- Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01451 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: it exercised discretion as to claims 43–46, 49, 50, 62–69, and 72, and found no reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 55–58.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition. Patent Owner argues that we should decline to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the Petition raises the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that were presented previously to the Office. Prelim. Resp. 19–26. In particular, Patent Owner contends that each of the claims in the reexamination was rejected based on Eddison, under either 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and/or in combination with Jewkes under § 103(a), and that Petitioner relies upon Jewkes again under § 102(b) in its Petition. Id. at 23–26. Petitioner makes no attempt to explain why the references that form the bases for Petitioner’s challenge here are not the same or substantially similar prior art to that presented during the reexamination or why the arguments are not the same or substantially similar to those presented previously to the Office. Eddison and Jewkes were relied upon in the reexamination. See id. at 141–60 (Office Action (mailed Aug. 25, 2014)). Additionally, Tandberg was presented to the Office in conjunction with the original prosecution of the ’817 patent. See Ex. 2003; Prelim. Resp. 28.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Patent Owner makes a valid point. Section 1.530(k) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides: “Amendments not effective until certificate. Although the Office actions will treat proposed amendments as though they have been entered, the proposed amendments will not be effective until the reexamination certificate is issued and published.” This places us in a difficult position. If Patent Owner ultimately succeeds in the appeal of the reexamination, a certificate will issue and the amendments to claim 43 and its dependents will be “effective.” See id.; see Ex. 1007, 166 (showing the amendments to claim 43). Yet Petitioner provides no analysis of the amended limitations of claim 43. See, e.g., Pet. 16. Alternatively, if Patent Owner is unsuccessful in its appeal to the Federal Circuit, claim 43 and its dependents, as challenged in the reexamination, will be declared unpatentable. In either circumstance, any review we undertake of the unamended version of claim 43, and the claims depending therefrom, will be for naught. Accordingly, in light of the above circumstances, reviewing these claims on the record presented would waste judicial resources as well as the resources of the parties.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Apple Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 28, 2016 · CBM2016-00053 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied Apple’s petition and did not institute CBM review because Apple failed to establish standing, including a real and immediate controversy concerning the ’060 patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“3. Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to show sufficiently that it has standing to bring this covered business method patent review. Specifically, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established sufficiently, at this time, that there is a real and immediate 8 controversy regarding the ’060 patent. An essential link in the logical chain of Petitioner’s allegations that it has standing is that the scope of the claims of the ’060 patent and the asserted claims of ’850 patent in the district court lawsuit are “substantially similar.” See Pet. 7–10. We agree, however, with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown adequately that the claims of the two patents are sufficiently similar. Although Petitioner contends that claim 13 of the challenged patent is similar in scope to claim 12 of the already asserted ’850 patent, it fails to provide any meaningful analysis to support its contention. Instead, it merely summarizes and lists certain similar claim limitations in the two claims without providing any discussion of the actual language of the identified limitations, the other limitations in the claims, and the claims as a whole.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“petitioner’s grounds for standing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a). Rule 42.304(a) states it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.” Id. One of those eligibility requirements is that only persons (or their privies) who have been sued or charged with infringement under a patent are permitted to file a petition seeking a covered business method patent review of that patent. AIA § 18(a)(1)(B); 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Under our rules, “[c]harged with infringement means a real and substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal court.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,009,060 - Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC / Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals LP And Amylin Pharmaceuticals, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 28, 2016 · IPR2016-00348 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the Petition did not identify a sufficiently clear combination of references or explain how they rendered the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Section 312 requires that a petition for inter partes review “identif[y], . . . with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(3). Furthermore, our rules require a petition for inter partes review to (i) identify “[t]he specific statutory grounds under 35 U.S.C. [§] 102 or 103 on which the challenge to the claim is based and the patents or printed publications relied upon for each ground”; (ii) identify “[h]ow [each] construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified”; (iii) “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon”; and (iv) identify “the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2), (4)–(5). Here, the Petition fails to explain sufficiently the specific combination of references it relies upon to satisfy these requirements.” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDenied
