- Par-Kan Company, LLC v. Unverferth Manufacturing CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01426 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds because Petitioner did not show Morris or the Hiniker Webpage was prior art for claims 16–22, and declined institution for claim 23 in view of efficiency.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review, the patent owner bears the burden of producing evidence supporting an invention date before the reference’s effective date. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At the institution stage of an inter partes review, the statutory “reasonable likelihood” standard for institution applies to the issue whether a reference qualifies as prior art. Cf. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 12 (precedential) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“partes review, the patent owner bears the burden of producing evidence supporting an invention date before the reference’s effective date. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At the institution stage of an inter partes review, the statutory “reasonable likelihood” standard for institution applies to the issue whether a reference qualifies as prior art. Cf. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 12 (precedential) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).” slip op. at 7
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“The Board may consider the number of claims and grounds that meet the reasonable likelihood standard when deciding whether to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at” slip op. at 14
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,967,940 - Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00871 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim; it also found institution inefficient based on Ground 1 alone.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. The Alleged Unpatentability of Claims 1, 11, and 12 as Anticipated by TI,” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims of the ’608 patent. IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 39
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Here, Petitioner advances five challenges with four directed to the same three independent claims. Pet. 3. We, for the reasons discussed below, determine that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Grounds 2 through 5. We further determine that, based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds and all the challenged claims based on evidence and arguments directed only to Ground 1 would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, even if Petitioner met the requisite burden for institution as to Ground 1, we would exercise our discretion and not institute an inter partes review. E. The Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 11, and 12 by Galinski (Ground 2)” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,590,608 - Risen (Suzhou) Pharma Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Alzheon, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 13, 2023 · PGR2022-00051 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, finding no reasonable likelihood of unpatentability under §§ 101 and 112(a), and denying Grounds 4–6 under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence, we determine that the information presented fails to demonstrate it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’742 patent is unpatentable for ineligibility, lack of written description, or non-enablement. We also exercise our discretion to deny institution of post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“tramiprosate “showed a significant overall treatment effect” in “an APOE4+ sub-group,” including APOE4 homozygotes; “therapeutic interventions applied earlier in the course of AD more likely might achieve the goal of disease modification;” and that “AD would be optimally treated before significant cognitive impairment, during its pre-symptomatic or pre-clinical stages …”) (emphases removed). Accordingly, Caltagirone was previously presented to the Office and we also find that Caltagirone’s disclosures are substantially similar to, or cumulative of, other references previously considered by the Examiner.” slip op. at 49
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“D. Statutory Disclaimer After the filing of the Petition in this proceeding, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer, disclaiming claims 9 and 11–15 of the ’742 patent, effective October 7, 2022. Prelim. Resp. 12; Ex. 2001, 1. “No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e). We do not analyze the validity of claims 9 and 11–15 based on Petitioner’s challenges (e.g., Grounds 2 and 3) because these claims have been statutorily disclaimed.” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at least an M.D. or Ph.D. degree in a biomedical science or equivalent field. They would also have several years of clinical experience treating and/or conducting clinical trials of drugs for AD patients, or professional experience working in clinical trial design and execution related to drugs for AD or supervising such work. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62) (internal citation omitted). Patent Owner does not contest the characterization offered by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization as it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’742 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Mayo · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,191,742 - Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Koninklijke Philips N.VInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2022 · IPR2022-00904 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on the sole claim, finding the obviousness challenges inadequate and exercising discretion to deny the marginal anticipation challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An obviousness analysis involves two steps; first, “one must find a single reference, a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design”; second, “once this primary reference is found, other references may be used to modify it to create a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.” High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1311 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Even when secondary references are not used, however, the analysis still requires an explanation as to how and why the primary reference (something having design characteristics basically the same as the claimed design) would have been modified to arrive at a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design. See, e.g., In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1217 (involving single-reference obviousness rejection and addressing the differences between the reference and the claimed design); In re Lamb, 286 F.2d 610, 611 (CCPA 1961) (affirming the Board in a case involving a single-reference obviousness rejection where “the board observed that it is conventional to use relatively slimmer handles with slim blades and that therefore, ‘it would be expected that a designer skilled in the cutlery art would use a somewhat narrower or slimmer handle with a slim blade’”). None of the 42 obviousness challenges advanced in the Petition is supported by an adequate analysis of those two steps. See id. at 64–88. In particular, none sufficiently discusses both the differences between the been modified (alone or in view of any other reference) to have the same visual appearance as the claimed design. Id.