• Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00194 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding no reasonable likelihood for the remaining claims except claim 13, whose potential success did not justify instituting trial.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or equivalent and at least two years of experience working with radio communication systems and machine learning.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Zhi Ding. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. We adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 16. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 4–6, 12, 14, and 16–22 would have been obvious over Jüschke and Holt. Petitioner may satisfy its burden for claim 13, but, as discussed below, that would not impact our decision to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution. See Section II.F.” slip op. at 16

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “inter partes review. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366 (2018). Specifically, “[i]f a panel determines that a petition meets the standards for institution in relation to fewer than all the challenges presented, . . . the panel will evaluate all the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 64 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Here, thirteen challenged claims remain after Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer. Petitioner at most demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing for one dependent claim, which has no claims depending therefrom. See Sections II.C–II.E. Thus, based on the particular facts of this case, we find that instituting trial would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources, and we exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). See Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018- 01310, Paper 7 at 41–43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative); Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative).” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,777,540
• Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01247 · APJ Donald E Daybell · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied: claims 1–16 lacked a reasonable likelihood of success, and the Board declined to reach claims 17–18 because reviewing only two potentially viable claims would be inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “as of the time of the invention of the ’492 Patent “had at least a bachelor’s in EE/CE/CS, physics, or equivalent, and two years of experience with cellular telecommunications, radio-access network architectures, protocols and signal propagation in wireless networks. More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citation omitted). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion. At this juncture, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. This definition appears to be consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “In view of the parties’ agreement to adopt Patent Owner’s construction and the District Court’s persuasive analysis, we find that the “multi-user detector decision unit” terms in claims 1 and 10 are properly construed on the record before us to recite the functions “using decision criteria to determine a selected multi-user detector” for claim 1 and “select[ing] a multi-user detector based upon at least one threshold” for claim 10, both of which have the following corresponding structure: a MUD decision unit 220 (or, alternatively, decision logic unit 520) configured to perform one or more of the several decision algorithms (e.g., the BER/User, SINR/Symbol, Filtered SINR/Symbol, Detected Amount/Symbol, Correlation Matrix Ratio/User, Correlation Matrix Eigenvalues, Computational Complexity, Number of Bits, Number of Users, and other algorithms) disclosed at 8:12–18, 13:35–14:40, 15:3–21, 19:43– 48, 19:56–62, and 20:41–49 of the ’492 Patent.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “a reasonable likelihood of success in establishing that Onggosanusi teaches or suggests these limitations. Petitioner does not rely on Egnor for these limitations. Therefore, Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success in establishing that claims 1 and 10 would have been obvious over Onggosanusi and Egnor. Claims 2–9 and 11–16 depend from claims 1 and 10 respectively, and thus Petitioner likewise fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success that those dependent claims would have been obvious over Onggosanusi and Egnor. Therefore, we find that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success for Ground 1.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). “Even when a petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to one or more claims, . . . institution of review remains discretionary.” Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (citing SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018); Harmonic, 815 F.3d at 1367). Where a Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of success as to only a small number of the challenged claims, the Board has the discretion to decline to institute review, because instituting a full review on all challenged claims may be an inefficient use of the Board’s limited resources. See, e.g., Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative) (denying institution where a petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on only two out of twenty- a petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on only two out of twenty claims). Of the eighteen challenged claims, we have found that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success as to sixteen of those claims. This leaves a single independent claim (claim 17) and a single dependent claim (claim 18) remaining for consideration. Even were we to conclude that Petitioner had established a reasonable likelihood of success as to claims 17 and 18, this would leave at most two claims subject to a single ground upon which such a showing had been made, out of eighteen challenged claims. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, it would be inefficient for the Board to expend resources on a full review of all eighteen challenged claims, where Petitioner has failed to establish even a reasonable likelihood of success as to the vast majority of those claims. Accordingly, we need not, and do not, take any position as to Petitioner’s showing on Ground 2 but instead exercise our discretion to deny review.” slip op. at 21

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,593,492
• Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00871 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim; it also found institution inefficient based on Ground 1 alone.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. The Alleged Unpatentability of Claims 1, 11, and 12 as Anticipated by TI,” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims of the ’608 patent. IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 39