“Section 312 requires that a petition for inter partes review “identif[y], . . . with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(3). Furthermore, our rules require a petition for inter partes review to (i) identify “[t]he specific statutory grounds under 35 U.S.C. [§] 102 or 103 on which the challenge to the claim is based and the patents or printed publications relied upon for each ground”; (ii) identify “[h]ow [each] construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified”; (iii) “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon”; and (iv) identify “the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2), (4)–(5). Here, the Petition fails to explain sufficiently the specific combination of references it relies upon to satisfy these requirements.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,297,761 - Corelogic, Inc. v. Boundary Solutions, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 24, 2016 · CBM2016-00017 · APJ Richard H Marschall · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review because CoreLogic did not show that the patent claims a method or apparatus for a financial product or service.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with BSI. CoreLogic does not explain adequately how any of the claims of the ’946 patent recite a method or apparatus “for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.” AIA § 18(d)(1). CoreLogic focuses on claim 1, but fails to identify any limitation in claim 1 or any other claim that relates to a financial activity in any way. Claim 1 claims a “method for retrieving and displaying geographic parcel boundary polygon maps,” which has applicability to retrieving and displaying map data, not financial products and services. CoreLogic suggests that the method of claim 1 “can be used” by various entities in a business context, but does not argue, let alone establish, that the claim terms on their face are financial in nature. See Pet. 11. CoreLogic asserts that the specification of the ’946 patent describes several methods of generating revenue using the claimed methods, and that numerous businesses may pay for access to map data generated using the claimed method. Pet. 10–16. CoreLogic’s reliance on these portions of the specification is unavailing. First, CoreLogic fails to address how these disclosures relate directly to, or meaningfully informs our analysis of, the language of the claims. For example, CoreLogic does not direct us to any claims or claim limitations that require users to pay for access to the map database or use of the claimed methods. Second, CoreLogic fails to address portions of the specification that indicate the claimed invention can be used “for free,” i.e., without any generation of revenue or financial aspect at all. See Ex. 1001, 2:59 (“These end users may access for free . . . .”), 13:54–56 (“Another public-private alliance option is to offer the free use of the NPDP server to such data sponsors in addition to or in lieu of their revenue share.”), 14:20–21 (“[C]ommodity service subscriber end users (customers) can have access to the NPDP at no charge.”), 15:51–55 (“It is also contemplated that other independent public and private data sponsors could be provided with links as part of the NPDP display which end users could access on a free or fee basis.”). Given that the specification contemplates use of the claimed inventions for free, it is not apparent that the “purpose of the claimed method is to provide data in exchange for money,” as CoreLogic suggests. Pet. 11. At most, CoreLogic has established that the claimed methods could be used to generate revenue in a number of ways, even though the language of the claims does not require any exchange of money or other financially related step. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the “financial prong” has not been met. Numerous Board decisions have taken a similar approach in situations where the specification refers to potential financial applications for the claimed inventions but the claim language does not expressly indicate a financial context.3 In Qualtrics, LLC v. OpinionLab, Inc., CBM2015-00164 (Feb. 3, 2016) (Paper 8), for example, the claims were “devoid of any terms that reasonably could be argued as having any particular relation to a financial product or service,” but the specification” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,499,946 - Corelogic, Inc. v. Boundary Solutions, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 24, 2016 · CBM2016-00018 · APJ Richard H Marschall · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–23 because the petition did not establish that the ’352 patent qualifies as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“method patent,” as defined by the AIA. CoreLogic bears the burden of persuasion that the ’352 patent is a covered business method patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a). For the reasons discussed below, we determine CoreLogic has made an insufficient showing that the ’352 patent is a “covered business method patent.” The AIA defines “covered business method patent” as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). The legislative history of the AIA “explains that the definition of covered business method patent was drafted to encompass patents ‘claiming activities that are financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.’” Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and Technological Invention; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,374, 48,735 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“CBM Final Rules”) (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)); see also Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). To determine whether a patent is eligible for a covered business method patent review, the focus is on the claims. AIA § 18(d)(1) (“a patent that claims . . .” (emphasis added)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (same); CBM Final Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,736 (comment 4) (“[T]he definition set forth in § 42.301(a) . . . is based on what the patent claims.”). A patent need have only one claim directed to a covered business method to be eligible for review. CBM Final Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,736 (comment 8) (“A patent having one or more claims directed to a covered business method is a covered business method patent for purposes of the review, even if the patent includes additional claims.”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,065,352 - Old Republic General Insurance Group, Inc. / Old Republic Insurance Company et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 15, 2016 · CBM2015-00184 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1-49 because Petitioner did not establish that the patent was eligible for covered business method review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We apply 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” For the reasons that follow, we do not institute a covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,546,002 - Qualtrics, LLC v. Opinionlab, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 13, 2016 · CBM2016-00003 · APJ Carl M Defranco · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds and challenged claims because the ’805 patent did not qualify as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“for a patent that is a covered business method (“CBM”) patent. AIA § 18(a)(1)(e). As the petitioner, Qualtrics bears the burden of demonstrating that the ’805 patent is a CBM patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 304(a). The AIA defines a CBM patent as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1) (emphasis added); 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). The determination of whether a patent is eligible for CBM review focuses on “what the patent claims.