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  • PTAB · Jun 4, 2018 · IPR2018-00220 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all challenged claims: claims 1–13, 23–26, and 28 for failure to show a reasonable likelihood of success, and claims 14–17 in its discretion.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Our rules require Petitioner to set forth in the Petition “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and specifically state that “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(3). It is against this backdrop that we determine whether Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. In this case, Petitioner unambiguously takes the position that the terms “error utility software module,” “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation,” and “processing means for processing a user execution of an erroneous operation” are not amenable to construction because the specification of the ’792 patent does not describe sufficient structure corresponding to these terms. Pet. 12–21. Petitioner advances unequivocal, and uncontroverted, expert testimony supporting this position. Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 26–40. Because Petitioner’s arguments and evidence are directed to the contrary position, Petitioner does not establish that these three terms are capable of being construed. If Petitioner cannot show that these claim terms are amenable to construction, Petitioner cannot apply the features of the prior art to those terms, nor expect us to do so. Cf. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–62 (CCPA 1962) (“As we have previously indicated, our analysis of the claims leaves us in a quandary as to what in fact is covered by them. We think the examiner and the board were wrong in relying on what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims and basing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 thereon.”). Therefore, Petitioner does not establish that it is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that claims 1, 6, 23, and 28 would have been obvious.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

      “The Federal Circuit has “stated that the use of the word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies” and that “the failure to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112, para. 6 does not apply.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). Because it recites “means,” the term “processing means” presumptively is in means-plus-function format. The terms “error utility software module” and “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation” presumptively are not. This presumption, however, is not “strong” and should not have the practical effect of “placing a thumb on what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale.” Id. at 1349. “When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. Petitioner argues that “error utility software module” is in means-plus- function format. Pet. 12–13.2 As Petitioner observes (id.), “‘[m]odule’ is a well-known nonce word that can operate as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6” because it “is simply a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Petitioner argues that “this term’s limitations are all simply functions the module is supposed to perform and do not specify any structure for performing the recited functions.” Pet. 13. Petitioner’s expert testifies that “[t]hese recited limitations are purely functional and provide no structure for performing them” and that “[t]he term ‘software module’ does not convey to one of ordinary skill a definite structural meaning for performing the recited function.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 26. Similarly, Petitioner argues that “logic configured to recognize erroneous operation” is purely functional and does not specify structure for performing the recited function. Pet. 17. Dr. Essa’s testimony supports this argument. Ex. 1015 ¶ 36.” slip op. at 9

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Petitioner’s means-plus-function arguments, detailed above. Nevertheless, if we were to institute a trial on claim 14 and its dependents, we also would have to institute on the challenged means-plus-function claims. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1369–60 (2018) (The Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition.); see also Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. The result of institution would be a trial in which Petitioner contends that the majority of the challenged claims are not amenable to construction. Although Petitioner is not permitted to pursue a ground of indefiniteness in an inter partes review (see 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), indefiniteness likely would be a significant issue for those claims going forward given Petitioner’s current posture and presentation of evidence. Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), “the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). Because a trial on the challenged claims, including claims 14–17, likely would be dominated by issues of alleged indefiniteness of claims 1–6, 8–13, 23–26, and 28, we exercise our discretion to deny institution on all challenged claims and grounds.” slip op. at 18

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 6,972,792

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.