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Here, Petitioner advances five challenges with four directed to the same three independent claims. Pet. 3. We, for the reasons discussed below, determine that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Grounds 2 through 5. We further determine that, based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds and all the challenged claims based on evidence and arguments directed only to Ground 1 would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, even if Petitioner met the requisite burden for institution as to Ground 1, we would exercise our discretion and not institute an inter partes review. E. The Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 11, and 12 by Galinski (Ground 2)” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,590,608
• Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Koninklijke Philips N.VInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2022 · PGR2021-00116 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because eight grounds failed the threshold showing and the remaining lack-of-ornamentality ground was marginal, making trial inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Here, Petitioner advances nine challenges against the claim of the ’346 patent. Pet. 8. As discussed above, we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has not met its burden for institution under eight grounds—an on-sale bar ground, six obviousness grounds, and an indefiniteness ground. Additionally, we determine that the ninth ground— the challenge based on the alleged lack of ornamentality—is marginal, at 5 We acknowledge that SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, but see no reason to interpret differently § 324(a), the statute governing post-grant reviews. 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf best. Based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds based on evidence and arguments directed only to the one ornamentality ground would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 26

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Under the Office Guidance, “if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.” Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018).6 When a petition fails to satisfy the “more likely than not” institution standard as to some challenges, the Board evaluates “all the challenges and determine[s] whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide7 64 (Nov. 2019) (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 316(b), 326(b)). Here, Petitioner advances nine challenges against the claim of the ’346 patent. Pet. 8. As discussed above, we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has not met its burden for institution under eight grounds—an on-sale bar ground, six obviousness grounds, and an indefiniteness ground. Additionally, we determine that the ninth ground— the challenge based on the alleged lack of ornamentality—is marginal, at 5 We acknowledge that SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, but see no reason to interpret differently § 324(a), the statute governing post-grant reviews. 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf best. Based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds based on evidence and arguments directed only to the one ornamentality ground would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 26

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The POSITA relating to the subject matter of the D’346 patent would possess [a] Bachelor’s degree in industrial design (or a related or equivalent field) and at least ten (10) years of research or work experience related to designing, developing, specifying, testing or analyzing multi-component consumer products (or supervising the same), with experience related to handheld consumer electronic products. Pet. 14. For purposes of this decision, we assume Petitioner is referring to the designer of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216 (CCPA 1981) (“In design cases we will consider the fictitious person identified in § 103 as ‘one of ordinary skill in the art’ to be the designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of the type presented in the application.”). Patent Owner has not filed a preliminary response and therefore, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art. Based on the limited record in front of us, we determine that Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “incorrect standard, but also lacks credibility because it is internally inconsistent with other parts of his testimony. Mr. Fletcher testifies that it is his understanding that indefiniteness is viewed through the perspective of the ordinary observer, stating the following: I understand that an ordinary observer must be able to understand the scope of an invention with reasonable certainty. If not, a design is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is my understanding that errors and inconsistencies between drawings of a design patent can be indefinite, and thus invalid, if an ordinary observer cannot discern the overall appearance of the claimed design without resorting to conjecture or speculation. Ex. 1003 ¶ 27 (emphasis added). However, his opinions regarding indefiniteness all are in terms of the “POSITA.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–58; see, e.g., id. ¶ 32 (“The D’346 Patent is indefinite due to the inclusion of conflicting views, which would prevent a POSITA from understanding the claimed design as drawn. . . . A POSITA cannot discern from the D’346 Patent figures what design is actually being claimed.”). Casting further doubt on the reliability of his testimony, Mr. Fletcher does not articulate any definition for the POSITA, which is a necessary foundation for his opinions.4 Mr. Fletcher does not refer to the perspective of the ordinary observer (or even one skilled in the art, viewing the design as would an ordinary observer) in his opinions regarding indefiniteness (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32– 58), and we decline to assume his references to the unadorned “POSITA” implicitly encompass the perspective of the ordinary observer. Thus, Mr. Fletcher’s testimony regarding indefiniteness is unhelpful because it utilizes the incorrect perspective.” slip op. at 20