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“An obviousness analysis involves two steps; first, “one must find a single reference, a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design”; second, “once this primary reference is found, other references may be used to modify it to create a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.” High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1311 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Even when secondary references are not used, however, the analysis still requires an explanation as to how and why the primary reference (something having design characteristics basically the same as the claimed design) would have been modified to arrive at a design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design. See, e.g., In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1217 (involving single-reference obviousness rejection and addressing the differences between the reference and the claimed design); In re Lamb, 286 F.2d 610, 611 (CCPA 1961) (affirming the Board in a case involving a single-reference obviousness rejection where “the board observed that it is conventional to use relatively slimmer handles with slim blades and that therefore, ‘it would be expected that a designer skilled in the cutlery art would use a somewhat narrower or slimmer handle with a slim blade’”). None of the 42 obviousness challenges advanced in the Petition is supported by an adequate analysis of those two steps. See id. at 64–88. In particular, none sufficiently discusses both the differences between the been modified (alone or in view of any other reference) to have the same visual appearance as the claimed design. Id.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)
“Specifically, on that crucial issue, Mr. Peyser testifies “that the multiple perspective views are informative enough to prov[id]e me an understanding of what the front and rear views of the shaver head would look like.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 60 (emphasis added). Mr. Peyser neither explains why the perspective views are sufficient to disclose the missing front and rear views of the Philips OneBlade shaver head, nor keys his testimony, with sufficient clarity, to the understanding of an ordinary observer. Ex. 1003 ¶ 60 (referring to “me,” not the ordinary observer). When Mr. Peyser does turn to the relevant inquiry, therefore, focusing on the ordinary observer, his opinions are not tethered adequately to supporting facts. Ex. 1003 ¶ 61. Stated somewhat differently, his ultimate opinion is conclusory. See id.; see also In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a petitioner’s burden of proving obviousness cannot be satisfied by employing “mere conclusory statements”).” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Specifically, on that crucial issue, Mr. Peyser testifies “that the multiple perspective views are informative enough to prov[id]e me an understanding of what the front and rear views of the shaver head would look like.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 60 (emphasis added). Mr. Peyser neither explains why the perspective views are sufficient to disclose the missing front and rear views of the Philips OneBlade shaver head, nor keys his testimony, with sufficient clarity, to the understanding of an ordinary observer. Ex. 1003 ¶ 60 (referring to “me,” not the ordinary observer). When Mr. Peyser does turn to the relevant inquiry, therefore, focusing on the ordinary observer, his opinions are not tethered adequately to supporting facts. Ex. 1003 ¶ 61. Stated somewhat differently, his ultimate opinion is conclusory. See id.; see also In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a petitioner’s burden of proving obviousness cannot be satisfied by employing “mere conclusory statements”).” slip op. at 15
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips - Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00535 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–17 under § 325(d), finding no material error in the Examiner’s priority determination and Quam essential to every asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“2. Conclusion as to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) As discussed in detail above, the Quam and Modi references only qualify as prior art that can be used against the ’890 patent if the ’890 patent is not entitled to priority. However, the Petition fails to establish that the Examiner erred in determining that the ’890 patent is entitled to its priority claim. We exercise our discretion to decline to reconsider the issue of priority which has already been addressed by the Office. Thus, the Petition cannot show that Quam and Modi are prior art that can be used against the ’890 patent. As Quam is essential to all grounds in the Petition, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to decline to institute.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s argument fails to identify any material errors by the Examiner. First, we determine that Petitioner makes no credible argument that one of skill in the art would not understand the ’554 application to teach that weather data is obtained from outside a building or that the Examiner erred in making such a determination. Petitioner acknowledges that the ’554 application teaches data comprising an outside weather condition. Id. at 12– 14. Data of an outside weather condition necessarily ultimately comes from a source outside of a building; otherwise it would not be an “outside” weather condition. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the claim does not require that the outside weather condition be transmitted from a source external to the building to the one or more processors through a network connected to the thermostat. See id. at 14. The claim states that the “outside weather condition [is] collected from a source external to the building,” but then only requires that the outside weather condition be received by the one or more processors from a network connected to the thermostat. Thus, how it is collected and how it is received is not linked or required by the claim language. Secondly, Figure 2 relied on by the Applicant shows that the entire system is set-up on a network. Thus, Figure 2 shows “a network connected to the thermostat” as required by the claim and sharing of data comes across the network, such as would occur when a server having a processor retrieves data, such as an outside weather condition, from a storage database on another server in the network. See e.g., Ex. 1005, 46; Ex. 1007, 399 at ¶¶ 81, 84, 406 at ¶ 110, 440–441.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“qualify as prior art that can be used against the ’890 patent if the ’890 patent is not entitled to priority. However, the Petition fails to establish that the Examiner erred in determining that the ’890 patent is entitled to its priority claim. We exercise our discretion to decline to reconsider the issue of priority which has already been addressed by the Office. Thus, the Petition cannot show that Quam and Modi are prior art that can be used against the ’890 patent. As Quam is essential to all grounds in the Petition, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to decline to institute. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we do not institute trial. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), no inter partes review as to any claim of U.S. Patent 10,584,890 B2 is instituted.” slip op. at 14
