in table 4 below, at the time of the ’039 Petition, Next Caller was aware or could have reasonably been aware of the prior art asserted in the challenges set forth in the instant proceeding.” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,238,532 - Next Caller Inc. v. Trustid, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00962 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–52 under § 314(a), finding the petitions duplicated parallel district court litigation scheduled to conclude before a Board final decision.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“discretion under § 314(a) to deny a petition upon determining that institution would be an inefficient use of Board resources. NHK Spring, IPR2018- 00752, Paper 8 at 19–20. In particular, the Board determined that it was proper to exercise discretion to deny institution in a case having a parallel district court proceeding involving (i) the same patent/parties, (ii) the same claim construction standard, (iii) the same prior art references, and (iv) the same arguments as in the district court proceeding, which was scheduled to be completed before a final decision would have been due in the Board proceeding.7 See id. The Board determined that these circumstances supported denial of the petition under § 314(a), considering the AIA’s objective “to provide an effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation.” Id. at 20 (quoting Gen. Plastic8). We agree with TRUSTID that the case before us presents circumstances that support denial of institution under § 314(a). Prelim. Resp. 15–19.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“A threshold issue raised by the Preliminary Response is whether, pursuant to the precedent set forth in NHK Spring, we should deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in view of the similarities between this proceeding and the Parallel District Court Proceeding, and the expected completion date of the Parallel District Court Proceeding before the Board’s final written decision in this proceeding. Id. Because we determine that the specific factual circumstances of this case warrant denial of institution under § 314(a), this threshold issue is dispositive.5 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) states that [t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director6 determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,238,532 - Fedex Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 17, 2018 · IPR2017-02030 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no overlooked or misapprehended basis to authorize a motion to terminate the reexamination.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner
“First, IV requested that the Board exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a) to terminate the reexamination request because it was abusive to IV and an unmistakable attempt to circumvent General Plastic. Second, IV requested that the Board exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to terminate the reexamination request because that request presented the same references and substantially the same arguments that FedEx presented in Case IPR2017-00729 and Case IPR2017-02030. Id. For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions that we misapprehended or overlooked its arguments in connection with its request for authorization to file a motion to terminate. Id. at 1–8.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for patent owner
“First, IV requested that the Board exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a) to terminate the reexamination request because it was abusive to IV and an unmistakable attempt to circumvent General Plastic. Second, IV requested that the Board exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to terminate the reexamination request because that request presented the same references and substantially the same arguments that FedEx presented in Case IPR2017-00729 and Case IPR2017-02030. Id. For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions that we misapprehended or overlooked its arguments in connection with its request for authorization to file a motion to terminate. Id. at 1–8.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,494,581 - Nikon Corporation v. ASML Netherlands B.V. And Carl Zeiss AGInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 4, 2018 · IPR2018-00220 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims: claims 1–13, 23–26, and 28 for failure to show a reasonable likelihood of success, and claims 14–17 in its discretion.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Our rules require Petitioner to set forth in the Petition “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and specifically state that “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(3). It is against this backdrop that we determine whether Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. In this case, Petitioner unambiguously takes the position that the terms “error utility software module,” “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation,” and “processing means for processing a user execution of an erroneous operation” are not amenable to construction because the specification of the ’792 patent does not describe sufficient structure corresponding to these terms. Pet. 12–21. Petitioner advances unequivocal, and uncontroverted, expert testimony supporting this position. Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 26–40. Because Petitioner’s arguments and evidence are directed to the contrary position, Petitioner does not establish that these three terms are capable of being construed. If Petitioner cannot show that these claim terms are amenable to construction, Petitioner cannot apply the features of the prior art to those terms, nor expect us to do so. Cf. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–62 (CCPA 1962) (“As we have previously indicated, our analysis of the claims leaves us in a quandary as to what in fact is covered by them. We think the examiner and the board were wrong in relying on what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims and basing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 thereon.”). Therefore, Petitioner does not establish that it is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that claims 1, 6, 23, and 28 would have been obvious.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The Federal Circuit has “stated that the use of the word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies” and that “the failure to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112, para. 6 does not apply.