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,736 (Aug. 14, 2012) (response to comment 8). A patent need have only one claim directed to a CBM to be eligible for review. Id.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,041,805 - Alarm.Com Inc. v. Vivint, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 30, 2016 · IPR2015-01967 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds, finding the grounds cumulative of a parallel petition and relying on § 325(d) because the prior art had been presented to the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“b. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), “[i]n determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Here, Suzuki and Godden were among a very small number of references that the Examiner uncovered in a pre-issuance search and considered before allowing the challenged claims. See Ex. 1103, 41. Petitioner produces no evidence of any kind to support its belief that the Examiner misapprehended Suzuki. In the absence of such evidence, we are unwilling to assume that, after having uncovered a very limited amount of relevant art, the Examiner failed to consider at least that art, either alone or in combination, with respect to the filed claims. See Pet. 21. Therefore, we determine that the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. For this additional reason, we decline to institute an inter partes review, based on either of claims 1–8, 14, 16, 19–26, 32, 34, 37–44, 50, and 52 of the ’713 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Suzuki or of any of claims 1–54 of the ’713 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as rendered obvious by Suzuki and Godden, alone or in combination with other references. See Funai Elec. Co. v. Gold Charm Ltd., Case IPR2015-01491, slip op. at 4–6 (PTAB Feb. 18, 2016) (Paper 18) (denying rehearing of denial of institution on grounds based on a reference considered during the original prosecution).” slip op. at 21
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under our Rules, we have broad discretion to institute an inter partes review as to some asserted grounds and not others. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized our discretion in this regard when it stated that “under [37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a)], it is clear that the Board may choose to institute some grounds and not institute others as part of its comprehensive institution decision.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., No. 2015-1072, 2016 WL 798192, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2016). This discretion applies to grounds asserted in a single petition, as well as to those asserted in parallel petitions challenging the same claims of the same patent, as presented here. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b); see Asustek Comput. Inc. v. Exotablet, Ltd., Case IPR2015- 00043, slip op. at 9–10 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015) (Paper 6). Thus, for example, we determine not to institute on grounds in the instant Petition that have not been shown to be necessary to address all of the challenged claims or to be superior to other grounds, upon which we instituted review in the parallel proceeding, i.e., Case IPR2015-01965. Consequently, in view of our decision to institute review on all of the challenged claims on grounds asserted in the parallel petition, and on this record, we decline to institute inter partes review on any asserted grounds in the instant Petition.” slip op. at 20
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,884,713 - LG Electronics, Inc. v. Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 24, 2016 · IPR2015-01987 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 16–28 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“any explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would come to the conclusion that the priority field of a Packet Resource Request is a requested quality of service parameter for a TBF.” Prelim. Resp. 12. We agree. Petitioner’s only support for this argument is the testimony of Dr. Fuja who states, in conclusory fashion, and without citation to evidence, that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that in the context of a connection in the form of a TBF the PRIORITY field is a requested quality of service parameter that is part of request messages communicated by a mobile station to a decision making device.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 76. Dr. Fuja’s testimony includes little persuasive evidence or reasoning. Accordingly, we assign it little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). On this record, Petitioner is not reasonably likely to show that GSM 04.60’s description of establishment of a TBF teaches a request message “indicating at least one requested quality of service parameter associated with the requested communication connection,” as recited in claim 16. Each of independent claims 20, 24, and 25 includes a limitation substantially similar to claim 16’s “indicating at least one requested quality of service parameter associated with the requested communication connection.” For the same reasons, GSM 04.06’s disclosure of TBF establishment does not teach these similar limitations of claims 20, 24, and 25.” slip op. at 12
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 16 requires that the apparatus be encoded to receive from a decision making device “a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter.” Thus, Petitioner must show that the Channel Coding Command corresponds to the QoS Information Element, or its sub-fields, identified as the at least one quality of service parameter. Petitioner’s only identified evidence of such a correspondence is Dr. Fuja’s testimony that: A POSITA would understand that the channel coding scheme that is included in the CHANNEL_CODING_COMMAND as part of the PACKET UPLINK ASSIGNMENT and the Packet Uplink Ack/Nack message is selected by the network to satisfy the QoS Profile that was negotiated during the PDP context activation procedure under the existing channel conditions. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81. As Patent Owner argues (Prelim. Resp. 9), this testimony is conclusory and lacks any explanation as to why the Channel Coding Command is selected to satisfy the QoS profile. Prelim. Resp. 9. Aside from this conclusory statement, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Fuja points to any evidence that the selection of the Channel Coding Command of GSM 04.60 has any relationship to the QoS Information Element of GSM 03.60. Petitioner’s evidence and argument is insufficient to show that the Prior GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson teach this limitation. Moreover, as explained above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Channel Coding Command is received from the SGSN, which Petitioner identifies as the “decision making device” of claim 16.