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
• Netscout Systems, Inc. v. Longhorn HD LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2022 · IPR2021-01258 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all grounds and claims, finding no reasonable likelihood for at least claims 1–11 and that trying all 12 claims would be inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “The problem with Petitioner’s contention is that limitation 1[f] does not require an “anomaly detector” to detect anomalous correlations between input vectors, but instead, an “anomaly detector . . . to detect anomalous correlations between individual ones of said clusters.” Ex. 1001, 10:66– 11:3. In this regard, the’846 patent’s specification discloses [o]nce sufficient data has be stored in the database, multi-dimensional vectors can be constructed and reduced from the stored data. The reduced multi-dimensional vectors can be processed using one or more conventional multi-variate analysis methods and the output sets produced by the multi-variate analysis methods can be correlated against one another according to one or more selected metrics. Id. at 4:34–40; see also id. at 9:15–19 (“Once, the reduced vectors have been processed by the multiple clustering methodologies in block 270, one or more metrics can be selected in block 280 for purposes of establishing a correlation between the output sets of the processed reduced multi-dimensional vectors.”). In contrast, the portions of Rhodes relied upon by Petitioner to address the argued limitation disclose that Rhodes detects anomalous behavior based on a correlation between input vectors, i.e., a “‘comparison function’ to measure ‘how different two vectors are.’” Pet. 39 (citing Ex. 1004, 3); see also id. at 40 (citing Ex. 1004, 8 (“The most obvious measure of vector similarity is somehow aggregating the differences among their several coordinates.”).” slip op. at 17

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Here, the Petition challenges 12 claims of the ’846 patent. Pet. 1. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing with respect to its challenges to at least 11 of these claims. Were we to institute review, the resulting trial would nonetheless go forward on all 12 claim challenges. We find that instituting trial, therefore, would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Consequently, we exercise our discretion to deny institution of the entire Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314.10” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. 8 The Petition in this case was accorded a filing date of August 11, 2021. See Paper 3, 1. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). The prior art itself may be sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Thus, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,260,846
• Decurtis LLC v. Carnival CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2021 · IPR2021-00782 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding no reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–18 and 20 and declining to reach claim 19.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) for the ʼ184 patent is a person with a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related subject matter, plus at least two years of professional experience in the field of computer networks, wireless communications, or a similar field. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–43). Petitioner elaborates that “more experience would compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner has not provided an assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is supported by the Almeroth Declaration and is consistent with the ’184 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “B. CLAIM INTERPRETATION The Petition explains that “Petitioner and its expert have applied the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms of the challenged claims.” Pet. 8. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not propose any explicit claim constructions. We do not discern a need to construe expressly any claim language. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “limitation 1[d] means Barry inherently discloses limitation 1[d], Petitioner also does not support that position. Establishing inherent disclosure of a limitation requires showing that the limitation necessarily results from the prior art disclosure. Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.”). Petitioner does not allege or demonstrate that a “unique identifier of a portable guest device” necessarily results from the disclosure of Soleimani’s paragraph 175, much less that such an identifier is necessarily associated with location and a timestamp. As noted above, the Petition states that “[i]dentifiers may be associated with location and timestamp.” (Pet. 26 (emphasis added)). Because Petitioner does not support its position that “Barry discloses” limitations 1[d] and 7[d] and does not argue that limitations 1[d] and limitation 7[d] would have been obvious, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Ground 1.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Patent argues that Petitioner does not show sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references’ teachings. Patent Owner first argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated a motivation to combine Berg with Soleimani. Prelim. Resp. 31–33. Patent Owner then argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated a motivation to modify Soleimani with the teachings of Brulé. Id. at 34. With respect to this issue, weighing the parties’ arguments, we see some merit in Petitioner’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Soleimani, Berg, and Brulé. We do not further address the merits of Petitioner’s challenge to claim 19. As explained below in Section III, given that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to nearly all of the challenged claims, we exercise our discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 28

