- Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00082 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the district court had already held all challenged claims invalid under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“recent Director Review decision (i.e. in the above-noted related cases, IPR2024-01252 and IPR2024-01253) reached the opposite conclusion to that of AviaGames in holding that a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment precludes instituting challenges to the invalid claims even though an appeal of that judgment is pending. Specifically, in Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024-01252, -01253, Paper 27 (PTAB April 17, 2025) (Director Review decision) (“Hulu”), the Acting Director held that “[b]ecause the patent claims already stand invalid [due to the District Court’s § 101 invalidity judgment], it is unnecessary to institute another proceeding to review them for patentability under other grounds.” Hulu at 2, 3 (reasoning that “[i]n the event the Federal Circuit reverses the district court’s decision, Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand”) (remanding the panel’s institution decisions and denying institution). Accordingly, under clear guidance from Hulu, because the District Court held all the ’403 patent claims invalid under § 101, we deny institution. See Hulu at 3 (holding that “where a district court already has found the challenged claims invalid, the efficiency and integrity of the patent system is best served by denying institution” (citing Fintiv at 16)).” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,986,403 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Universal Connectivity Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01482 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1, 2, 4, 8–10, 12, 13, 15, 18–20, and 25, exercising § 314(a) discretion after balancing the Fintiv factors and finding the merits not particularly strong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied
“partes review “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts,” and strongly weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Of the three district court proceedings, the Lenovo Group case, pending in the Eastern District of Texas, is the most significant to our analysis here. In the Lenovo Group case, Lenovo Group has not requested a stay. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner argues that the Lenovo Group case is not likely to be stayed based on that court’s low grant rate in other cases and the progress of that case in particular. Id. at 17. The district court in the HP case denied a stay without prejudice and stated that a stay could be reconsidered in the future depending on the outcome at the PTAB. Prelim. Reply 3. The Dell case has been stayed. Id. On this record, we decline to speculate as to how any of the involved district courts where no stay is pending might rule on any future motion to stay. Thus, we determine that, while one stay has been granted, the lack of a stay in the other underlying district court cases, especially the Lenovo Group case, is not sufficiently persuasive to weigh this factor against exercising discretion. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative), cautions against speculating whether the district court would grant a stay if one were requested. Therefore, this factor has a neutral effect on the overall balancing of the Fintiv factors. B. Proximity of Trial Date to Projected Statutory Deadline (Factor 2) The scheduled trial date for the Lenovo Group case is November 3, 2025, which is about six months prior to the expected date for the final written decision here (i.e., late April 2026). See Prelim. Resp. 20; IPR2024- 01429, Ex. 2002 (Lenovo Group case Docket Control Order), 1. Petitioner argues this trial date is uncertain. Prelim. Reply 3. Further, Petitioner focuses its argument on what it terms a “growing backlog” in the Eastern District of Texas and “associated scheduling uncertainty.” Id. at 4. Petitioner refers to the status of the HP case, which is currently set for trial on September 21, 2026, and the stay in the Dell case. Id. Patent Owner responds that “[b]oth the scheduled trial date and the date of trial [in the Lenovo Group case] based on median time-to-trial statistics occur months before a final written decision would be expected here.” Prelim. Sur-reply 4. Patent Owner asserts that the time-to-trial statistics for the Eastern District of Texas project a median time-to-trial of 21.9 months. Prelim. Resp. 20–21 (citing Ex. 2007, U.S. District Courts Federal Court Management Statistics–Profiles—September 30, 2024). This projection yields a trial date that is prior to the expected final written decision date of April 2026. Prelim. Sur-reply 4. As with the previous factor, the status of the Lenovo Group case is our focus here. As stated, that trial is set to occur about six months before a final written decision would issue in this proceeding. The district court has stated that this trial date setting “cannot be changed without an acceptable showing of good cause.” Prelim. Resp. 20. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s unsupported argument that the trial date is uncertain. We also consider the fact that the median time-to-trial statistic discussed by both parties projects a trial date earlier than the actual date set by the district court. Ex. 2007; Prelim. Sur-reply 1. The fact that the time-to-trial statistic is earlier than the trial date set in the Lenovo Group case confirms that the schedule set by the district court is credible and should be given weight. From this evidence, we are persuaded that we should rely on the trial” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“E. Conclusion Regarding the Merits Petitioner does not present particularly strong merits. Petitioner’s arguments on the “bus limitation,” to succeed at trial, would require addressing a claim construction issue that was never addressed in the Petition and is arguably contradicted by the ’520 patent, which discloses transmitting packets representing a plurality of different control signals on a single bus. See Prelim. Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:34–38, 9:23–25, 9:50–54). Similarly, prevailing on the “modified protocol” issue would require proving that the HDMI–C protocol, which uses the same separate channel arrangement for CEC and DDC as standard HDMI, is sufficiently “modified” to meet the claim. Taking into account Patent Owner’s persuasive arguments supra in response, and for the reasons given, we do not find the merits of Petitioner’s position on either of these dispositive issues to be particularly strong.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party proposes claim constructions for our consideration. Petitioner submits that it “for the purposes of this proceeding, the terms of the challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and no terms require specific construction.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s position that no terms require construction. Prelim. Resp. 11–12. We determine there are no claim terms that need to be expressly construed for this Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner states that a person of ordinary skill “would have the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training and three years of work experience with data communications systems or interfaces, including at least some experience with serial or display data communications systems or interfaces .” Prelim. Resp. 12. The differences between these nearly-identical definitions are minor and immaterial to our decision. We regard either description as consistent with the challenged patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,856,520 - Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00871 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim; it also found institution inefficient based on Ground 1 alone.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. The Alleged Unpatentability of Claims 1, 11, and 12 as Anticipated by TI,” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims of the ’608 patent. IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 39
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Here, Petitioner advances five challenges with four directed to the same three independent claims. Pet. 3. We, for the reasons discussed below, determine that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Grounds 2 through 5. We further determine that, based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds and all the challenged claims based on evidence and arguments directed only to Ground 1 would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, even if Petitioner met the requisite burden for institution as to Ground 1, we would exercise our discretion and not institute an inter partes review. E. The Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 11, and 12 by Galinski (Ground 2)” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,590,608 - Facebook, Inc. v. Palo Alto Research Center Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 29, 2022 · IPR2021-01536 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds because a parallel IPR had already begun on the same claims and grounds, making another trial inefficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“§ 314(a). Here, it is unnecessary to institute review of claims 1, 4, 6, 7, 9–12, 15, 17, and 18 of the ’599 patent because trial has already been commenced on these claims on the same grounds in the -01294 IPR. Compare Pet. 3–4, with -01294 Dec. 6. Neither party advocates that trial be instituted under these circumstances. Stmt. 5; Prelim. Resp. 26. To institute inter partes review under these circumstances would not be an efficient use of the parties’ or the Board’s resources. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny inter partes review.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons described below, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,489,599 - Netscout Systems, Inc. v. Longhorn HD LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 10, 2022 · IPR2021-01258 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds and claims, finding no reasonable likelihood for at least claims 1–11 and that trying all 12 claims would be inefficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The problem with Petitioner’s contention is that limitation 1[f] does not require an “anomaly detector” to detect anomalous correlations between input vectors, but instead, an “anomaly detector . . . to detect anomalous correlations between individual ones of said clusters.” Ex. 1001, 10:66– 11:3. In this regard, the’846 patent’s specification discloses [o]nce sufficient data has be stored in the database, multi-dimensional vectors can be constructed and reduced from the stored data. The reduced multi-dimensional vectors can be processed using one or more conventional multi-variate analysis methods and the output sets produced by the multi-variate analysis methods can be correlated against one another according to one or more selected metrics. Id. at 4:34–40; see also id. at 9:15–19 (“Once, the reduced vectors have been processed by the multiple clustering methodologies in block 270, one or more metrics can be selected in block 280 for purposes of establishing a correlation between the output sets of the processed reduced multi-dimensional vectors.”). In contrast, the portions of Rhodes relied upon by Petitioner to address the argued limitation disclose that Rhodes detects anomalous behavior based on a correlation between input vectors, i.e., a “‘comparison function’ to measure ‘how different two vectors are.’” Pet. 39 (citing Ex. 1004, 3); see also id. at 40 (citing Ex. 1004, 8 (“The most obvious measure of vector similarity is somehow aggregating the differences among their several coordinates.”).” slip op. at 17
