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  • PTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00439 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not justify a second parallel petition after instituting review in IPR2024-00438.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “CTPG 59 (emphases added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For instance, a second petition might be justified “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. Petitioner does not argue that the number of claims in the parallel litigation is “large.” Additionally, while Petitioner does argue that the prior art relied on might be antedated, Patent Owner responds by “stipulat[ing] that if the Board were to institute only [Petitioner’s] second ranked petition (IPR2024-00439), and deny IPR2024-00438 and IPR2024-[0]0440 as improper parallel petitions, then, in the IPR2024-00439 proceeding, Patent Owner will not challenge the status of Petrovic and Cholas as prior art.”11 Prelim. Resp. 41.” slip op. at 9

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,399,206
  • PTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00440 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 314(a), because the third parallel petition would add unnecessary burden after instituting the first petition.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Our Practice Guide provides guidance on handling situations involving multiple petitions by a single petitioner challenging the same patent claims: Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. . . . In addition, multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of patents have been challenged with a single petition. CTPG 59 (emphases added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For instance, a second petition” slip op. at 8

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,399,206
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00323 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–20, finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition lacked compelling merits; it also denied based on multiple petitions.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “The second, third, and fifth Fintiv factors favor denial. The first factor is neutral, and only the fourth factor weighs against denial. Thus, we determine that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and we now assess compelling merits. CommScope, Paper 23 at 5 (“In circumstances where, however, the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution, the Board shall then assess compelling merits.”). The compelling merits standard is met when “the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo 4. A challenge can only meet this standard “if it is highly likely that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021-01064, Paper 102 at 49 (PTAB Oct. 4, 2022) (precedential) (“OpenSky”).” slip op. at 13

    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “and purporting to explain differences between the petitions. Paper 3. Petitioner ranks this Petition above the petition in IPR2024-00324. Id. at 1. As discussed above, we do not find that the instant Petition meets the compelling merits standard, but we find that the petition in IPR2024-00324 does meet this standard for at least one claim. Petitioner also argues that certain references are prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) that can be antedated by Patent Owner. Paper 3 at 1–2. Petitioner argues that Redford predates the ’751 patent’s earliest priority date by more than a year whereas one of the references in IPR2024-00324 only predates the ’751 by about six weeks. Id. at 2. As Patent Owner points out, however, Petitioner asserts a challenge in IPR2024-00324 that relies only on prior art under § 102(b), which cannot be predated. Paper 10 at 2. Thus, the petition in IPR2024-00324 also provides an advantage in the event of a priority dispute.” slip op. at 23

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “In view of the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner’s obviousness challenges based on Redford do not meet the compelling merits standard. Petitioner does not rely on Bartfeld or Gonze to teach the “message” limitations. See Pet. 14–21 (relying on Bartfeld for limitations regarding a synchronization code); id. at 24–36 (relying on Gonze for limitations regarding selecting and controlling a first media player application). 7. Fintiv Determination On balance, the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and the Petition does not meet the compelling merits standard of the Guidance Memo. Therefore, we determine that discretionary denial is appropriate in view of the related district court litigation.” slip op. at 22

    • BurdenNot reached

      “As noted above, our inquiry is directed to whether the Petition meets the compelling merits standard, not the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). On this record, we agree with Patent Owner.” slip op. at 20

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,048,751
  • PTAB · Nov 27, 2019 · IPR2019-01125 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on claim 5 because its ambiguous scope prevented a reliable merits assessment and made trial resource intensive.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “Id. at 2:29–42. Thus, within the context of both the claim and the Specification, a radio system and a station are not the same. It is unclear what is referred to by the reference in claim 5 to “radio systems in accordance with the first radio interface standard.”” slip op. at 14