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,045,184
• Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company / Helmerich & Payne Technologies, LLC et al. v. Nabors Drilling Technologies USA, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 21, 2021 · IPR2021-00621 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on at least 18 claims, and review of all 19 would be inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “the monitored toolface angle, in and of itself, is indicative of a difference between the actual and desired toolface orientations as required by limitation 1[a]. Although Petitioner and Mr. Sharma point to comparing the monitored toolface angle with the tool face angle selected to achieve a desired trajectory for the bore hole, they do not identify any such comparison disclosed in Haci. Nor do they identify adequately any disclosure that Haci’s system displays or otherwise provides both the desired and measured toolface angles to the driller such that the measured toolface angle display, in conjunction with a desired toolface angle display, is indicative of the difference therebetween. At best, Petitioner and Mr. Sharma assert that the measured toolface angle could be used by the driller to determine the difference between the actual and desired toolface angles. Claim 1, however, requires the drilling operation parameter itself, which Petitioner maps to the measured toolface angle, to be indicative of the difference between the actual and desired toolface orientations.” slip op. at 21

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “institute review or don’t.” SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1355. When a petition fails to meet the reasonable likelihood standard as to some challenges, the Board evaluates “all the challenges and determine[s] whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 64 (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 316(b), 326(b)). In determining whether to institute in circumstances such as those presented here, we take into account the efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. See Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at 41–43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (designated informative); Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (designated informative).” slip op. at 27

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Based on the record, we determine that no explicit construction of terms is needed to resolve the issues presented to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,823,655
• Wilson Electronics, LLC v. Cellphone-Mate, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2019 · IPR2018-01776 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, finding no reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds and citing petition clarity, prior art accessibility, and objective evidence.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “in an unexpired patent are given their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016).9 Consistent with that standard, we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “disclosure teaches identity between the engineering concepts for amplify uplink channels and amplifying downlink channels. Additionally, assuming the cited disclosure does demonstrate some similarity between amplifying uplink and downlink channels, Petitioner again fails to provide persuasive evidence or reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Aida or Kenington, even if they could have. Petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine the prior art references. In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. 2016); Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is insufficient to simply conclude the [prior art] combination would have been obvious without identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art would have made the combination.”); see Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention”).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “ordinary skill in the art could have modified Aida or Kenington. See Pet. 30. Petitioner also cites paragraph 110 of McKay, which discloses an example in which “[w]ith the exception of the frequency band, each of the elements of the uplink F1 signal path 274 is functionally identical to the corresponding element previously described with respect to the downlink signal F2 path 236.” Ex. 1107 ¶ 110; Pet. 30. Specifically, Petitioner contends that McKay’s disclosure tends to demonstrate that the paths for uplink and downlink channels could be similar. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 110). But even if McKay demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have made paths for uplink channels and downlink channels similar, Petitioner does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have so modified Aida or Kenington.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightTeaching away not foundDecided for patent owner

    “Moreover, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s reliance on the cited portion of the ’190 patent is impermissible hindsight. See Prelim. Resp. 20. Indeed, Petitioner alleges that disclosure of the ’190 patent demonstrates what “the [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand.” Pet. 30. “It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious.” In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Thus, we find that Petitioner’s allegation of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand now (after seeing the disclosure of the ’190 patent) does not support an assertion of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103, which precludes patentability “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention” (emphasis added).” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,402,190
• Nikon Corporation v. ASML Netherlands B.V. And Carl Zeiss AGInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 4, 2018 · IPR2018-00220 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims: claims 1–13, 23–26, and 28 for failure to show a reasonable likelihood of success, and claims 14–17 in its discretion.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Our rules require Petitioner to set forth in the Petition “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and specifically state that “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(3). It is against this backdrop that we determine whether Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. In this case, Petitioner unambiguously takes the position that the terms “error utility software module,” “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation,” and “processing means for processing a user execution of an erroneous operation” are not amenable to construction because the specification of the ’792 patent does not describe sufficient structure corresponding to these terms. Pet. 12–21. Petitioner advances unequivocal, and uncontroverted, expert testimony supporting this position. Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 26–40. Because Petitioner’s arguments and evidence are directed to the contrary position, Petitioner does not establish that these three terms are capable of being construed. If Petitioner cannot show that these claim terms are amenable to construction, Petitioner cannot apply the features of the prior art to those terms, nor expect us to do so. Cf. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–62 (CCPA 1962) (“As we have previously indicated, our analysis of the claims leaves us in a quandary as to what in fact is covered by them. We think the examiner and the board were wrong in relying on what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims and basing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 thereon.”). Therefore, Petitioner does not establish that it is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that claims 1, 6, 23, and 28 would have been obvious.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “The Federal Circuit has “stated that the use of the word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies” and that “the failure to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112, para. 6 does not apply.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). Because it recites “means,” the term “processing means” presumptively is in means-plus-function format. The terms “error utility software module” and “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation” presumptively are not. This presumption, however, is not “strong” and should not have the practical effect of “placing a thumb on what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale.” Id. at 1349. “When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. Petitioner argues that “error utility software module” is in means-plus- function format. Pet. 12–13.2 As Petitioner observes (id.), “‘[m]odule’ is a well-known nonce word that can operate as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6” because it “is simply a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Petitioner argues that “this term’s limitations are all simply functions the module is supposed to perform and do not specify any structure for performing the recited functions.” Pet. 13. Petitioner’s expert testifies that “[t]hese recited limitations are purely functional and provide no structure for performing them” and that “[t]he term ‘software module’ does not convey to one of ordinary skill a definite structural meaning for performing the recited function.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 26. Similarly, Petitioner argues that “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation” is purely functional and does not specify structure for performing the recited function. Pet. 17. Dr. Essa’s testimony supports this argument. Ex. 1015 ¶ 36.” slip op. at 9