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner responds that “neither Petitioner nor its declarant offer any explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would come to the conclusion that the priority field of a Packet Resource Request is a requested quality of service parameter for a TBF.” Prelim. Resp. 12. We agree. Petitioner’s only support for this argument is the testimony of Dr. Fuja who states, in conclusory fashion, and without citation to evidence, that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that in the context of a connection in the form of a TBF the PRIORITY field is a requested quality of service parameter that is part of request messages communicated by a mobile station to a decision making device.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 76. Dr. Fuja’s testimony includes little persuasive evidence or reasoning. Accordingly, we assign it little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“encoded to receive from a decision making device “a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter.” Thus, Petitioner must show that the Channel Coding Command corresponds to the QoS Information Element, or its sub-fields, identified as the at least one quality of service parameter. Petitioner’s only identified evidence of such a correspondence is Dr. Fuja’s testimony that: A POSITA would understand that the channel coding scheme that is included in the CHANNEL_CODING_COMMAND as part of the PACKET UPLINK ASSIGNMENT and the Packet Uplink Ack/Nack message is selected by the network to satisfy the QoS Profile that was negotiated during the PDP context activation procedure under the existing channel conditions. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81. As Patent Owner argues (Prelim. Resp. 9), this testimony is conclusory and lacks any explanation as to why the Channel Coding Command is selected to satisfy the QoS profile. Prelim. Resp. 9. Aside from this conclusory statement, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Fuja points to any evidence that the selection of the Channel Coding Command of GSM 04.60 has any relationship to the QoS Information Element of GSM 03.60. Petitioner’s evidence and argument is insufficient to show that the Prior GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson teach this limitation. Moreover, as explained above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Channel Coding Command is received from the SGSN, which Petitioner identifies as the “decision making device” of claim 16. We cannot conclude, on this record, that Petitioner is likely to show that the GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson teach an apparatus encoded to “receive from said decision making device a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter,” as recited in claim 16. The remaining independent claims have analogous limitations that Petitioner, for the same reasons, has failed to show in the Prior GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson. Specifically, independent claim 20 recites “a receiver configured to receive from the network element, a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter”; independent claim 24 recites “receive from said decision making device at least one of a channel coding and interleaving scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter”; and independent claim 25 recites “receiving from said decision making device a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter.”” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham - Apple Inc. v. Tracbeam, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 19, 2016 · IPR2015-01702 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
Instituted review in IPR2015-01703 on specified Loomis grounds for claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215; denied institution in IPR2015-01702.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude the information presented shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215, but not of claims 17, 40, or 72. Accordingly, we authorize an inter partes review to be instituted only as to claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215 of the ’231 patent. Our factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far (prior to Patent Owner’s Response). This is not a final decision as” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“and second location estimation determiners determine geographical indications “independently of one another.” Independent claim 17, similar to claim 40, requires that “wherein the second instance does not depend on a geographical location of the mobile station obtained from information indicative of a distance between the mobile station and at least one of the one or more satellites.” Petitioner’s sole contention with respect to claim 40 and the cited portions of claim 17 is: “Location determiners can be independent of each other. See, e.g., 5:7–9; Figs. 6, 9.” 1703-Pet 39, 44. The portion of Loomis cited by Petitioner states that “[t]he outdoor LD system operates independently of the radio LD signal system, and each of these systems can determine the present location of the user at selected times.” IPR-1703, Ex. 1008, 5:7–9. Thus, Petitioner has shown that the outdoor LD system of Loomis is independent of the radio LD signal system, but has not shown that the radio LD signal system is independent of the outdoor LD system. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the determiners are “independent of each other,” as required by claim 40, or that “second instance does not depend on a geographical location . . . obtained from information indicative of a distance between the mobile station and at least one of the one or more satellites,” as required by claim 17 and claim 72, which depends from claim 17.” slip op. at 15
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary other
“E. Additional Grounds We decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215 based on Bruno, in combination with Olsson and/or Geier. We also decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 40, 72, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215 based on Green and Hashimoto, and additional art, as asserted in IPR-1702. Petitioner asserts multiple grounds to each challenged claim of the ’231 patent across two separate petitions, but does not address the duplicative nature of its arguments across petitions. The Board’s rules for AIA inter partes proceedings, including those pertaining to institution, are “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b); accord 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(b) (regulations for AIA inter partes proceedings take into account “the efficient administration of the Office” and “the ability of the Office to timely complete [instituted] proceedings”). Because we institute an inter partes review of these claims based on the grounds discussed above, we exercise our discretion not to institute a review based on these grounds for reasons of administrative necessity to ensure timely completion of the instituted proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,764,231
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.