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “Because the claim language is ambiguous as discussed above, we have an inadequate basis to assess the merits of Petitioner’s alleged grounds 5 We recognize that in limited circumstances, clear errors in claims can be corrected. See Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The deficiency in the claim language here clearly does not meet that standard. What the Applicant for patent intended by the language used is subject to much speculation and conjecture. of unpatentability. If the scope of the claims cannot be determined without undue speculation, as is the case here, the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art cannot be ascertained. See BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, IPR2013-00036, Paper 65 at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) and reasoning that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims”). In other words, “[w]ithout ascertaining the proper claim scope, we cannot conduct a necessary factual inquiry for determining obviousness—ascertaining differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art.” Id. at 20 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). Also, the difficulties and speculation we would encounter at trial if review is instituted, stemming from ambiguous claim language, substantially increase the resources and efforts required for reaching a resolution and thus weigh heavily against institution of review. In the circumstance here, reaching the merits of the alleged grounds of unpatentability, either before or after institution of review, involves substantial uncertainty and speculation. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d at 862– 63. Furthermore, given that any trial instituted here would address a single claim that we regard to be ambiguous, that issue would likely become the sole focus of that trial. That seems problematic given that Petitioner may not request to cancel any claim based on an assertion of indefiniteness. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).” slip op. at 16

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,016,676
  • PTAB · Oct 3, 2017 · IPR2017-01125 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on claims 4–15, 19, and 22–24, exercising discretion under §§ 314(a) and 325(d) based on overlapping petitions, follow-on arguments, and inefficient use of resources.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

      “’684 IPR, which in turn was a “copy-cat” of the ’976 IPR petition. Prelim. Resp. 2, 5. However, in deciding whether we should exercise our discretion and decline to go forward with this Petition, our concern is not only whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office,” as expressed in § 325(d), but also whether other factors weigh in favor of denying institution in light of the discretion afforded to us pursuant to § 314(a).” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied

      “whether at the time of filing of the ’684 petition, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of Pearce, Zhang, and McCullough (“the Additional References”); the length of time that elapsed between learning of the Additional References, and the filing of the instant Petition; whether Petitioner has provided adequate explanation for the time lapse; whether at the time of filing of the instant Petition, Petitioner already had access to Patent Owner’s response in the ’976 IPR; and the finite resources of the Board. See Gen. Plastic Indus. at 16 (Paper 19) (informative). Petitioner provides no explanation of whether it knew or should have known of the Additional References when filing the ’684 petition; of when it first learned of these references; or of any time lapse between learning of these references and the filing of the instant Petition.” slip op. at 13

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “August 14, 2017, and a final decision is due by November 2, 2017. At this point, the decision in the ’976 IPR as to whether to see the matter through to final determination is squarely in our hands, regardless of whether any settlement is reached between the parties. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (“The parties may agree to settle any issue in a proceeding, but the Board is not a party to the settlement and may independently determine any question of jurisdiction, patentability, or Office practice.”). Thus, if we deem it appropriate, we can reach a final decision on the grounds presented in the ’976 IPR with or without participation from the parties in that matter. These facts weigh in favor of us exercising our discretion not to move forward with the instant Petition, at least with respect to the ’976 instituted claims insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’976 IPR, because the issues raised are fully briefed and ripe for a final decision in the ’976 IPR, and Petitioner’s non-participation in that proceeding is at best neutral to our analysis. Petitioner is a party to the ’684 IPR, and in that proceeding the petition is directed to the same claims of the same patent as in this Petition. This fact weighs in favor of us not moving forward with the instant Petition. Also, at least with respect to the ’684 instituted claims, insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’684 IPR, Petitioner has the opportunity to address the same art and arguments in the ’684 proceeding. It would be an inefficient use of Office resources, and would run counter to securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the challenges to the patentability of the ’235 patent, if we were to allow Petitioner to proceed on the same art and arguments in two separate proceedings.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner submits a list of terms for which Patent Owner has proposed construction in a co-pending district court case. Pet. 7–8. Petitioner, however, asserts that for the purposes of this Decision no terms need to be construed. Id. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. We reviewed the parties’ arguments, and, for the purposes of this Decision, we have determined that no terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 6,775,235

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