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Here, the Petition challenges 12 claims of the ’846 patent. Pet. 1. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing with respect to its challenges to at least 11 of these claims. Were we to institute review, the resulting trial would nonetheless go forward on all 12 claim challenges. We find that instituting trial, therefore, would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Consequently, we exercise our discretion to deny institution of the entire Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314.10” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. 8 The Petition in this case was accorded a filing date of August 11, 2021. See Paper 3, 1. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). The prior art itself may be sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Thus, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,260,846 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01423 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petitions did not show sufficiently material differences to justify additional reviews.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“[b]ased on the Board’s prior experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time . . . may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (July 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf. However, more than one petition may be necessary when, for example, “there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,118,948 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01422 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the second and third petitions did not differ materially enough to justify additional reviews after instituting on claims 1–26 in IPR2019-01421.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“In the Notice, Petitioner requests that we first consider the petition in IPR2019-01421. Notice, 2. For the reasons provided in our concurrent decision on institution in IPR2019-01421, we conclude that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’948 patent is unpatentable, and, thus, we institute on all the challenged claims in that case. Therefore, all of the claims challenged in these proceedings are subject to inter partes review in IPR2019-01421. Here, Petitioner contends that multiple proceedings are necessary because Patent Owner may attempt to antedate the asserted references. Notice, 3–4. However, Patent Owner stipulates it will not attempt to antedate any of the references in the three proceedings. Response, 3. Thus, the possibility of Patent Owner antedating the asserted references does not warrant instituting multiple inter partes reviews of the ’948 patent. Petitioner also argues that multiple inter partes reviews are necessary because each petition relies on different references to disclose claim elements. Notice, 2, 5. Specifically, the challenged claims require user equipment and simultaneous recording of programs. Id. As Petitioner indicates, the three petitions rely on different references to teach the user equipment and simultaneously recording limitations. Id. Yet Petitioner does not sufficiently clarify why these differences warrant three proceedings. See id. For instance, Petitioner lists the different combinations of user equipment taught by the references but does not explain why this distinction among the petitions is important. Id. at 2. Therefore, although there may be differences among the petitions, Petitioner does not show that the distinctions are sufficiently material to warrant institution in multiple proceedings. Petitioner further asserts that multiple proceedings are warranted because each petition cites new prior art, i.e., references that were either not cited or not applied by the Examiner during prosecution. Id. at 3–4. We are unpersuaded, though, that simply relying on prior art that was not considered during examination justifies instituting multiple inter partes reviews of the same claims of the ’948 patent. In sum, per Petitioner’s request, we first considered Petitioner’s arguments and Patent Owner’s responses in IPR2019-01421. As set forth in the decision on institution in IPR2019-01421, we instituted, on all grounds set forth in that petition, inter partes review of claims 1–26 of the ’948 patent. We subsequently reviewed the parties’ submissions in IPR2019- 01422 and IPR2019-01423. The Petitions addressed here do not contain sufficiently material differences to support instituting any additional inter partes reviews of the ’948 patent. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of review in IPR2019-01422 and IPR2019-01423.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In sum, per Petitioner’s request, we first considered Petitioner’s arguments and Patent Owner’s responses in IPR2019-01421. As set forth in the decision on institution in IPR2019-01421, we instituted, on all grounds set forth in that petition, inter partes review of claims 1–26 of the ’948 patent. We subsequently reviewed the parties’ submissions in IPR2019- 01422 and IPR2019-01423. The Petitions addressed here do not contain sufficiently material differences to support instituting any additional inter partes reviews of the ’948 patent. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of review in IPR2019-01422 and IPR2019-01423. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons provided above, considering all the circumstances in this case, we exercise our discretion under § 314(a) and deny the Petitions requesting inter partes review of the ’948 patent in IPR2019-01422 and IPR2019-01423. IV. ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the Petitions are denied as to all challenged claims of the ’948 patent in IPR2019-01422 and IPR2019-01423, and no trial is instituted in those cases.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,118,948 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Promptu Systems Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2018 · CBM2018-00033 · APJ Karl D Easthom · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 14–52, exercising discretion because Comcast advanced a conflicting claim construction in concurrent proceedings.