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). Because it recites “means,” the term “processing means” presumptively is in means-plus-function format. The terms “error utility software module” and “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation” presumptively are not. This presumption, however, is not “strong” and should not have the practical effect of “placing a thumb on what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale.” Id. at 1349. “When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. Petitioner argues that “error utility software module” is in means-plus- function format. Pet. 12–13.2 As Petitioner observes (id.), “‘[m]odule’ is a well-known nonce word that can operate as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6” because it “is simply a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Petitioner argues that “this term’s limitations are all simply functions the module is supposed to perform and do not specify any structure for performing the recited functions.” Pet. 13. Petitioner’s expert testifies that “[t]hese recited limitations are purely functional and provide no structure for performing them” and that “[t]he term ‘software module’ does not convey to one of ordinary skill a definite structural meaning for performing the recited function.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 26. Similarly, Petitioner argues that “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation” is purely functional and does not specify structure for performing the recited function. Pet. 17. Dr. Essa’s testimony supports this argument. Ex. 1015 ¶ 36.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Petitioner’s means-plus-function arguments, detailed above. Nevertheless, if we were to institute a trial on claim 14 and its dependents, we also would have to institute on the challenged means-plus-function claims. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1369–60 (2018) (The Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition.); see also Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. The result of institution would be a trial in which Petitioner contends that the majority of the challenged claims are not amenable to construction. Although Petitioner is not permitted to pursue a ground of indefiniteness in an inter partes review (see 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), indefiniteness likely would be a significant issue for those claims going forward given Petitioner’s current posture and presentation of evidence. Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), “the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). Because a trial on the challenged claims, including claims 14–17, likely would be dominated by issues of alleged indefiniteness of claims 1–6, 8–13, 23–26, and 28, we exercise our discretion to deny institution on all challenged claims and grounds.” slip op. at 18
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,972,792 - Viptela, Inc. v. Fatpipe Networks Private LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 3, 2017 · IPR2017-01125 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 4–15, 19, and 22–24, exercising discretion under §§ 314(a) and 325(d) based on overlapping petitions, follow-on arguments, and inefficient use of resources.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“’684 IPR, which in turn was a “copy-cat” of the ’976 IPR petition. Prelim. Resp. 2, 5. However, in deciding whether we should exercise our discretion and decline to go forward with this Petition, our concern is not only whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office,” as expressed in § 325(d), but also whether other factors weigh in favor of denying institution in light of the discretion afforded to us pursuant to § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“whether at the time of filing of the ’684 petition, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of Pearce, Zhang, and McCullough (“the Additional References”); the length of time that elapsed between learning of the Additional References, and the filing of the instant Petition; whether Petitioner has provided adequate explanation for the time lapse; whether at the time of filing of the instant Petition, Petitioner already had access to Patent Owner’s response in the ’976 IPR; and the finite resources of the Board. See Gen. Plastic Indus. at 16 (Paper 19) (informative). Petitioner provides no explanation of whether it knew or should have known of the Additional References when filing the ’684 petition; of when it first learned of these references; or of any time lapse between learning of these references and the filing of the instant Petition.” slip op. at 13
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“August 14, 2017, and a final decision is due by November 2, 2017. At this point, the decision in the ’976 IPR as to whether to see the matter through to final determination is squarely in our hands, regardless of whether any settlement is reached between the parties. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (“The parties may agree to settle any issue in a proceeding, but the Board is not a party to the settlement and may independently determine any question of jurisdiction, patentability, or Office practice.”). Thus, if we deem it appropriate, we can reach a final decision on the grounds presented in the ’976 IPR with or without participation from the parties in that matter. These facts weigh in favor of us exercising our discretion not to move forward with the instant Petition, at least with respect to the ’976 instituted claims insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’976 IPR, because the issues raised are fully briefed and ripe for a final decision in the ’976 IPR, and Petitioner’s non-participation in that proceeding is at best neutral to our analysis. Petitioner is a party to the ’684 IPR, and in that proceeding the petition is directed to the same claims of the same patent as in this Petition. This fact weighs in favor of us not moving forward with the instant Petition. Also, at least with respect to the ’684 instituted claims, insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’684 IPR, Petitioner has the opportunity to address the same art and arguments in the ’684 proceeding. It would be an inefficient use of Office resources, and would run counter to securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the challenges to the patentability of the ’235 patent, if we were to allow Petitioner to proceed on the same art and arguments in two separate proceedings.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits a list of terms for which Patent Owner has proposed construction in a co-pending district court case. Pet. 7–8. Petitioner, however, asserts that for the purposes of this Decision no terms need to be construed. Id. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. We reviewed the parties’ arguments, and, for the purposes of this Decision, we have determined that no terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,775,235
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.