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,584,890 - Guardant Health, Inc. v. University Of WashingtonInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00449 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the written-description priority arguments were substantially the same as those considered by the Office, and Petitioner did not show material error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Based on this record, we find Petitioner’s arguments challenging written description support are the same or substantially the same as those considered by the examiner during the prosecution of the ’045 application. 4. Material Error Having found that the condition in the first part of the two-prong framework is satisfied, we next evaluate whether Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in its prior consideration of those arguments. Advanced Bionics, 8. Based on the current record, we determine Petitioner has not met its burden to show the examiner materially erred.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached
“Specifically, Petitioner argues that the ’785 application lacks written description support for “converting” or “attaching” tags to “circulating DNA molecules,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 20. Id. at 17–30. Patent Owner argues that we should deny institution under § 325(d) “because the Office already found that the specification provides § 112 support for tagging circulating DNA.” Prelim. Resp. 10. For the reasons explained below, we find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive.5 5 As another basis for its priority arguments, Petitioner contends that the ’785 application does not enable methods for “converting” or “attaching” tags to “circulating DNA molecules.” Pet. 30. Patent Owner asserts that “[t]he Petition gives enablement only cursory treatment.” Prelim. Resp. 36. We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner disposes of the entire enablement argument in a single seven-line paragraph. See Pet. 30. It provides no meaningful analyses of the factors set forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION Petitioner’s anticipation and obviousness grounds rest on the priority date of the challenged claims. Because we decline to reconsider Petitioner’s challenge of priority date based on lack of written description support, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and decline to institute inter partes review of the ’699 patent. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied.” slip op. at 18
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,689,699 - Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Koninklijke Philips N.VInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 24, 2022 · PGR2021-00116 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because eight grounds failed the threshold showing and the remaining lack-of-ornamentality ground was marginal, making trial inefficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Here, Petitioner advances nine challenges against the claim of the ’346 patent. Pet. 8. As discussed above, we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has not met its burden for institution under eight grounds—an on-sale bar ground, six obviousness grounds, and an indefiniteness ground. Additionally, we determine that the ninth ground— the challenge based on the alleged lack of ornamentality—is marginal, at 5 We acknowledge that SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, but see no reason to interpret differently § 324(a), the statute governing post-grant reviews. 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf best. Based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds based on evidence and arguments directed only to the one ornamentality ground would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 26
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under the Office Guidance, “if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.” Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018).6 When a petition fails to satisfy the “more likely than not” institution standard as to some challenges, the Board evaluates “all the challenges and determine[s] whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide7 64 (Nov. 2019) (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 316(b), 326(b)). Here, Petitioner advances nine challenges against the claim of the ’346 patent. Pet. 8. As discussed above, we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has not met its burden for institution under eight grounds—an on-sale bar ground, six obviousness grounds, and an indefiniteness ground. Additionally, we determine that the ninth ground— the challenge based on the alleged lack of ornamentality—is marginal, at 5 We acknowledge that SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, but see no reason to interpret differently § 324(a), the statute governing post-grant reviews. 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf best. Based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds based on evidence and arguments directed only to the one ornamentality ground would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The POSITA relating to the subject matter of the D’346 patent would possess [a] Bachelor’s degree in industrial design (or a related or equivalent field) and at least ten (10) years of research or work experience related to designing, developing, specifying, testing or analyzing multi-component consumer products (or supervising the same), with experience related to handheld consumer electronic products. Pet. 14. For purposes of this decision, we assume Petitioner is referring to the designer of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216 (CCPA 1981) (“In design cases we will consider the fictitious person identified in § 103 as ‘one of ordinary skill in the art’ to be the designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of the type presented in the application.”). Patent Owner has not filed a preliminary response and therefore, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art. Based on the limited record in front of us, we determine that Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“incorrect standard, but also lacks credibility because it is internally inconsistent with other parts of his testimony. Mr. Fletcher testifies that it is his understanding that indefiniteness is viewed through the perspective of the ordinary observer, stating the following: I understand that an ordinary observer must be able to understand the scope of an invention with reasonable certainty. If not, a design is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is my understanding that errors and inconsistencies between drawings of a design patent can be indefinite, and thus invalid, if an ordinary observer cannot discern the overall appearance of the claimed design without resorting to conjecture or speculation. Ex. 1003 ¶ 27 (emphasis added). However, his opinions regarding indefiniteness all are in terms of the “POSITA.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–58; see, e.g., id. ¶ 32 (“The D’346 Patent is indefinite due to the inclusion of conflicting views, which would prevent a POSITA from understanding the claimed design as drawn. . . . A POSITA cannot discern from the D’346 Patent figures what design is actually being claimed.”). Casting further doubt on the reliability of his testimony, Mr. Fletcher does not articulate any definition for the POSITA, which is a necessary foundation for his opinions.4 Mr. Fletcher does not refer to the perspective of the ordinary observer (or even one skilled in the art, viewing the design as would an ordinary observer) in his opinions regarding indefiniteness (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32– 58), and we decline to assume his references to the unadorned “POSITA” implicitly encompass the perspective of the ordinary observer. Thus, Mr. Fletcher’s testimony regarding indefiniteness is unhelpful because it utilizes the incorrect perspective.” slip op. at 20