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“Petitioner argues the Board should not exercise its discretion to deny this CBM Petition based on the ’344 and ’345 Petitions, because “the grounds for unpatentability identified in this petition are different than the grounds for unpatentability identified in the IPR petitions—indeed, the grounds for unpatentability raised here are not permitted in an IPR proceeding,” and Patent Owner had “not yet filed a preliminary response to the pending IPR petitions challenging the ’196 Patent.” Pet. 4, n.1 (citing General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (identifying relevant factors)). Nevertheless, as Patent Owner argues, General Plastic cites a non-exhaustive list of factors. See Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Petitioner fails to explain why it filed this CBM 2 “Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6, in response to Halliburton,” 329 U.S. at 1. Warner–Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997). Petition (filed April 2, 2018) about three and a half months after it filed the ’344 and ’345 Petitions (both filed Dec. 19, 2017) with competing claim construction arguments that impact central aspects of both trials. Petitioner’s implied argument that Congress only authorized certain grounds for inter partes reviews and limited other grounds to CBM reviews (e.g., § 112, ¶ 2), fails to explain sufficiently why the Board should entertain Petitioner’s new claim construction that potentially would impact central and major aspects of the concurrent ’344 and ’345 IPRs instituted based on a prior contradictory claim construction advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“A potential consequence of instituting the instant CBM based on Petitioner’s arguments related to the scope issue raised by Patent Owner involves at least raising the related issue of whether to terminate the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. See BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013- 00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) and reasoning that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims”). Petitioner does not propose terminating the ’344 and ’345 IPRs in the event that we decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding. Without terminating the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, instituting the instant CBM proceeding based on Petitioner’s means plus function arguments would result in different Board panels proceeding under two contradictory claim constructions on a central issue––i.e., for the same claim term of the same patent, involving all of the challenged claims in the CBM and a slight majority of the collectively challenged claims in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. The Board’s reviewing court disfavors conflicting “reasoning on a point . . . central to [the Board’s] analysis” absent an adequate explanation for the conflict. See Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, No. 2017-1866, 2018 WL 4145081, slip op. at *3 (Aug. 29, 2018 Fed. Cir.) (“Because the Board did not adequately explain its reasoning on a point that was central to its analysis and its conclusion on that point was contrary to another Board opinion on nearly identical facts, we vacate the Board’s determination as to the appealed claims and remand for further proceedings.”) (nonprecedential); Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 869 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a panel simultaneously issues opinions on the same technical issue between the same parties on the same record, and reaches opposite results without explanation, we think the best course is to vacate and remand these findings for further consideration.”). As noted above, Petitioner does not present an adequate explanation for the contradictory claim constructions. Whether a recitation constitutes a means-plus-function element does not depend on whether the claim is construed in an inter partes review or a covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, based on the particular circumstances involved as discussed above, we decline to decide whether to adopt Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position asserted here. On one hand, if we decided to adopt it and institute a CBM review on that basis, concurrent trials would proceed on diametrically opposed claim construction positions––unless the panel in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs decided to terminate those trials based on our adoption of the diametrically opposed claim construction asserted here. At the least, even without a termination the ’344 and ’345 IPRs, the diametrically opposed positions would infiltrate the three proceedings and raise collateral issues, undermining the Board’s resources and effort “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). On the other hand, if we decide Petitioner’s showing here lacks sufficient support on the merits for purposes of a CBM review, a decision denying institution may serve to advise the parties on this limited record that Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs appears to be correct even though no final decision has been reached there yet.” slip op. at 11
- BurdenNot reached
“As presented, Petitioner advances the second and third theories of unpatentability as contingent upon not adopting its central argument that “program steps” represents a means plus function term. Because we do not decide the issue of whether “program steps” constitutes a means plus function term, we decline Petitioner’s invitation to investigate further its second and third contingent theories. In addition, given the prominence of the means plus function claim construction issue raised by the parties, in the event we were to decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding, the means plus function issue likely would dominate the CBM trial and may impact the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, as discussed above.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,047,196
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.