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Petitioner’s means-plus-function arguments, detailed above. Nevertheless, if we were to institute a trial on claim 14 and its dependents, we also would have to institute on the challenged means-plus-function claims. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1369–60 (2018) (The Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition.); see also Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. The result of institution would be a trial in which Petitioner contends that the majority of the challenged claims are not amenable to construction. Although Petitioner is not permitted to pursue a ground of indefiniteness in an inter partes review (see 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), indefiniteness likely would be a significant issue for those claims going forward given Petitioner’s current posture and presentation of evidence. Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), “the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). Because a trial on the challenged claims, including claims 14–17, likely would be dominated by issues of alleged indefiniteness of claims 1–6, 8–13, 23–26, and 28, we exercise our discretion to deny institution on all challenged claims and grounds.” slip op. at 18

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,972,792
• Tietex International, Ltd. v. Precision Fabrics Group, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 11, 2016 · IPR2015-01671 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on both asserted § 103 grounds, finding no reasonable likelihood of success and exercising § 314(a) discretion for the Radwanski, Rowan, and Murch ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “We approach our discretion to deny a petition on a case-by-case basis. There are sufficient reasons under the specific facts of this case to exercise our discretion to deny institution on Petitioner’s asserted ground that claims 1–30 of the ’162 patent would have been obvious over the combination of Radwanski, Rowan, and Murch. Notably, in this proceeding, the claims of the ’162 patent are so similar in scope and content to those in the ’639 patent that Petitioner is relying on the same arguments that we found to be unpersuasive in the 1248 Final Decision. See Pet. 29; 1248 Final Dec. 22. We do not see how the efficient administration of the Office, or the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding, would be secured by instituting an inter partes review in this proceeding when the same prior art references and arguments are asserted against substantially the same claim limitations as in the 1248 IPR.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “A showing of obviousness must be supported by an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support a motivation to combine the prior art teachings. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 414 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). An analysis regarding an apparent reason to combine known elements “should be made explicit.” Id.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “A showing of obviousness must be supported by an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support a motivation to combine the prior art teachings. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 414 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). An analysis regarding an apparent reason to combine known elements “should be made explicit.” Id.” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “terminology as the claims in related US patent 8,501,639, which is the subject of [the] previously instituted [1248 IPR]” and argues “that for purposes of this proceeding, the same definitions should apply.” Pet. 7. In the 1248 IPR, we determined that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “intumescent” in light of the specification is “a substance that swells and chars upon exposure to heat or flame.” Tietex Int’l, Ltd. v. Precision Fabrics Group, Inc., Case IPR2014-01248, slip op. at 5–6 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2015) (Paper 14); see id., slip. op. at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 27, 2016) (Paper 39). Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that “intumescent” as used in claim 1 of the ’162 patent should be interpreted the same way in this proceeding. Pet. 7; Prelim. Resp. 17. Therefore, for purposes of this Decision, we interpret “intumescent” to mean “a substance that swells and chars upon exposure to heat or flame.” B.” slip op. at 5

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,796,162

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.