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips - Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GMHBInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01222 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding substantially the same prior art or arguments had been presented to the Office and no material examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“stated in the Petition, standing alone, supports a finding of material examiner error, that argument is not developed adequately and, therefore, is unpersuasive on this record. Pet. 84–85. Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the Office erred, for example, by “misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art whose teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. Where “the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive under” Becton, Dickinson factors (e) and (f). Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. As explained above, when assessing factor (e), we consider whether Petitioner “point[s] out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art.” Supra 8. When assessing factor (f), in turn, we look for some explanation of how or why “the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments.” Id. Petitioner addresses neither of those issues adequately, if at all. Pet. 81–85; Prelim. Reply 5–10. The closest Petitioner comes to addressing those issues is by observing, “the obviousness analysis” in the Petition “is supported by expert testimony, which the Examiner did not have.” Pet. 85. That observation is undeveloped by further analysis and, therefore, is ineffective to show that the Examiner materially erred by failing to discuss the same prior art combinations advanced in the Petition, or that “additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art” previously presented to the Office. Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8 at 18.” slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“institute review. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, Preliminary Reply, Preliminary Sur-reply, and evidence of record, we exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for patent owner
“namely, whether the claimed invention is entitled to a priority date of July 22, 2010, based on certain German priority documents, thereby disqualifying Jarisch as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). See Pet. 15–18 (discussing priority to the German applications), 22–23 (asserting Jarisch as prior art under § 102(e)), 85 (arguing that the examiner did not consider Jarisch because of an error in priority); Ex. 1002–176, Part 1, 278. Pet. 15–18 (arguing that the challenged claims are not entitled to priority based on the German priority documents), 85 (arguing the examiner applied an incorrect priority date, based on the German priority documents, to antedate Jarisch); Prelim. Resp. 4–6, 16–22; Prelim. Reply 8–10; Prelim. Sur-reply 7–10. Petitioner focuses only on whether the examiner erred in assessing that argument. Pet. 85. Petitioner does not, and cannot, submit that the Office never considered the issue during patent prosecution, at least with respect to applications in the priority chain of the ’177 patent. The Office, in fact, expressly considered whether “Jarisch is not prior art” because the challenged claims are “entitled to a priority date of 22 July 2010” based on the German priority documents. Ex. 1002–176, Part 1, 278 (prosecution history for the grandparent application). The Office also expressly responded to Patent Owner’s argument on that point as follows: “This urging is not deemed persuasive.” Id. This issue represents a second, significant argument previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“B. Discretionary Denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner also argues that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in light of parallel district court litigation involving the parties and the ’177 patent. Prelim. Resp. 36–44; Prelim. Sur-reply 1–4. Because we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) and deny the Petition, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 28
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,858,177 - Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01221 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–15 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same prior art or arguments had been presented to the Office and no material Examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“the same prior art or arguments asserted in the Petition and, if so, we resolve whether Petitioner shows sufficiently that the Examiner erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“challenged claims and (2) that the claimed invention, including the feature relating to barcode location, would not have been obvious over the combination of prior art references applied by the Examiner, including Jarisch. Id. at 393–404. Where both alternatives were before the Examiner, it is not at all clear that “the Examiner applied an incorrect priority date” or otherwise accepted that Jarisch does not qualify as prior art. Pet. 85.” slip op. at 23
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,858,176 - Intel Corporation v. Acqis LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2021-01114 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 17–19, 26–31, 35, and 36 because substantially the same arguments were previously presented and Petitioner did not show material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) based on the framework set forth in Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GMBH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In Advanced Bionics, the Board applied a two-part framework in considering whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d): “(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. at 10. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“For the foregoing reasons, the ’882 application identified the ’886 provisional with particularity and would have directly led an ordinarily skilled artisan to the document intended to be incorporated. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to show that the Examiner erred in determining that the ’882 application (Chu ’330) incorporated the ’886 provisional by reference.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelOther
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.